Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Boeing assumed that pilots could be relied upon to recover from a MCAS induced runaway trim. Practice has shown that they can't. Whether Boeing or the pilots is at fault is, from a safety perspective, irrelevant. From a practical perspective, however, Boeing making universal assumptions about pilot capabilities in life-or-death situations, utilizing new equipment that they were not trained on, is anything but irrel…
Their logic was that pilots are trained to deal with runaway trim, a MCAS failure is runaway trim, ergo pilots are trained to deal with a MCAS failure. Obviously that logic turned out to be faulty but it's not like Boeing made some outlandish leap here.
It seems to me that your statement has some assumptions that may not be true, that a MCAS failure caused runaway trim would be recognized as such by the pilots. The ultimate issue may be a runaway trim, but a MCAS failure may not produce the normal indicators that would lead the pilots to diagnose the failure correctly within the time available. Assuming that a MCAS failure is the same thing as a runaway trim failure and should have been handled by the pilots, while technically correct, might not be an appropriate conclusion.