Live data from Hacker News

Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

blogs.microsoft.com

151–160 of 177 posts

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#151
post #113
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is only relevant if you propose to have weekly/monthly elections. For elections every few years even a week of counting would not be a problem.

Although the longer counting takes, the more difficult it becomes for a substantial number of people to monitor the entire process. In the UK, counting takes place overnight, immediately after the polls close; it's feasible for multiple parties to ensure they have people at every location for the entire time, keeping an eye out for irregularities. If the process were extended over a week instead of a night, it become…

That is true, but if they happen digitally then that becomes completely impossible.

As things are now I see no reason of sort not to use paper ballots as the main proof of vote. Especially for big nation wide elections.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A corporate PAC is simply a group of people joining together to create political speech, with the added legal protection of incorporation. The Citizens United case was in direct response to the FEC approving nearly all corporate speech from liberal sources, while stopping conservative versions. Explicitly in the Michael Moore v Citizens United FEC complaints. Nothing changed for liberals voices in Citizens United, on…

that is a version of the story I never heard before! Can you share some links?

Where I brushed up on my info:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens_United_v._FEC

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#153

Earlier quoted context omitted.

no its not.

Care to elaborate?

The system for verifiable receipts in the article does not require electronic voting in either the vote-casting or vote-counting process. It's an explicitly paper system.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#154

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Care to elaborate?

The system for verifiable receipts in the article does not require electronic voting in either the vote-casting or vote-counting process. It's an explicitly paper system.

so

> no its not.

As in not related not as in not a bad idea.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Just so the results of voting can be displayed on TV a bit earlier, we are supposed to accept substantial risks to democracy You already accept the influence of corporate PACs, which arguably are a much bigger threat to democracy. Not saying you should add another vector, (electronic voting), just that the argument that there's a solid democratic system now is not quite true.

> You already accept the influence of corporate PACs This is leading astray but just to make this clear for anyone looking up this thread later: I do not accept the influence of corporate PACs at all, and believe (but IANAL) that where I live these would be illegal.

> I do not accept the influence of corporate PACs at all

Good, but I meant "you" as in the broader society concerned about electronic voting, not "you" as the individual.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#156
post #147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Electronic voting is the classical solution to a nonexistent problem. Just so the results of voting can be displayed on TV a bit earlier, we are supposed to accept substantial risks to democracy posed by blatantly insecure endpoints, blatantly insecure company infrastructure, insecure network communications and devices (routers, etc.), private companies that often have a track record of insecure and sloppy programmin…

A bit earlier? Election recounts were triggered and entire countries and regions were affected because a recount couldn’t be completed in time. Take for example Al Gore vs George W Bush: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qcz6NSyxrfQ Because the recount was stopped earlier than it could be completed, Bush became President, stopped watching Bin Laden and we got 9/11, then invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and the entire region…

Do you truly believe that Bin Laden is the beginning and end of 9/11? That multiple buildings were turned to dust because two planes hit two of them? That some "art students" filming the event were happenstance? That Bin Laden was captured, killed, and thrown into the sea? That Middle East destabilization, the War on Terror, and ubiquitous global surveillance were unplanned consequences of an unforeseen catastrophe?

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#157

I've been accumulating a mental list of properties that would support less-exploitable, more-auditable paper balloting. This has a surprising number of the properties. The main items I don't see represented are all roughly related to auditability for ballot chain of custody. I think issues/irregularities with the ballot chain of custody are probably good proxies for triaging hand-audit efforts. The goal is knowing wh…

I think the whole point of this fancy homomorphic encryption-based system is that only the endpoints need to be verifiable, you no longer have to worry about chain of custody anymore. Kinda like how end-to-end encryption means you no longer have to trust every link in the network that connects you to the other party. As long as you can verify that the final tally is correctly calculated from all the public encrypted…

Maybe? I won't assert it doesn't, since I don't know. It certainly seems to be a tolerable solution to the questions of whether votes were changed, or whether ballots were disappeared without counting.

But I don't see how the ability of individuals to verify that their own vote was counted can sum, at scale, to verifying that real-but-fraudulent ballots aren't also in the total.

It seems like you could verify this if everyone who voted proved that their vote was included in the count and the full count was explained by everyone who proved they voted. In practice, that seems unlikely?

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#158

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>>> These are mostly solved problems in all western nations (except for the US). E.g. I am Austrian living in Germany and I vote by mail since a decade. The US has had vote-by-mail for as long as I can remember [0]... So what is an example of a "mostly solved problems in all western nations (except for the US)" other than an example that you posted that is inaccurate? I'm not arguing that we have solved all election…

The US doesn't have vote-by-mail, we have mail-in absentee ballots and they're intended to be a last resort. You can only request an absentee ballot if you're unable to vote in person. You can't request an absentee ballot simply because it's more convenient.

I'm not sure what state you are in, but that entire statement is not true in the state of FL.

Per the link I cited above as a sample reference to vote-by-mail in the US - "Vote-by-mail refers to voting a ballot received by mail or picked up by or for a voter instead of going to the polls to vote during early voting period or Election Day. Except on Election Day, no excuse is needed to vote a vote-by-mail ballot (see Who Can Pick Up a Vote-by-Mail Ballot below)."

The key phrase being that last one, "no excuse is needed to vote a vote-by-mail ballot". There is no verbiage about it being a "last resort" and that you can only vote-by-mail if "you're unable to vote in person". The Florida Division of Elections even titles the page "Vote-by-mail".

https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/for-voters/voting/vote-b...

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#159
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's digital tabulation, AKA electronic voting. This is the most common type of attempt to subvert paper voting. The paper becomes the "recount" which is often challenged in court. See? The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count.

>The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count. The whole point of this scheme is to provide strong evidence for when the numbers won't match. This is an advantage over existing optical scan systems, where a recount requires watching every single paper ballot go into the reader.

Optical scan is electronic voting. Gaming optical scan machines was one of the first demonstrated hacks.

Hand counted paper ballots.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#160
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Digital tabulation is electronic voting. The paper becomes the recount, which gets challenged in court and might not even happen.

So, it sounds like you're entirely in support of this article, the only tiny change you want to make is for the paper to be counted FIRST, and then the eletronic tabulation to be used as a validator. And any discrepancy results in an investigation, no?

I'm opposed to any form of electronic counting. If the first hand count of paper ballots has a problem, then they can be re-counted. By humans.
Post reply on HN