Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting • Hacker News Board

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#121

Post by kazagistar » Wed, May 08, 2019, 2:43 PM UTC

gfiorav wrote: post #79

atoav wrote: post #35

I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can look at it and say: “There was nothing fishy there, I saw it”. This is because it is about trust and not only about secrecy and security. Your electronic voting system can be mathematically perfect, but if nobody average can say from the outside that everythi…

Also prevent uninterested, lazy, people from voting out of spite. I know it's unpopular to say, but I don't think it's a bad thing that voting requires personal (strictly personal; no corporation should get in your way) effort.

Because the amount of spare effort people have available is correlated to class, and thus adding more hoops to jump through is yet another way to favor the idle rich over the working poor.

But I also don't see why the first sentence is inherently bad. Why is it good to police what type of people may vote? Why is it good to police the reason for voting?

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#122

Post by kazagistar » Wed, May 08, 2019, 2:48 PM UTC

dunkelheit wrote: post #88

codedokode wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> most fraud occured at the local level If it was something that was done at local level, not in conspiracy with central government, then why the investigations in cases of election fraud are so ineffective, and even if the case gets to the court, it typically ends with just a fine? If the central government didn't have relation to the fraud, they would prefer to punish local officials, yet they try to avoid doing it…

> If it was something that was done at local level, not in conspiracy with central government, then why the investigations in cases of election fraud are so ineffective, and even if the case gets to the court, it typically ends with just a fine? If the central government didn't have relation to the fraud, they would prefer to punish local officials, yet they try to avoid doing it. Instead, they warn heads of regions…

This is something that cannot be fixed with electronic votes, because if the powers that be cannot corrupt the system, they won't choose to use it.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#123

Post by sam_goody » Wed, May 08, 2019, 2:52 PM UTC

snaky wrote: post #93

amelius wrote: post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Electronic voting is the classical solution to a nonexistent problem. And some may argue that voting is a pretty bad "solution" by itself.

And some may argue that democracy is a pretty bad "solution" by itself. https://reason.com/2018/11/10/libertarian-critiques-of-democ...

"Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.…" - Winston Churchil

https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/quotes/the-worst-form...

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#124

Post by abathur » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:19 PM UTC

couchand wrote: post #110

For the most part, this seems like a pretty reasonable application of homomorphic cryptography to act as an extra voting record. Like others here I think it would need to be secondary to the paper voting record, and I worry that would be hard to enforce forever. But one line stands out as particularly troubling: Our sample reference will showcase how people can make their selections at home, where they can easily res…

This is a good point.

I don't mean this as a what-about, but it's worth noting: any ballots that list the party of the candidates or offer single-action straight-party votes are effectively a subtle form of a ballot pre-populated by an interested party.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#125

Post by alexandercrohde » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:25 PM UTC

atoav wrote: post #35

I shall repeat it like a mantra: voting beeing slow inefficient is a side effect of it’s transparency. You want a voting system were a average voting helper can look at it and say: “There was nothing fishy there, I saw it”. This is because it is about trust and not only about secrecy and security. Your electronic voting system can be mathematically perfect, but if nobody average can say from the outside that everythi…

Has anybody even read the article? Jesus. Your comment is a complete non-sequiter.

There are two ENTIRELY UNRELATED questions. One question is "cryptographic verification." One is "Paper/electronic"

You can have any combination. You can have a crypographical, verifiable, PAPER voting system, for example (and that's what this article is about).

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#126

Post by YokoZar » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:29 PM UTC

jakeogh wrote: post #65

YokoZar wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This isn't an electronic voting system. It's a system for verifiable receipts that attach to paper systems. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.

It's digital tabulation, AKA electronic voting. This is the most common type of attempt to subvert paper voting. The paper becomes the "recount" which is often challenged in court. See? The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count.

>The numbers match, there is no reason for a hand count.

The whole point of this scheme is to provide strong evidence for when the numbers won't match. This is an advantage over existing optical scan systems, where a recount requires watching every single paper ballot go into the reader.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#127

Post by alexandercrohde » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:29 PM UTC

jakeogh wrote: post #67

YokoZar wrote: post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This isn't an electronic voting system. > ElectionGuard provides a complete implementation of end-to-end verifiable elections. It is designed to work with systems that use paper ballots, supplementing today’s tabulation process by providing a means of public verification of the accuracy of reported results.

Digital tabulation is electronic voting. The paper becomes the recount, which gets challenged in court and might not even happen.

So, it sounds like you're entirely in support of this article, the only tiny change you want to make is for the paper to be counted FIRST, and then the eletronic tabulation to be used as a validator. And any discrepancy results in an investigation, no?

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#128

Post by Tharkun » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:29 PM UTC

michaelt wrote: post #116

wongarsu wrote: post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How does electronic voting solve any of those? - With electronic voting the identification problem is at least as hard as with paper ballots, so Voter ID is at least as hard (an honestly, I've never heard of any problem of this kind outside of the US) - Electronic ballots could be simpler than paper ballots, but they can also be a lot more complicated. Under the assumption that voter suppression is taking place we ha…

Depends if "electronic voting" means "in-person voting at polling stations with existing polling cards and polling booths, but replace paper ballots with touchscreen vote-counting machines" or if it means "Voting by smart phone" Although there are downsides to vote-by-smartphone, an advocate would argue you should compare it to vote-by-mail rather than vote-in-person, given that almost every election allows vote-by-m…

Smartphone voting sounds like a recipe for disaster. The fact that votes are cast in private in an otherwise public place is part of what makes the system work. If you let a large number of people vote remotely, you have zero certainty that a) the voters weren't pressured into voting a certain way, say by a domineering parent or b) that the device wasn't compromised.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#129

Post by merpnderp » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:33 PM UTC

AsyncAwait wrote: post #115

jonathanstrange wrote: post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Electronic voting is the classical solution to a nonexistent problem. Just so the results of voting can be displayed on TV a bit earlier, we are supposed to accept substantial risks to democracy posed by blatantly insecure endpoints, blatantly insecure company infrastructure, insecure network communications and devices (routers, etc.), private companies that often have a track record of insecure and sloppy programmin…

> Just so the results of voting can be displayed on TV a bit earlier, we are supposed to accept substantial risks to democracy You already accept the influence of corporate PACs, which arguably are a much bigger threat to democracy. Not saying you should add another vector, (electronic voting), just that the argument that there's a solid democratic system now is not quite true.

A corporate PAC is simply a group of people joining together to create political speech, with the added legal protection of incorporation. The Citizens United case was in direct response to the FEC approving nearly all corporate speech from liberal sources, while stopping conservative versions. Explicitly in the Michael Moore v Citizens United FEC complaints. Nothing changed for liberals voices in Citizens United, only for conservatives. Which is why this is such a polarizing issue as one side lost a hugely unfair advantage.

Re: Protecting democratic elections through secure, verifiable voting

#130

Post by asdfman123 » Wed, May 08, 2019, 3:35 PM UTC

couchand wrote: post #110

For the most part, this seems like a pretty reasonable application of homomorphic cryptography to act as an extra voting record. Like others here I think it would need to be secondary to the paper voting record, and I worry that would be hard to enforce forever. But one line stands out as particularly troubling: Our sample reference will showcase how people can make their selections at home, where they can easily res…

I have at times followed an election guide verbatim. It's far more rational than voting straight ticket.

If it means it's easier to vote for those overwhelmed by all the various choices out there, then that's a win. If it means you can get your average millennial or Generation-Z friend to vote, someone who cares about social issues but can't be bothered to learn about local judges -- then that's a good thing. It could mean more accurate representation. It's better than letting the richest and most idle determine everything.