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No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

reuters.com

21–30 of 106 posts

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#21
Licensed nuclear plant control room operators go through 40 hours of training every 6 week. Generally 5 weeks of operations rotation then 1 week of training, all year, every year. Twenty hours of classroom and 20 hours of simulator training, the week includs a written and simulator exam. Failing either and the operator is taken off shift until his remediation training is complete and exams passed.

If pilots rotated into training time these changes could be addressed in simulators on a scheduled basis the airline could plan for.

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#22
post #21

Licensed nuclear plant control room operators go through 40 hours of training every 6 week. Generally 5 weeks of operations rotation then 1 week of training, all year, every year. Twenty hours of classroom and 20 hours of simulator training, the week includs a written and simulator exam. Failing either and the operator is taken off shift until his remediation training is complete and exams passed. If pilots rotated i…

A nuclear power plant failure, in the worst case, is much worse than the worst case pilot error.

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#23
post #19
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm going to let the pilots decide whether it's reasonable. I don't know anything about flying a 737 and I'd wager that 99% of the people posting here don't either. If the US pilots unions are okay with it, I'll be okay with it. They haven't crashed any 737 Max yet.

The US airlines all purchased some/all of the "optional" safety features that would have made it obvious to the pilots that the system was malfunctioning.

A system they weren't told about, weren't trained on. What they have is an "AOA disagree" indicator, among dozens of indicators. There's no reason for them to see it or go looking for it in the example cases of MCAS upset where they're reacting to an urgent situation. The indicator might be useful for a maintenance squawk report.

Ordinarily sensor disagree would give you some idea what could be affected because you've had training to tell you this. Not in the MCAS upset due to faulty AOA sensor case.

Until the reports are complete, I think it's getting out over one's skis to say would would have been obvious to U.S. pilots.

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#24
post #19
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm going to let the pilots decide whether it's reasonable. I don't know anything about flying a 737 and I'd wager that 99% of the people posting here don't either. If the US pilots unions are okay with it, I'll be okay with it. They haven't crashed any 737 Max yet.

The US airlines all purchased some/all of the "optional" safety features that would have made it obvious to the pilots that the system was malfunctioning.

There is no regulation that prevents them from making safety-related components optional?

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#25
post #20
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wholeheartedly agree and am going out of my way to not fly 737max and 787 (those aren’t any better. Their batteries still burn up, just now in a “metal container”. Just google ‘787 smoke’ and you’ll get tons of incidences, the last one was two days ago. And those planes fly over-water for thousands of miles - https://simpleflying.com/united-787-noumea-diversion/ ). A once-proud engineering company that has become n…

Bingo. This is the end state of capitalism, a total lack of concern for brand on the part of the companies; a total lack of loyalty and trust on the part of the customer.

Still better than famine and genocide. And since we have a representative liberal democracy, the institutions and the state have recourse and are solving the problem.

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#26
The more I read about Boeing's malfeasance here, the more certain I am that I will refuse to fly in the 737 MAX if and when it's ever recertified, unless the airframe is substantially redesigned and substantial retraining of pilots occurs. A software patch is not going to cut it for me to trust the aircraft going forward.

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#27

I'd highly recommend anyone who wants to see what an MCAS runaway looks like and the steps needed to correct it watch the following video by Mentour Pilot.[1] He's a 737 pilot for a European budget carrier, and I believe he is qualified to certify other pilots. In the video he goes over what an MCAS failure/runaway stabilizer would feel like to the pilots, the troubleshooting steps, and at the end of the video he sho…

Great video, thanks for sharing. That simulator work at the end was a fantastic demonstration of team work. Crew Resource Management.[1] I still remember DAM CLAS from the Navy.[2] Numerous examples in the video. Sad and terrifying thinking about what it must have been like for the pilots and passengers of the crashed airlines. If the issue was MCAS, the slowly worsening situation, never disabling the trim, just one step to remedy the situation that’s never taken, and the intuitive solution of pulling back hard on the yoke not working, because Boeing removed it in the latest version--a sad example of awful decision making on the ground.[3]

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_resource_management

2. https://quizlet.com/45297265/crew-resource-management-crm-th...

3. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p...

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#28

I'd highly recommend anyone who wants to see what an MCAS runaway looks like and the steps needed to correct it watch the following video by Mentour Pilot.[1] He's a 737 pilot for a European budget carrier, and I believe he is qualified to certify other pilots. In the video he goes over what an MCAS failure/runaway stabilizer would feel like to the pilots, the troubleshooting steps, and at the end of the video he sho…

> he shows a simulated runaway MCAS failure 'I am not doing that...' is now on my most terrifying phrases to hear.

The thing that was the most chilling to me was the fact that the last item on the memory checklist is to try and prevent the trim wheel from moving using physical force. At that point it almost seems like "well, you are probably going to die, but you might as well keep yourself busy in the process."

I thought the communication was really interesting. Air France Flight 447[1] crashed due to the pilot flying pulling back on the stick for over a minute while in a stall, overriding the command inputs of the pilot monitoring. The other pilots realized that the pilot flying had been pulling the stick back the entire time only a few seconds before impact, and at that point it was too late to recover. The transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder are pretty chilling.

That exact situation isn't exactly possible in a Boeing because the sticks are linked, but there were a several crashes in the modern era that occurred because of communication issues in the cockpit. Of course, in addition to better communication, we have systems like MCAS which are designed to prevent pilots from repeating the mistakes of AF447. In this case it obviously didn't work out that well.

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447

Re: No call for simulators in new Boeing 737 Max training proposals

#29
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bingo. This is the end state of capitalism, a total lack of concern for brand on the part of the companies; a total lack of loyalty and trust on the part of the customer.

Still better than famine and genocide. And since we have a representative liberal democracy, the institutions and the state have recourse and are solving the problem.

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