Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
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Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
1–10 of 52 posts
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#2No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#3No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
With the right systems in place, you can be protected from physical compromise. For example, if my credit card is stolen, I call visa and I'm fine.
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#4No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
With the right systems in place, you can be protected from physical compromise. For example, if my credit card is stolen, I call visa and I'm fine.
And who do you think foots the bill? You might not pay it in one lump sum, but I’m pretty sure you still pay it.
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#5Trezor is designed to protect against remote/logical attacks (including a compromised host). It isn't really hardware protected in any meaningful way against local access. This lets users inspect/validate their own hardware better, though.
The issue is most users (reasonably, IMO) assume physical protection for their hardware wallets, at least against someone getting temporary access and without insane levels of resources. That is fairly safe using a Ledger today (barring an undisclosed vuln); that's why I think the Ledgers are somewhat better.
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#6No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requirements for that though, it might make the device significantly bigger.
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#7No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Doesn't the iPhone claim to be able to protect from physical access?
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#8No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…
Size requirements shouldn't be intensive, assuming it's a single-shot system. All you need is 128-256 bits worth of secret key data that is physically-destructible (e.g. with a high voltage spike). You then encrypt/decrypt the rest of the secrets stored in the device with this destructible key.
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#9No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…
True HSM with active self destruct needs to be constantly powered. On the other hand for many if not most applications, typical secure smart-card is is completely sufficient (and in fact typical POS card terminal stores most of it's long term secrets on SIM-like smart-card).
Re: Critical flaw in Trezor hardware wallets
#10No hardware can protect itself from absolute physical compromise; perhaps a self-fuse burner when somebody tries to open it
Banks store private keys for their ATMs in hardware security modules (HSM) and there are lots of crypto exchanges that started doing that. One of the features is private keys self destruct when tampering is detected. If you have a backup you’ll be able to recover the private key. While I agree that Trezor wasn’t designed with this in mind, I think it’s a good idea to include this feature. Not sure about the size requ…
At this years RWC someone fuzzed the software on the HSM. Keys came out.