Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets • Hacker News Board

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#11

Post by tzumby » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 3:00 AM UTC

wbl wrote: post #10

tzumby wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…

At this years RWC someone fuzzed the software on the HSM. Keys came out.

Thanks for sharing this, I had to google RWC. For others that don’t know the acronym: https://rwc.iacr.org

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#12

Post by nnx » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 3:05 AM UTC

Nothing in this flaw is a surprise considering Trezor does not even use a secure element (unlike Ledger).

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#13

Post by numpad0 » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 3:17 AM UTC

dfox wrote: post #9

tzumby wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…

True HSM with active self destruct needs to be constantly powered. On the other hand for many if not most applications, typical secure smart-card is is completely sufficient (and in fact typical POS card terminal stores most of it's long term secrets on SIM-like smart-card).

Somewhere in my junk parts bin is such a PCI card I bought out of a junk bin at Akihabara, that has Mitsubishi logo clearly printed with archaic construction overall, apparently marketed by NEC somehow, which product brochure page disappeared after I mentioned it on Twitter,

Had a pair of blown AA battery for self destruction. I never bothered to get it working, but IIRC it was supposed to detect removal from PCI slot(the proper) to self erase. So it’s not rare or difficult.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#14

Post by evan_ » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 3:35 AM UTC

quelltext wrote: post #7

tmlee wrote: post #2

No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it

Doesn't the iPhone claim to be able to protect from physical access?

That’s what the US Department of Justice claims, at least.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#15

Post by thinkloop » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 3:59 AM UTC

Some lucky people will be able to restore lost crypto.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#16

Post by wmf » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 4:35 AM UTC

lostlogin wrote: post #4

6gvONxR4sf7o wrote: post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With the right systems in place, you can be protected from physical compromise. For example, if my credit card is stolen, I call visa and I'm fine.

And who do you think foots the bill? You might not pay it in one lump sum, but I’m pretty sure you still pay it.

People who lost 100% of their coins are probably wishing they had the option to buy some kind of insurance. But no, be your own bank. (Wait, don't real banks also have insurance?)

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#17

Post by pat2man » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 6:03 AM UTC

nnx wrote: post #12

Nothing in this flaw is a surprise considering Trezor does not even use a secure element (unlike Ledger).

It’s surprising considering how cheap SIM card chips are. It’s not hard to do secure elements these days, at least at scale.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#18

Post by Lucadg » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 6:11 AM UTC

tzumby wrote: post #6

tmlee wrote: post #2

No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it

Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…

Bigger may be better.

After all these devices are hard to use in part because if the tiny screens.

Since most of the time you don't carry them in your pocket it does not appear to be a problem if they are bigger.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#19

Post by GhettoMaestro » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 6:14 AM UTC

wbl wrote: post #10

tzumby wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…

At this years RWC someone fuzzed the software on the HSM. Keys came out.

> the HSM

Which HSM? There are multiple vendors.

Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets

#20

Post by 6nf » Sat, Feb 01, 2020, 6:23 AM UTC

quelltext wrote: post #7

tmlee wrote: post #2

No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it

Doesn't the iPhone claim to be able to protect from physical access?

Let's agree that protection against physical access is extremely difficult.