Every pilot on that plane should have been trained on the new system. How is that supposed to work when Boeing didn't inform any of the airlines of this system?
Boeing did inform them. Otherwise how would the third pilot have known what to do when he saved the plane?
"New plane, but flies the same as old plane! No retraining necessary!"
2 pilots crash the plane...
"Why didn't you learn how to fly with the new system?!?!"
I am almost sure that some engineer of Boeing has noticed that there was a major design flaw with the function of the MCAS, but that he was overruled by a less technical (and probably younger) superior.
My question is why doesn't the "omg something is seriously fucked up give me manual control NOW" button disable the MCAS as well? That seems like a UX failure.
MCAS is designed to work only with autopilot disengaged. With autopilot and autothrottle engaged there would be similar logic at play because the general goal would be to not have the automation induce a stall. With everything disabled there is a risk that applying full throttle will result in the airplane pitching up dramatically beyond the ability of the elevator to pitch the airplane back down and potentially indu…
Various pilot unions aren't mincing words. Here's one quote: "This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen,” the message from the pilots association at American reads. “It is not in the American Airlines 737 Flight Manual … nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual). It will be soon.” It doesn't seem unreasonable to me that the jumpseat rider made an educated guess ba…
It doesn't seem unreasonable to me that the jumpseat rider made an educated guess based on some prior experience. Aided by the fact that he didn't have other things to do besides observing. Or he went back into the cabin and pulled out a copy of the FCOM to do some emergency diagnostic work. https://www.grid.id/read/04966850/deretan-kejanggalan-yang-d...
The "runaway stabilizer trim" section. Which didn't mention MCAS at all at the time. So, if you guess correctly, you can find the right procedure.
Actual instrument-rated pilot here. What people (including pilots) do under stress is resort to simple actions drilled in by training. That's why emergency procedure training is a major part of pilot training curriculum. What goes away first under stress is capability for complex reasoning, which is what one would need to figure out what the heck is going on and take appropriate action. In this case an a/c doing unco…
My question is why doesn't the "omg something is seriously fucked up give me manual control NOW" button disable the MCAS as well? That seems like a UX failure.
Well, there is no such button. Perhaps there should be though a better solution might be to fix the automation. Airbus planes seem to work ok without a button but don't have a crash the plane if one sensor fails system.
My question is why doesn't the "omg something is seriously fucked up give me manual control NOW" button disable the MCAS as well? That seems like a UX failure.
MCAS is designed to work only with autopilot disengaged. With autopilot and autothrottle engaged there would be similar logic at play because the general goal would be to not have the automation induce a stall. With everything disabled there is a risk that applying full throttle will result in the airplane pitching up dramatically beyond the ability of the elevator to pitch the airplane back down and potentially indu…
>The pilots of a doomed Lion Air Boeing 737 Max scoured a handbook as they struggled to understand why the jet was lurching downwards, but ran out of time before it hit the water, three people with knowledge of the cockpit voice recorder contents said. (straitstimes)
I can't help thinking things would be safer and the Ethiopian crash may not have happened if they just published all the info rather leaving this kind of thing to anonymous leaks to the press.
> No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed. I mean there are only two 737MAXes that have crashed in total, right? It's not like we have such a huge sample to work with for this to carry that much weight.
And the only airlines that bought the option are North American, so we are immediately confounding with pilot training differences.
I guess when ordering a plane or a car you assume you don't need to order optional extras to stop the thing killing you.
> The Indonesia safety committee report said the plane had had multiple failures on previous flights and hadn’t been properly repaired. It probably wouldn’t have mattered. Lion Air couldn’t even maintain their planes properly; assuming an extra indicator would help would be charitable at best.
The Ethiopian plane was new and this was still a problem.
My question is why doesn't the "omg something is seriously fucked up give me manual control NOW" button disable the MCAS as well? That seems like a UX failure.
Well, there is no such button. Perhaps there should be though a better solution might be to fix the automation. Airbus planes seem to work ok without a button but don't have a crash the plane if one sensor fails system.
There an AirFrance (Airbus) flight a few years back that crashed over the Atlantic that was partially the result of a stuck pitot tube. I remember at the time one of the debates was how automated Airbus planes were over Boeing. Pilots seemed split as to which system they preferred, but generally wanted more control, not less.
Actual instrument-rated pilot here. What people (including pilots) do under stress is resort to simple actions drilled in by training. That's why emergency procedure training is a major part of pilot training curriculum. What goes away first under stress is capability for complex reasoning, which is what one would need to figure out what the heck is going on and take appropriate action. In this case an a/c doing unco…
My question is why doesn't the "omg something is seriously fucked up give me manual control NOW" button disable the MCAS as well? That seems like a UX failure.
That would be the autopilot disconnect button or, in this case, the trim switch, the pressing of which is the correct immediate response to this occurrence, followed by the disabling of the system using switches on the center pedestal. While it's certainly hazardous for Boeing to knowingly expose pilots to this occurrence, I'm also conflicted by the fact that they failed to respond properly. The procedure is similar on Boeing, Airbus, Embraer and Bombardier aircraft. Standardized, in a way.