If pilots rotated into training time these changes could be addressed in simulators on a scheduled basis the airline could plan for.
No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
21–30 of 106 posts
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#22Licensed nuclear plant control room operators go through 40 hours of training every 6 week. Generally 5 weeks of operations rotation then 1 week of training, all year, every year. Twenty hours of classroom and 20 hours of simulator training, the week includs a written and simulator exam. Failing either and the operator is taken off shift until his remediation training is complete and exams passed. If pilots rotated i…
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm going to let the pilots decide whether it's reasonable. I don't know anything about flying a 737 and I'd wager that 99% of the people posting here don't either. If the US pilots unions are okay with it, I'll be okay with it. They haven't crashed any 737 Max yet.
The US airlines all purchased some/all of the "optional" safety features that would have made it obvious to the pilots that the system was malfunctioning.
Ordinarily sensor disagree would give you some idea what could be affected because you've had training to tell you this. Not in the MCAS upset due to faulty AOA sensor case.
Until the reports are complete, I think it's getting out over one's skis to say would would have been obvious to U.S. pilots.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#24Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm going to let the pilots decide whether it's reasonable. I don't know anything about flying a 737 and I'd wager that 99% of the people posting here don't either. If the US pilots unions are okay with it, I'll be okay with it. They haven't crashed any 737 Max yet.
The US airlines all purchased some/all of the "optional" safety features that would have made it obvious to the pilots that the system was malfunctioning.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
I wholeheartedly agree and am going out of my way to not fly 737max and 787 (those aren’t any better. Their batteries still burn up, just now in a “metal container”. Just google ‘787 smoke’ and you’ll get tons of incidences, the last one was two days ago. And those planes fly over-water for thousands of miles - https://simpleflying.com/united-787-noumea-diversion/ ). A once-proud engineering company that has become n…
Bingo. This is the end state of capitalism, a total lack of concern for brand on the part of the companies; a total lack of loyalty and trust on the part of the customer.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#26Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#27I'd highly recommend anyone who wants to see what an MCAS runaway looks like and the steps needed to correct it watch the following video by Mentour Pilot.[1] He's a 737 pilot for a European budget carrier, and I believe he is qualified to certify other pilots. In the video he goes over what an MCAS failure/runaway stabilizer would feel like to the pilots, the troubleshooting steps, and at the end of the video he sho…
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management
2. https://quizlet.com/45297265/crew-resource-management-crm-th...
3. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p...
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#28I'd highly recommend anyone who wants to see what an MCAS runaway looks like and the steps needed to correct it watch the following video by Mentour Pilot.[1] He's a 737 pilot for a European budget carrier, and I believe he is qualified to certify other pilots. In the video he goes over what an MCAS failure/runaway stabilizer would feel like to the pilots, the troubleshooting steps, and at the end of the video he sho…
> he shows a simulated runaway MCAS failure 'I am not doing that...' is now on my most terrifying phrases to hear.
I thought the communication was really interesting. Air France Flight 447[1] crashed due to the pilot flying pulling back on the stick for over a minute while in a stall, overriding the command inputs of the pilot monitoring. The other pilots realized that the pilot flying had been pulling the stick back the entire time only a few seconds before impact, and at that point it was too late to recover. The transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder are pretty chilling.
That exact situation isn't exactly possible in a Boeing because the sticks are linked, but there were a several crashes in the modern era that occurred because of communication issues in the cockpit. Of course, in addition to better communication, we have systems like MCAS which are designed to prevent pilots from repeating the mistakes of AF447. In this case it obviously didn't work out that well.
Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals
#29Earlier quoted context omitted.
Bingo. This is the end state of capitalism, a total lack of concern for brand on the part of the companies; a total lack of loyalty and trust on the part of the customer.
Still better than famine and genocide. And since we have a representative liberal democracy, the institutions and the state have recourse and are solving the problem.