It seems rather intuitive to me. Our brain is composed of neurons. Different subsets seem to have more or less specialised functions. Any subset can be seen as it own 'thinker'. We think of them as larger units based mostly on the amount of communication / how independently they can function. Sometimes it is helpful to think of our mind as been made of many smaller 'thinkers'. Though there is no crisp boundary, every…
This works to some extent, but does not account for consciousness. A mind, at the very least a moment of experience, is a coherent whole. Your left and right visual fields are bound together. Thinking of neurons as entirely discrete units makes the binding problem insoluble.
True, although consciousness itself is rather poorly defined. There are also other related issues like qualia. But I'm not sure it needs to 'account' for those things. To observe that there are certain mental phenomena that are evident at different scales.
> A mind, at the very least a moment of experience, is a coherent whole.
That rather assumes your conclusion. In the example of a divided brain, a stimuli may be presented to only half the brain. How would one know whether one's experience of 'coherent whole'ness was accurate?
> Thinking of neurons as entirely discrete units makes the binding problem insoluble.
No more than thinking of base pairs in your DNA as discrete units makes higher order phylogenesis insoluble. To recognise that discrete units are simple does not mean that large aggregates of them cannot display fundamentally different dynamics.