The Computational Theory of Mind (2015) • Hacker News Board

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#61

Post by naasking » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 5:36 PM UTC

tcgv wrote: post #36

taneq wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090

"True random number" is a set of statistical tests, which means they can be deterministically fooled. Humans have a lot more inputs than your typical computer, so it's not surprising that their outputs can seem random.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#62

Post by naasking » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 5:37 PM UTC

yters wrote: post #47

Zigurd wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

What is an illusion without consciousness?

> What is an illusion without consciousness?

A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion.

So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#63

Post by michaelmrose » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:14 PM UTC

0xBA5ED wrote: post #14

michaelmrose wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

If by computer, you mean a binary computer using transistors, there's no reason to think you can make it do anything a brain can do. Alternatively, if computer means any hypothetical hardware, it may very well end up looking like a brain, in which case you might just call it an artificial brain rather than a computer.

Why couldn't a traditional computer fast enough simulate the brain you imagine?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#64

Post by michaelmrose » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:17 PM UTC

antonvs wrote: post #20

michaelmrose wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

It depends what you my mean by "do anything". If that includes "have a conscious experience," then you're the one who's going to have to descend into hand wavy nonsense to explain how that's possible. Unless you've solved the hard problem of consciousness.

It's not clear that a computer storing input data and then modifying future computations based on that data and storing the results of that computation and using it to modify further computations is at all remarkable to start with.

If there is nothing inherently remarkable beyond scale then no hand waving needed.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#65

Post by antonvs » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:22 PM UTC

Zigurd wrote: post #42

TuringTest wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners ma…

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

That doesn't really work. What is "yourself" in that statement, other than a conscious entity?

How would you write a computer program that "tells that story to itself," such that it actually has an experience of the world, as opposed to just being a machine executing a program without any conscious awareness?

Edit: also, whether we're in charge of our thoughts is a separate question from whether we possess consciousness. Even if we're not in charge of our thoughts, we still have a conscious experience of them.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#66

Post by bolzano » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:22 PM UTC

omarhaneef wrote: post #57

bolzano wrote: post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He is fantastic, I've only been able to find a couple of videos of him on Youtube. If you have any links at all, I would really really appreciate the share, even just plain old audio recordings would be awesome. Thanks!

I also rely on youtube. If I knew then what I knew now I would have been more diligent in recording what he said.

Yeah, a great loss to Cog Sci, I love his humour too

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#67

Post by michaelmrose » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:23 PM UTC

disem_brane wrote: post #16

michaelmrose wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the idea that the brain can do anything a sufficiently fast computer can't deserves any credence. Those who argue this point always descend into hand wavy nonsense.

And how about you make the case for silicon becoming self aware or having subjective experience without descending into hand wavy nonsense? Primates, which are very similar to us, do not have a comparable subjective experience. We know that because we can communicate with them and they don't have that much to say. There are also brains in other animals that share a lot of similarities and are larger than ours. Yet no…

I'm not saying that your particular software running on your machine would produce a subjective experience. Quake at 3 billion frames per second doesn't equal self awareness.

I'm saying that your hypothetical gaming rig because it can simulate any type of classical computation including running a simulation of your brain and thus would be sufficient given a programmer.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#68

Post by tcgv » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:30 PM UTC

criddell wrote: post #52

tcgv wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090

Why are you limiting it to deterministic computers? There are electronic circuits that can provide genuine random numbers.

From the linked article's context:

> 3. The classical computational theory of mind

> The label classical computational theory of mind (which we will abbreviate as CCTM) is now fairly standard.

> Turing computation is deterministic: total computational state determines subsequent computational state.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#69

Post by [deleted] » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:32 PM UTC

yters wrote: post #48

tcgv wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090

Turing machines don't have to be deterministic. You can have non deterministic Turing machines, and probabilistic Turing machines.

[deleted]

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#70

Post by antonvs » Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 6:57 PM UTC

michaelmrose wrote: post #64

antonvs wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It depends what you my mean by "do anything". If that includes "have a conscious experience," then you're the one who's going to have to descend into hand wavy nonsense to explain how that's possible. Unless you've solved the hard problem of consciousness.

It's not clear that a computer storing input data and then modifying future computations based on that data and storing the results of that computation and using it to modify further computations is at all remarkable to start with. If there is nothing inherently remarkable beyond scale then no hand waving needed.

The description you doesn't addresses consciousness.

The remarkable aspect is that of conscious awareness. You (presumably) have an experience of the world, in a way that a computer does not. Paraphrasing Nagel, "there is something it is like to be you."

Most people don't think that this is true of an executing computer program, for example - it executes whatever its instructions are, and even a self-modifying program, as you described, doesn't change that.

There is no known way to write a computer program which has conscious awareness, and no plausible reason that scale should affect this. If you scale up a computer program, or a computational neural network, there's no reason to believe that it wouldn't just be a very big machine, blindly executing its instructions with no conscious awareness.

The proposed explanations that do exist are all nothing but handwaving at this point, hence my original comment. The burden of explanation here is on those who claim that the brain is nothing but a computing device, since our current models of computing devices can't explain consciousness.