61–70 of 177 posts
Electronic voting isn't a solution, it's an attack. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w3_0x6oaDmI
This isn't an electronic voting system. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.
Incrementalism is a powerful technique.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not always - spoiled ballots can sometimes count, or indicate growing dissent in society. Not voting can achieve neither. Here's a case from last week of a spoiled ballot giving someone a majority of one: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/03/ballot-pape... Was that the result the voter intended? Probably not, but who knows? :)
How is this individual vote any more or less significant to the outcome than all the others?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also, there is another scenario. Let's say the rules allow to change the vote later. A voter votes for candidate X and gets a link that allows to verify that the vote is recorded. But several hours later the server software re-votes for candidate Y. If the voter bothers to check results after election, they will find that their vote was altered. But the voter has no proof that they didn't vote for candidate Y, and el…
» And one more scenario: before closing the elections, officials can make a list of people who didn't vote and vote for them. If they didn't vote they probably don't care about elections and won't find out that someone voted for them. This could already happen today. This is why all major candidates, even in these united states, send their own observers and not simply trust election officials to do their job.
I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can look at it and say: “There was nothing fishy there, I saw it”. This is because it is about trust and not only about secrecy and security. Your electronic voting system can be mathematically perfect, but if nobody average can say from the outside that everythi…
This isn't an electronic voting system. It's a system for verifiable receipts that attach to paper systems. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.
This is the most common type of attempt to subvert paper voting. The paper becomes the "recount" which is often challenged in court. See? The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count.
I thought about some advantages of paper voting compared to electronic: you can spoil the ballot, for example, if you don't like any of candidates and there is no option titled "Against all". In electronic elections, you cannot do that.
So we are supposed to trust all the digital pixie dust voting and no paper trail ?
This isn't an electronic voting system. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.
The paper becomes the recount, which gets challenged in court and might not even happen.
Relevant xkcd: https://xkcd.com/2030/
How is this relevant? This isn't an electronic voting system. It's a system for verifiable receipts that attach to paper systems. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.
>After the election is complete, the tracker codes can be used by voters to confirm that their votes were not altered or tampered with and that they were properly counted. So what's preventing vote-buying schemes?
In Estonian e-voting they allowed to change the vote later or re-vote offline. So that if someone sold their vote or was forced to vote, they can later change their mind. But such scheme is still vulnerable: for example, imagine if a large state-owned or having close ties with government company forces their employees to vote online under supervision. If the employees are not very good with computers or don't own one…
I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can look at it and say: “There was nothing fishy there, I saw it”. This is because it is about trust and not only about secrecy and security. Your electronic voting system can be mathematically perfect, but if nobody average can say from the outside that everythi…
My impression from fraud reports from Russian elections is that most fraud occured at the local level (where no one was able to precisely quantify it) and from the point the data was inserted into the centralized database everything was squeaky clean.
So maybe some kind of a centralized panopticon surveillance system that the FAAMG are so fond of is just the right fit for elections.