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New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

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Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#81

The most challenging part of this series is not in the material itself. These insights are learnings through hard experience and scale from Google are invaluable. No, the hard thing for everyone is to recognize is that most companies are not Google and don't have Google's problems, resources, or time to follow these practices. Definitely read the material, I will thoroughly, but don't apply this blindly. Solve YOUR p…

People say this a lot as an excuse to keep the status quo, but often times the problems do overlap and the solutions are generally good everywhere.

You're absolutely right. I have heard that argument first had used as a means to shut down an initiative as well. These philosophies require massive judgement calls from engineering leadership with payback periods tracked in years, not quarterly OKRs.

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#82
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you name a more secure OS or browser?

Unisys ClearPath MCP or Green Hills INTEGRITY OS, for example.

So no general purpose OS or browser then?

It's also not obvious to me that clearpath is more secure than android, mostly because I can't actually find any information about what it is, there's only marketing jargon :/

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#84
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unisys ClearPath MCP or Green Hills INTEGRITY OS, for example.

So no general purpose OS or browser then? It's also not obvious to me that clearpath is more secure than android, mostly because I can't actually find any information about what it is, there's only marketing jargon :/

It is quite obvious from how many CVE entries you can find for each one.

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#85
post #57

I scanned the introduction, but failed to see any concrete information on the expertise of the authors on security. Can anybody speak to the expertise of the authors on security? In particular, I am interested in specific projects or initiatives they directed or lead. The state of systems before and after these projects. If there were any long-term regressions after their involvement. To be even more concrete if poss…

> "Would the system prevent compromise by a red team with a $1 Billion... budget" Are there any such systems deployed in the world today?

That is the point of the question. If you believe that is not possible, then we should not use software in systems where an entity can derive more than $1 Billion in value from compromising the software otherwise it makes economic sense for them to compromise it. If the authors believe it is possible, I would like concrete information that is sufficient to counter the belief that it is not possible (I am pretty sure most people in the technical community believe it is not possible).

As an example of consequences of a belief that it is not possible:

The JP Morgan hack resulted in the loss of 76 million records. That means if each person's record is worth more than $14 it would be profitable for someone to hack JP Morgan if they had a system that could not prevent compromise by a red team with a $1 Billion budget. Given your question, I will assume you do not believe that such a system does not exist, in fact, you probably believe there is no system that is even in the general vicinity of that number (apologies if I am misinterpreting your statement). If we assume a $1 Million budget is all it takes, then each record would only need to be worth 1.4 cents for it to be profitable to hack JP Morgan. How do you think people would feel about that? Do you think it would be problematic for JP Morgan if they announced they protect every account with $14 of security, let alone 1.4 cents?

Now the JP Morgan hack is a little old, it happened in 2014, so let's use something newer. In 2019 Wells Fargo lost over 24 million records. At $1 Billion that is $40 per record. At $1 Million 4 cents. Do you think it would be problematic for Wells Fargo if they announced they protect every account with $40 of security, let alone 4 cents?

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#86
post #70
post #57

I scanned the introduction, but failed to see any concrete information on the expertise of the authors on security. Can anybody speak to the expertise of the authors on security? In particular, I am interested in specific projects or initiatives they directed or lead. The state of systems before and after these projects. If there were any long-term regressions after their involvement. To be even more concrete if poss…

You seem much more interested in the authors than in the book.

Indeed I am. Would you trust the contents of a book on a technical topic if the authors are not, in fact, subject matter experts? Would you read a book on cancer treatment by a doctor of theology with no medical training? To use a less egregious example, a neurologist with no training in oncology or experience with brain cancer? Knowing the expertise of the authors is very important, especially if you are not a subject matter expert in your own right who can directly evaluate the claims made and methodologies used. This is why such books usually have a little blurb which explains why the author is a subject matter expert.

I go one step further in asking for third or first-party confirmation of expertise in this interactive forum because self-made blurbs are easy to manufacture, and credentials and experience can be gamed. It is much harder to distort the opinions colleagues or people who use their systems every day after they have left. I ask the more detailed questions because I find that answers to general questions are usually pretty wishy-washy and thus not particularly useful. The detailed questions ask for more detailed metrics and observations that make it easier to sift out useful information. For instance, I ask what projects they lead or directed since I want to filter out cases where they may have been on important projects, but in an unimportant role or possibly even being carried by the rest of their team.

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#87
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So no general purpose OS or browser then? It's also not obvious to me that clearpath is more secure than android, mostly because I can't actually find any information about what it is, there's only marketing jargon :/

It is quite obvious from how many CVE entries you can find for each one.

That doesn't obviously follow.

CVE entries are both a function of security and interest. My github projects don't have any CVEs, not because they aren't woefully insecure to anyone who bothers to investigate deeply, but because no one cares.

"Android" is installed on more devices than any other OS in the world. So it stands to reason that there would be more interest in finding exploits in android than in OS's that are often airgapped or locked away behind firewalls.

Re: New Google SRE book: Building Secure and Reliable Systems

#88

The most challenging part of this series is not in the material itself. These insights are learnings through hard experience and scale from Google are invaluable. No, the hard thing for everyone is to recognize is that most companies are not Google and don't have Google's problems, resources, or time to follow these practices. Definitely read the material, I will thoroughly, but don't apply this blindly. Solve YOUR p…

I find it interesting that you think this might be a problem for some people. My experience would perhaps, if pushed to, lead me to conclude the opposite.
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