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DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

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Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#61
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

UK and Canada are parliamentary systems so most ballots are one page. Most of those are just a single question with one selection permitted. In the US the ballot I get in my polling place depends on where I live and sometimes what party I am registered with. My ballot will likely be different than the next person in line. That ballot is many pages with numerous questions per page. And for about half of the questions…

What you describe is not that different from Australia's preferential system afaict, aside from people at one district potentially having different ballots. Australian ballots are not always simple, and you vote for your local representative so each district has a different one. Often you will have multiple ballots to complete, and some have the choice between above or below the line voting (where above you select so…

Australia is always a curveball! I've wondered how a precinct counts those ballots, especially if some people vote below the line. I hope someone with experience comments here.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#62
post #47

when viewed from a sludge-money lens (a la the F35) electronic voting and election security seem largely working as intended: - we know paper works (Canada/UK) so there must be an ulterior motive for pushing on tech solution so hard - money gets sent to various entities under the guise of tech, security, freedom, etc. (contracts for voting machines, contracts for software, etc.). this basically gives some limited air…

UK and Canada are parliamentary systems so most ballots are one page. Most of those are just a single question with one selection permitted. In the US the ballot I get in my polling place depends on where I live and sometimes what party I am registered with. My ballot will likely be different than the next person in line. That ballot is many pages with numerous questions per page. And for about half of the questions…

This situation can be remarkably complex. In my county of around half a million people there can be over five hundred distinct ballot types in some elections. The underlying reason for this is election consolidation, in which elections held by different authorities using different voting districts are all combined into one ballot for the voter's convenience.

For example, in many areas the school district legally conducts separate elections based on separate precincts. But, no one is excited to take a separate trip to the polling place just for the school district election, which results in very low turnout. To improve turnout and save money, the school district questions are combined onto the same ballot as the municipal election - but two voters in the same municipal election precinct may be in different school district precincts. Imagine how this challenge multiplies as you add soil and water conservation districts, judicial districts, economic development areas, county issues, etc.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#63
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The discussion over paper vs. electronic ballots tends to miss many of the largest issues in election security. DHS is correct in pointing out that we need a focus on the larger landscape of election support infrastructure. Notably, electronic pollbooks are a very important part of the voting system which cannot readily be replaced with a non-digital solution. Simply switching to paper ballots reduces the problem, bu…

An audit recount is at least possible with paper ballots. If digital records are modified, how are you going to audit them?

With machines that do both, like this:

http://rbrua3v80lj2rulsf7iqfnpmf.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-...

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#64

Simple question, are electronic voting systems required to be FedRamp certified? If not why not?

Elections are managed by the states and, in some states, almost all aspects are deferred to the counties. There is currently no standardized framework for elections system security on a national level and it is difficult to implement one for political reasons. DHS has moved in the direction of producing guidance, but it is my hope that a mandatory framework can be introduced.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#65
post #47

when viewed from a sludge-money lens (a la the F35) electronic voting and election security seem largely working as intended: - we know paper works (Canada/UK) so there must be an ulterior motive for pushing on tech solution so hard - money gets sent to various entities under the guise of tech, security, freedom, etc. (contracts for voting machines, contracts for software, etc.). this basically gives some limited air…

UK and Canada are parliamentary systems so most ballots are one page. Most of those are just a single question with one selection permitted. In the US the ballot I get in my polling place depends on where I live and sometimes what party I am registered with. My ballot will likely be different than the next person in line. That ballot is many pages with numerous questions per page. And for about half of the questions…

In Canada voters at the same polling place get the same ballot only because there are enough polling places that local district seats will always be larger than polling catchment areas.

Last election I walked into my polling place six minutes before my bus was supposed to arrive right out front and caught my bus.

Skimping on costs when it comes to elections is pretty silly - it makes sense to make sure there isn't rampant corruption but people have enough reasons not to vote that adding inconvenience to the list can be quite discouraging.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#66
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>>How is it not efficient? It is not efficient for the people voting. More than 1 election I simply skipped because I did not want to find my polling place, stand in line, and then vote I want a Polling Place free Voting system

Move to Washington and mail it in. But to be honest, you have an obligation as a citizen to do whatever you have to do to vote and I’m not too sympathetic to people without a disability saying it’s too hard to get out of the house when I see other people standing outside in the cold and rain for hours to do it. Take some responsibility for your country.

>>>>you have an obligation as a citizen to do whatever you have to do to vote

1000000000000% disagree, I have zero obligations to society, if I did I would not be a free person, I would be a servant

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Voter ID laws aren't about protecting elections, they're about disenfranchising voters: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/some-republicans-ackno... https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/21/trump-advise...

If this was the case, then why do 17 other countries require ID when voting? Are they too "disenfranchising voters"?? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_Identification_laws#Norw... I would make a note that a majority of the Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway, and Iceland ALL require some form of ID when voting.

They also have national IDs, which simplifies the situation.

Some of them even have compulsory national IDs, obviously that changes the dynamics of the situation entirely.

And they also don't have the 24th amendment.

I would bet the number of voters who are disenfranchised there is > 0

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#68

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYVLH1tLIDY They should start with Rand Waltzman's presentation at DEFCON (link above). In sum, USGOV is still totally unprepared for information warfare ops ongoing and intended. About 1/2 through this video the content is the best I've ever watched from DEFCON, period.

That is a great video. Thank you for pointing me to it.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Racist? Where the hell does that come from? Why would any particular race not be able to produce legal documentation confirming their identity at a poll booth?

Voter ID laws disproportionately disenfranchise minority communities. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-we-know-about-vote... 11% of U.S. citizens – or more than 21 million Americans – do not have government-issued photo identification. These voters are disproportionately low-income, racial and ethnic minorities, the elderly, and people with disabilities. Such voters more frequently have difficulty obtaining…

I grew up in a poor, predominantly black inner-city. I and everyone I knew had an ID card, if not just to buy alcohol.

People who don't participate in our society enough to acquire basic documentation required for not living on the streets are overwhelmingly not interested in voting (this accounts for a sliver of the roughly half of the nation that didn't bother to participate in the last presidential election.) If you have the means and will to visit a poll booth, you have it to get an ID, unless there are legitimately disqualifying circumstances. If you believe this isn't the case, you should be lobbying explicitly to get these people ID's more easily, not to remove the requirement at the poll booth. This documentation is already required for virtually everything else; these (hypothetical) people need your help.

Re: DHS plans urgently needed to address identified challenges before 2020 elections [pdf]

#70
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

An audit recount is at least possible with paper ballots. If digital records are modified, how are you going to audit them?

Digital records kept by precinct tabulators are audited using the paper ballots. These machines read and retain the voter's original ballot for later inspection. if the ballot is machine-marked (done for voters with certain sensory/mobility limitations) the paper copy is produced for the voter's (or assister's) inspection prior to tabulation. This is perhaps the #1 misunderstanding of electronic voting technology tha…

Wow...thank you for all the great info and insight, and for the work you've put in yourself on our elections.
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