Just a note that priming has been a victim of the replication crisis.
The Dark Side of Expertise
41–50 of 51 posts
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#42This was pretty ramble-y and pulled in some pretty unrelated examples. * We never get a clear answer for why the Civic Center Engineers got the inputs wrong, so we can't conclude that it was because of their expertise. * With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading them: panic. If anything, the solution to the problem shows that expertise was the sol…
> We never get a clear answer for why the Civic Center Engineers got the inputs wrong, so we can't conclude that it was because of their expertise.
I think that's because you're focusing on a component, and not the whole. The construction project had a problem, and part of that is because they trusted the expertise of designers. Various people in charge of aspects of the project should have pushed back harder, noting that the expertise they were relying on was obviously false, since it didn't match reality. The problem is not the computers, but the designers, and the expertise in question is that of "trust your designers". The story and moral plays out the same whether it's a computer, or some bad math, or even purposeful sabotage.
Funnily enough, it might be possible to attribute your focus on the engineers as an aspect of priming itself. Even if you aren't an engineer or in a related discipline, this forum is very heavily frequented by such people and often focuses on such issues. As such, focusing so much on the engineers themselves and what they did or didn't do to the point if missing the whole can be expected. Well, it can be expected if you accept that priming plays a role, at least to some degree.
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#43This was pretty ramble-y and pulled in some pretty unrelated examples. * We never get a clear answer for why the Civic Center Engineers got the inputs wrong, so we can't conclude that it was because of their expertise. * With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading them: panic. If anything, the solution to the problem shows that expertise was the sol…
You are entirely missing the point in your first two points:
* The issue here isn't that the inputs were wrong, it's that the experts could not (or would not, if you don't want to be generous) accept that the structure was under-strength in spite of multiple reports; the believed their calculations rather than their lying eyes.
* There is no particular evidence that the firefighters panicked. Whether or not they did, though, they did what their training led them to believe was their only choice: keep their equipment and try to reach the top of the ridge. The foreman was the only one to realize either that the training wasn't going to work or that they had another option.
Do you have a great deal of expertise in this area?
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
They ignored the actual fact that it was sagging more than predicted and insisted the calculations were right. That might be ok, but someone allowed the project to proceed without explaining the contradiction. Real observations were dismissed in favor of believing in the expertise.
Hm. You're saying that inexpert decision-makers were misled by experts? That is true, but I'd argue that the article is making a different claim: the article is claiming that experts are misled by their own expertise.
The experts were led to disregard reports of sagging by their trust in the computer model.
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#45> They then told the students to go up the hallway to a different room where there would be another test. What the students didn't know was that the test was actually in the hallway; the time it took each participant to walk down the hall was measured. It turned out that the students who had been exposed to the "elderly words" walked more slowly down the hall. Attendees might be inclined to call that "absolute crap",…
I postulate that if this is a true cause/effect it depends on words having a strong association to the intended concept, and that concept being significant to the individuals.
Further, I would postulate that the selection of study participants at that time, and the construction of the test, were very well matched. Today there is probably greater cultural diversity and comingling, and may also there may be less unconscious association of those words to slow.
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#46Here's a link to the actual keynote if you want to watch it: https://youtu.be/Yv4tI6939q0
Thanks for this link
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#47> "the Florida effect"
This 1996 study by John Bargh, using only 30 psychology undergraduates as test subjects, is now more known as the prime example of bad psychology, done with too small sample size and dubious statistical methods. This study is at the very center of the replication crisis in psychology. That the conference presenter has not followed at all what has happened in psychology in the past 8 years, erodes the scientific credibility of the presentation.
https://replicationindex.com/2017/02/02/reconstruction-of-a-...
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2012/03...
https://replicationindex.com/2019/03/17/raudit-bargh/
https://www.nature.com/news/disputed-results-a-fresh-blow-fo...
https://www.nature.com/news/nobel-laureate-challenges-psycho...
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#48There's an interesting analysis of the Hartford collapse case here: https://web.archive.org/web/20080108024915/http://www.eng.ua...
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#49OT, but not much, if anyone is interested in how/why buildings/structures stand up or collapse, there are a couple great books by Mario Salvadori:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mario_Salvadori
Why Buildings Stand Up (1980) and Why Buildings Fall Down (1992)
that are elementary enough to be read by anyone, without being at all superficial.
Re: The Dark Side of Expertise
#50A really entertaining read, even if I am left wondering how much of the “Florida effect” stands up in the post reproducibility crisis times. And would have liked more details on the calculation failures. I would guess that there was perhaps less of a paycological bias and not a case of “you spend a large amount on a computer, if the calculations are wrong you are fired” type situation.
I’ve seen a lot of projects like this where pressure is built on project leads for the chosen solution to be correct and not just for the goal to be reached, which means you end up not looking at obvious alternatives because even if that solves the project “your solution failed”.
Does anyone know of similar stories or books that deal with engineering failures from a human psychology view?
Personally I’m reminded of the coverage of the Challanger disaster in “Ehat do you care what other people think” by Richard Feynman, which I can highly recommend reading if you haven’t already.