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Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

joeroussos.org

31–40 of 91 posts

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#31
post #19
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nah. Voting isn't some divine representation of the will of the people; it's a feedback mechanism to push the governing apparatus toward goals that are beneficial to the voting population, however halting or misguided the approach is. Some people voted for McCain over Obama; does that give them the moral, anti-war high ground, since Obama killed Libyans and McCain never had a chance to? Not at all. Nor does throwing…

Voting isn't a moral activity, this is a really, really strange proposition that I am not sure I can accept. Don't morals factor into deciding what goals are beneficial to the population? (I'm not even sure I agree with the proposition that voting pushes the governing apparatus this way in many democracies including the USA)

> (I'm not even sure I agree with the proposition that voting pushes the governing apparatus this way in many democracies including the USA)

I agree that it doesn't, but it's the intent. I don't think that's inherent to democracy, though, just the particular "democratic" structures that have evolved that we live with.

> Don't morals factor into deciding what goals are beneficial to the population?

As individuals, we can vote how we like, and everyone can and should use whatever individual morality they have to cast their vote (or not).

But the act of voting doesn't mean that the voter has delegated their moral agency (and, with that, the potential for moral blame or praise) to the people in government. If I vote for someone who decides to do something monstrous, I may be an idiot if I mis-predicted that would be a result, but I discount attempts to put the moral blame for their actions onto me.

This is a relatively unpopular view nowadays (because people see it as a way for Trump voters to distance themselves from Trump's actions), but a world that does assume voters bear moral responsibility for the actions of their government merely by the act of having voted for whoever is performing the actions is a world where it's impossible to be moral.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#32
post #5
post #2

It is interesting that he brings up the assistance of helping Saif Qaddafi getting a PHD as morally flawed. The destruction of Libya led Africas richest country - with free education and healthcare - to become a failed state with black slave markets and human trafficking. Is everyone that voted for Obama also complicit in the human misery/genocides in Libya ( or insert Somalia, Yemen, South Sudan, Chad etc.)? https:/…

Nah. Voting isn't some divine representation of the will of the people; it's a feedback mechanism to push the governing apparatus toward goals that are beneficial to the voting population, however halting or misguided the approach is. Some people voted for McCain over Obama; does that give them the moral, anti-war high ground, since Obama killed Libyans and McCain never had a chance to? Not at all. Nor does throwing…

Voting for someone you don't want in office because you don't want that person's opponent in office even more is not throwing away your vote?

Democracy is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to eat for breakfast!

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#33
post #12

Many countries still have military conscription, so sometimes enlisted soldiers do not really have a choice: you are either drafted with national pride, or drafted feeling moral guilt, or jailed for dodging and then maybe still drafted afterwards into a penal batallion. Or you break and bend the law.

Very important point. It should be considered a cornerstone of democracy to have only voluntary drafting -- just like a free press and general elections.

All nation-states (all communities really) involves two sorts of obligation: the obligations of the group to the individual (rights) and the obligations of the individual to the group (duties). Liberal democracies tend to foreground the rights of individuals rather than duties, but it is not anti-democratic or illiberal to expect citizens to do their duty as described in the constitution of that community. For some communities, a large well-trained military reserve is essential, and the draft is the best way to achieve that.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#34
> Why do people continue to work for management consulting firms?

I gather the money might have something to do with it.

As the great philosophers Devo once said: freedom of choice is what you've got, freedom from choice is what you want.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#35
post #12

Many countries still have military conscription, so sometimes enlisted soldiers do not really have a choice: you are either drafted with national pride, or drafted feeling moral guilt, or jailed for dodging and then maybe still drafted afterwards into a penal batallion. Or you break and bend the law.

Very important point. It should be considered a cornerstone of democracy to have only voluntary drafting -- just like a free press and general elections.

I would not take that as a fact. Drafting allows for a more representative selection of the population, giving more conscientious and better troops.

Drafting is democratic because it is equal. Drafting should also be an anti-war effort. Would you vote for someone who wanted to go to war, if you knew it would send your children or friends into the war?

With a draft, the choice to go to war becomes higher profile, and everyone is more invested in it.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#36
post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why? What is meant by "right thing to do"?

All human beings are equal. There is no supreme arbiter of human argument. When you need to organize with fellow human beings, you then need to give people the benefit of a doubt after achieving certain qualifications to give orders according to their own arguments and views. On the other hand, when you achieve those qualifications, others will have to give you the benefit of a doubt to give orders according to your…

So you‘re saying every order ever given by any leader should have been followed, just because they were more „qualified“ than the people following.

I disagree. What if a leader got his qualifications but has since gone slightly insane? Qualification alone isn‘t reason enough to blindly follow orders.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#37
post #18

> So here is an important moral question: is knowledge of moral risk (in the sense of a risk that I will do something bad, unknowingly) a reason to hold me morally culpable? I would say yes. Let’s make an analogy to physical risk: suppose you are a shift manager who is aware of general and persistent safety issues at a factory (by hearing about mutilations and deaths), even if you don’t know any of the specifics. For…

> Engaging with the question itself is assuming responsibility. This is a dangerous sentiment as it incentivizes people to not engage with such questions in order to avoid the accompanying duty, which cannot be known before considering the question.

One could read your reply as saying that people want to dodge responsibility, though. It's a double edged sword.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#38
This is a great blogpost on moral thinking. I think it's in line with the work of the german-american political theorist and philosopher Hannah Arendt who did reflect on these very questions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannah_Arendt

Arendt was of german and jewish decent and experienced first hand the rise of totalitarianism and persecution during the 1930s. She was able to escape with her family to the United States in 1940. Post-war she became a writer and a visiting scholar teaching at many academic institutions. She developed her political theory during the 1950's publishing various seminal works.

Notably, in 1961-1963, she attended the Adolf Eichmann trial in Jerusalem on behalf of The New Yorker, eager to test her ideas developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism. She was especially interested in Adolf Eichmann as an individual and how he ended up becoming the architect of the Holocaust.

> On this, Arendt would later state "Going along with the rest and wanting to say 'we' were quite enough to make the greatest of all crimes possible". What Arendt observed during the trial was a bourgeois sales clerk who found a meaningful role for himself and a sense of importance in the Nazi movement. She noted that his addiction to clichés and use of bureaucratic morality clouded his ability to question his actions, "to think". This led her to set out her most famous, and most debated, dictum: "the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us – the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil". By stating that Eichmann did not think, she did not imply lack of conscious awareness of his actions, but by "thinking" she implied reflective rationality, that was lacking. Arendt, who eschewed identity politics, was also critical of the way Israel depicted Eichmann's crimes as crimes against a nation state, rather than against humanity itself.

> Arendt was also critical of the way that some Jewish leaders associated with the Jewish Councils (Judenräte), notably M. C. Rumkowski, acted during the Holocaust, in cooperating with Eichmann "almost without exception" in the destruction of their own people. She had expressed concerns on this point, prior to the trial. She described this as a moral catastrophe. While her argument was not to allocate blame, rather she mourned what she considered a moral failure of compromising the imperative that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. She describes the cooperation of the Jewish leaders in terms of a disintegration of Jewish morality: "This role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter in the whole dark story". Widely misunderstood, this caused an even greater controversy and particularly animosity toward her in the Jewish community and in Israel. For Arendt, the Eichmann trial marked a turning point in her thinking in the final decade of her life, becoming increasingly preoccupied with moral philosophy.

It's an interesting observation since Arendt points out that the moral failure of compromising on an imperative is a far more nuanced story then first meets the eye. The lack of reflective rationality can happen regardless of time and place.

The failure to reflect on one's own actions came to the foreground in another highly covered court case: the My Lai massacre (1968) in which a company of U.S. Army soldiers ended up killing 347 south-vietnamese unarmed villagers.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Lai_Massacre

The court case ended up a scandal as officers, NCO's as well as privates where accused and prosecuted. Most notably, the failure of "command responsibility" and the fact that many involved resorted to "I was only following orders" stirred outrage.

I think it's interesting here to look at those cases with the hindsight of history and see how those dynamics and the questions raised about the morality of our actions still apply today. Even more so, I think this is the exact reason why education systems should teach about these cases and show what happens if you eschew your responsibility of reflecting on your own actions in order to own up to a shared imperative.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#39
post #26

> There are (plainly) bad consulting projects, and so it is true that there is a risk of doing bad work as a consultant. This bit of the argument contains the major flaw - it can be applied to literally any occupation. The most theoretically moral institution we have is the church. Ostensibly dedicated to doing nothing but espousing and propagating good in the world. Now look at what that means in practice for some o…

You're trying to exploit a slippery slope. There are many churches which have had no such scandals, and are not associated with any who have.

Just because Monitor (dozens of offices, thousands of employees) worked for Gaddafi doesn't mean "John & Jane's IT Setup Helpers" around the corner must also be an inherently immoral institution.

Re: Deciding to do morally risky work (2019)

#40

> Gadaffi... South Africa... What about the US federal government? Banks and investment firms? The oil companies? Blackwater, Haliburton, Bechtel and the like? Mineral extraction companies? Or perhaps - Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft et al, who spy on you all the time? > There are obvious and important differences between war and management consulting. The first straightforwardly involves killing people, the lat…

They’re also bad, and the author never said otherwise. Why engage in whataboutism here?

Because it may change the default: Perhaps you're more likely to end up doing immoral than moral work / working for an immoral, violent, indirectly-homicidal organization. The esoteric clients like Gadaffi rare.
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