Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding • Hacker News Board

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#21

Post by heymijo » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:26 PM UTC

tus87 wrote: post #5

I wonder how high the scandal goes. I mean does the CEO have to sign off on design decisions like the engine misplacement on the MAX?

Good question.

This is not my domain, but it reminds me of financial fraud, accountability of those at the top, and the consequences they face.

I was studied accounting in the wake of the major accounting scandals of the late 90's/early 00's. The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was passed. It states that the CEO and CFO are directly responsible for their company's financial statements.

AIG was the first major accounting fraud post Sarbanes-Oxley. Investigated by the SEC, determined non-criminal, CEO stepped down, and that was his consequence. [1]

Boeing's CEO, Dennis Muilenberg, has the blood of 346 people on his hands. He is at the top, it is his organization, and his responsibility. I hope an investigation determines if it is criminal.

I think one of the major shifts I would like to see in our society is holding those in power to account. Whether it's accounting, aviation, banking, it doesn't matter. As it stands those at the top rarely pay for their malfeasance.

[1] https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1145&cont...

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#22

Post by leesalminen » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:29 PM UTC

darkpuma wrote: post #20

adrr wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I won’t fly one unless it has 3 angle of attack sensors. Since that can’t be easily found out, I’ll avoid them.

Three angle of attack sensors seems unnecessary to me. They simply need to make MCAS pay attention to both (2) and cut out if one disagrees with the other.

How would it know which one is the malfunctioning one?

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#23

Post by jarym » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:31 PM UTC

darkpuma wrote: post #20

adrr wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I won’t fly one unless it has 3 angle of attack sensors. Since that can’t be easily found out, I’ll avoid them.

Three angle of attack sensors seems unnecessary to me. They simply need to make MCAS pay attention to both (2) and cut out if one disagrees with the other.

The reason there should be 3 is likely because the odds of 2 failing are not unlikely enough from a safety perspective.

There’s no problem if one fails but what if both fail and both corroborate a bad reading?

Certainly the cost of 3 such sensors would not be as high as the cost of another crash.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#24

Post by jarym » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:32 PM UTC

“This came so quickly and was steep”

Somewhat poor choice by the writer here given the association.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#25

Post by lisper » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:32 PM UTC

MuffinFlavored wrote: post #18

tibbydudeza wrote: post #9

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

> 346 people died because of their ineptitude. This might be too hot of a take for HackerNews, but... look at how many people the FAA has kept safe over the past 30 years. I'm pretty sure the number of people who travel without dying is very, very high. I don't disagree that their might have been some ineptitude (I'm sure you could find that anywhere for anything since it's opinion driven), but to say the FAA is all…

The problem is not that this is a big number of deaths in an absolute sense. The problem is that this is a big number of deaths to result from a chain of events that can ultimately be traced back to a strategic decision by Boeing to increase profits, and where an explicit component of that strategy was to cut corners on training. The whole point of MCAS was to avoid the overhead of having to obtain a new type certificate for the new engine design, and that lead to 346 deaths. That's the problem.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#26

Post by amelius » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:32 PM UTC

MuffinFlavored wrote: post #18

tibbydudeza wrote: post #9

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

> 346 people died because of their ineptitude. This might be too hot of a take for HackerNews, but... look at how many people the FAA has kept safe over the past 30 years. I'm pretty sure the number of people who travel without dying is very, very high. I don't disagree that their might have been some ineptitude (I'm sure you could find that anywhere for anything since it's opinion driven), but to say the FAA is all…

Well, the main argument (which still stands imho) was that the FAA would not be independent in this case.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#27

Post by foobarbazetc » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:34 PM UTC

This plane is dead. People just haven’t accepted it yet.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#28

Post by wtvanhest » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:35 PM UTC

MuffinFlavored wrote: post #18

tibbydudeza wrote: post #9

Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report. Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing. 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

> 346 people died because of their ineptitude. This might be too hot of a take for HackerNews, but... look at how many people the FAA has kept safe over the past 30 years. I'm pretty sure the number of people who travel without dying is very, very high. I don't disagree that their might have been some ineptitude (I'm sure you could find that anywhere for anything since it's opinion driven), but to say the FAA is all…

Was this aircraft even under FAA jurisdiction? I thought the FAA only had jurisdiction over airline flights to and from the US.

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#29

Post by testuser2131 » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:36 PM UTC

tus87 wrote: post #10

kyrra wrote: post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Incorrect. They still have a backlog of 4600 planes to deliver. And they aren't laying anyone off. https://www.npr.org/2019/04/05/710477435/boeing-to-slow-prod...

Then why are they slowing production? Interesting how the article doesn't explain that. > had a common link of a malfunctioning flight-control software called MCAS. My understanding is the software was fine, it was faulty sensors with no redundancy and poor feedback displays to pilots.

> My understanding is the software was fine, it was faulty sensors with no redundancy and poor feedback displays to pilots.

And who is managing one sensor only or not providing the feedback? The MCAS software

Re: Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding

#30

Post by foobarbazetc » Sun, Apr 07, 2019, 6:37 PM UTC

kyrra wrote: post #6

tus87 wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If by places you mean customers that sounds about right.

Incorrect. They still have a backlog of 4600 planes to deliver. And they aren't laying anyone off. https://www.npr.org/2019/04/05/710477435/boeing-to-slow-prod...

Denial is the first stage... :)