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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

plato.stanford.edu

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#41

Post by omarhaneef »

mjburgess wrote: post #37
omarhaneef wrote: post #30

In a different lifetime I got to take a few classes with Jerry Fodor, and although this publication references him extensively, one of his most succinct arguments for the computational theory of mind is only alluded to: the lack of alternatives. Fodor was a snappy writer and talker. I urge you to view his videos if they can be found on YouTube. Unfortunately he passed away recently. The argument goes something like t…

The problem with that argument is that it "the computational theory of mind" isn't a "theory of mind" -- so I don't think we have any. A TOM needs to explain "mental life", at best the CTOM provides a model of a very narrow sort of cognition (inference over propositions). There's a gigantic (and in my view, deeply implausible) leap from "hey this kinda works for modelling inference in animals" to "hey this is how The…

You’re right in the sense that the CCTM (classical computational theory of mind) isn’t a complete theory. There are lot of problems. Studying it is essentially memorizing all the problems and the problems with various proposed solutions.

As a theory, not only is it incomplete, it is only remotely plausible. He concedes that up front!

It’s like the old joke about capitalism - worst but for any other.

I would expect a response to give a better alternative, not to lay out admittedly deep problems with it.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#42

Post by Zigurd »

TuringTest wrote: post #26
taneq wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The definition of "a conscious experience" is so vague and circular that I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in human…

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners ma…

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#43

Post by YeGoblynQueenne »

mLuby wrote: post #8
DanielleMolloy wrote: post #5

Please let me apologize for the lack of understanding, maybe someone can add to this: If biological intelligence works like a Turing machine, is it even possible to know what or how certain brain areas compute without simulating them bottom-up? Question is influenced by this idea originally from the 80s: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_irreducibility

>biological intelligence works like a Turing machine We know it doesn't. There's no metaphorical linear tape in the brain; it's a network of neurons. But a Turing machine can simulate a network of neurons (see Machine Learning), just as a brain can model a Turing machine (see Programmer). There are currently things a brain can think about that a Turing machine cannot, but the question is whether that will continue to…

Machine learning doesn't "simulate a network of neurons". I think by "machine learning" you mean "artificial neural networks" but (artificial) neural networks also do not simulate a network of (I assume you mean:) biological neurons.

The article above has a good summary of the problems with the idea of neural networks as simulations of biological neural networks:

These appeals to biology are problematic, because most connectionist networks are actually not so biologically plausible (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2002: 341–343; Bermúdez 2010: 237–239; Clark 2014: 87–89; Harnish 2002: 359–362). For example, real neurons are much more heterogeneous than the interchangeable nodes that figure in typical connectionist networks. It is far from clear how, if at all, properties of the interchangeable nodes map onto properties of real neurons. Especially problematic from a biological perspective is the backpropagation algorithm. The algorithm requires that weights between nodes can vary between excitatory and inhibitory, yet actual synapses cannot so vary (Crick and Asanuma 1986). Moreover, the algorithm assumes target outputs supplied exogenously by modelers who know the desired answer. In that sense, learning is supervised. Very little learning in actual biological systems involves anything resembling supervised training.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/#ArgFo...

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#44

Post by mjburgess »

omarhaneef wrote: post #41
mjburgess wrote: post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem with that argument is that it "the computational theory of mind" isn't a "theory of mind" -- so I don't think we have any. A TOM needs to explain "mental life", at best the CTOM provides a model of a very narrow sort of cognition (inference over propositions). There's a gigantic (and in my view, deeply implausible) leap from "hey this kinda works for modelling inference in animals" to "hey this is how The…

You’re right in the sense that the CCTM (classical computational theory of mind) isn’t a complete theory. There are lot of problems. Studying it is essentially memorizing all the problems and the problems with various proposed solutions. As a theory, not only is it incomplete, it is only remotely plausible. He concedes that up front! It’s like the old joke about capitalism - worst but for any other. I would expect a…

That's an argument for a research paradigm, its not an argument for the truth.

If there are fatal problems with Theory-A, Theory-A isn't true. No matter how much Theory-A might help with some other problem you have.

The CCTM is the research paradigm for modern AI, parts of cognitive science, etc. -- and insofar as it provides a clear set of assumptions to arrive at useful models, so be it.

Alexa can turn the lights on, for sure. She may even be able to reason a little (if-then-else, etc.). I doubt she will ever know what a "light" is, or what she is doing when she turns it "on".

That would require Alexa to have lived a human life, and to have lived in a deep and complex social/physical environment. There is no "logic" which can specify such things in a limited set of propositions: the effect of the world on animals is not merely to add propositions to their "set of beliefs".

Rather, animals are first traumatised by the world: their emotions, physical memory, instincts, etc. are all unmindfully coerced by their environments. Only with a peculiar sort of frontal lobe are those things expressible as propositions -- but they arent propositions, as evidenced by the infinite number of them required to capture the effects.

What we need before understanding inference, is to understand on what inference operates: the mental life created by the effect of the world on the whole mind of the animal.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#45

Post by YeGoblynQueenne »

joe_the_user wrote: post #2

It seems like basic materialism to claim that the brain could be simulated by a large enough Turing machine. But that claim would not necessarily imply that a Turing machine is a useful model for brain. A Turing machine isn't necessarily even used as the working model of a computer though it conceivably could be. Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means. It seems li…

>> Edit: My comment is basically asking what saying "the mind is a Turing machine" really means.

The article clarifies that "the mind is a Turing machine" is not what the Classic Computational Theory of Mind claims. See section 3 "The classical computational theory of mind":

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/#ClaCo...

To summarise, the article suggests that, while: "It is common to describe CCTM as embodying “the computer metaphor”. This description is doubly misleading." (first because nobody claims that the mind is a computer and second because the comparison to Turing machines is not a metaphor).

The article concludes that: "CCTM claims that mental activity is “Turing-style computation” [snipped for relevance]".

In short, nobody really claims that the mind is a computer, a digital computer, a Turing machine, a metaphorical Turing machine, etc etc. The idea, if I'm not misrepresenting it myself, is that the mind can think like Turing machines can compute.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#46

Post by bolzano »

omarhaneef wrote: post #30

In a different lifetime I got to take a few classes with Jerry Fodor, and although this publication references him extensively, one of his most succinct arguments for the computational theory of mind is only alluded to: the lack of alternatives. Fodor was a snappy writer and talker. I urge you to view his videos if they can be found on YouTube. Unfortunately he passed away recently. The argument goes something like t…

He is fantastic, I've only been able to find a couple of videos of him on Youtube. If you have any links at all, I would really really appreciate the share, even just plain old audio recordings would be awesome. Thanks!

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#47

Post by yters »

Zigurd wrote: post #42
TuringTest wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners ma…

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

What is an illusion without consciousness?

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#48

Post by yters »

tcgv wrote: post #36
taneq wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing (since quantum mechanics is computable and everything including the brain is ultimately quantum mechanics).

True random number generation can't be done by a deterministic computer, and it appears that human brains can, although not conclusive yet, and the precise mechanism is unclear: - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15922090

Turing machines don't have to be deterministic. You can have non deterministic Turing machines, and probabilistic Turing machines.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#49

Post by yters »

claudiawerner wrote: post #35
yters wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If there is nothing that is uncomputable, then doesn't that mean the hypothesis is unfalsifiable?

It's worth noting that the theory that a falsifiable hypothesis constitutes scientific investigation (as proposed by Popper) isn't really the gold standard of the philosophy of science any more - especially since Popper's formulation is known to be pretty shoddy.

That sounds like a recipe for making up stuff and calling it 'science'.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#50

Post by Gupie »

Zigurd wrote: post #42
TuringTest wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm not sure the question of "whether an X can have conscious experience" (where X is computer, dog, fish, human infant...) is even all that meaningful. I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners ma…

You may have the illusion of a "conscious experience" that is in fact a story told to yourself about how a thing you call "you" is in charge of your thoughts.

I also hear sounds, see colours, feel pain. These are qualia don't exist outside minds, and are not thoughts but experiences.
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