The problem with Zoom isn't, that it doesn't have end-to-end encryption. If you consider the problem, it is extremely difficult to solve, as in contrast to a 1:1 video call, the server somehow has to to multiplex the streams and thus at least some access to them. With a trustworthy provider, this isn't a big issue. A trustworthy provider will have a clear policy which ensures that only the multiplexer has access to the unencrypted data. After all, you are running a proprietary client from that provider, and each client of course has access to all unencrypted data.
The problem is, that the actions of Zoom doesn't make them look like a trustworthy provider. They lied about the end-to-end encryption. What they should have done instead is to be transparent on how unencrypted data is used on their servers and what their protocols are to prevent unauthorized access to that data. Which is especially important in a business context, because the business users themselves have confidentiality agreements, they need to guarantee and using an external provider for confidential data required that provider passing the neccessary scrutiny.
And of course, the huge pile of security issues coming up with their client, the web server, the mac installer, the script host, give any reason to believe that they either don't know what they are doing or completely reckless at least. And the term "reckless" doesn't fit in a conversation about security :).