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DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

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Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#281
post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. That seems backwards. Touch screens suck. Why not build a validation machine that voters can feed manu…

I think they want to simplify the human interaction as much as possible to eliminate things like hanging chads, misreads due to erasures etc. This also requires less importance on the other human step which is reviewing as there are hopefully fewer errors in the first place Although I would favor a screen with physical buttons next to it (not like the garbage you see on ATMs and gas pumps though)

> not like the garbage you see on ATMs and gas pumps though

What don't you like about these buttons? As mentioned elsewhere in the comments, this is a proved design that works well for a great number of people. Plus, the elderly / tech averse are likely to already know how it works.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#282
post #273

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not sure why hand counting is so difficult. In the UK we hand count elections. It is just a matter of sorting ballot papers into a pile for each candidate. This pile can then be easily checked to make sure that no vote has been mis-recorded.

Sort and stack is pretty good. When done at poll sites, it's fairly manageable (many hands make light work). In the USA, federal, state, and local contests are all on the same ballot. Where I live, general election ballots have 30+ items. For manual counting to be feasible, we'd have to split into separate ballots. Of all the people I've spoken with over the years, there's been no objections to this. But it is a big…

Having too many races on the same ballot already compromises ballot secrecy, to an extent.

"We want you to vote for Jim Totes-Legitimate for President. But so that we can recognize your ballot paper and we can verify that you voted for him and we don't have to break your kneecaps, please also mark your other ballot races as follows: Fred Also-Ran for First Assistant Flangedoodle, Sheila Plausible for Second Assistant Flangedoodle, Hazel Placeholder for Junior Hog Counsellor."

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#283

> Kiniy said Galois will design two basic voting machine types. The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. Galois will bring this system to Def Con…

I hate being outright dismissive but it sounds like an expensive html/pdf form with a printer attached. I do agree that the paper trail is a great thing. I'm not fundamentally against electronic voting, but I haven't heard of a system that can really compete with the simplicity and verifiability of the immutablility you get from paper ballots inside ballot boxes being watched over by interested parties on all sides.

I'd say that the massive investment is necessary because of how uncomplicated this particular system is. Without a large, sprawling, and well-funded project backing it, a simple (and probably far more reliable) solution can lack credibility when compared to more complicated alternatives.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#284
post #238

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aren't counting ballots always wrong? Like every time there is a recount the number changes... What's wrong with electronic ballots? If we can have a secure and audit-able banking system (and every other aspect of our lifes), surely we can have the same for voting?

> If we can have a secure and audit-able banking system (and every other aspect of our lifes), surely we can have the same for voting? There's one major requirement in voting systems that throws a huge wrench in everything, anonymity. In order to prevent vote buying and coercion voters can't be tied to specific votes. So any system that allows a person to check that their vote got counted for their candidate isn't wo…

The way this (anonymity) is handled in the Estonian system is that votes can be validated out-of-band for 30 minutes after they were cast, then they're locked. Additionally, a voter can overwrite their previous vote at any time during the vote period, so they could always prove their first vote, and then overwrite it privately later.

There are several other major problems with their system [0], but I think they should at least get credit for their approach.

0: https://www.aaspring.com/ccs2014/ivoting-paper.pdf

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#285
post #60

Why does this keep coming up? What is the compelling argument against paper ballots? There is no need for results to be known immediately, so how does making voting an exercise done by computers make anything better, particularly when computers are much more vulnerable to remote interference?

Aren't counting ballots always wrong? Like every time there is a recount the number changes... What's wrong with electronic ballots? If we can have a secure and audit-able banking system (and every other aspect of our lifes), surely we can have the same for voting?

Bank records aren't anonymous, and people are allowed to challenge their individual results, up to and including suing in court.

The US requires that once you leave the polling station you must not be able to prove to anyone how you voted.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#286
post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. That seems backwards. Touch screens suck. Why not build a validation machine that voters can feed manu…

"Why not build a validation machine that voters can feed manually-completed optical scan ballots into, before they go to the tabulator?" That's precisely how poll-based opscans work. Central count (for postal ballots processing) is necessarily different, because that sanity check cannot be done, so voter intent must be adjudicated when ballots (or individual votes) are unreadable. It's a sausage factory.

> That's precisely how poll-based opscans work.

I know, we have them in my district, but they don't do all the validation I was talking about. I think all that the current machines do is validate that there were no overvotes, etc. I was proposing a separate machine that would let the voter validate that the ballot would be read as they intended.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#287

Could this be a useful application of blockchain?

No.

Can you elaborate? It seems each vote would be harder to tamper if blockchain is applied. (or some other techniques chaining data together to be verified)

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#288
post #282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sort and stack is pretty good. When done at poll sites, it's fairly manageable (many hands make light work). In the USA, federal, state, and local contests are all on the same ballot. Where I live, general election ballots have 30+ items. For manual counting to be feasible, we'd have to split into separate ballots. Of all the people I've spoken with over the years, there's been no objections to this. But it is a big…

Having too many races on the same ballot already compromises ballot secrecy, to an extent. "We want you to vote for Jim Totes-Legitimate for President. But so that we can recognize your ballot paper and we can verify that you voted for him and we don't have to break your kneecaps, please also mark your other ballot races as follows: Fred Also-Ran for First Assistant Flangedoodle, Sheila Plausible for Second Assistant…

Browser fingerprinting for ballots -- how many bits of entropy on a long ticket?

Not hard if you've got 10 or so multi-way contests or 20 or so ballot measures.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#289
post #288
post #282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Having too many races on the same ballot already compromises ballot secrecy, to an extent. "We want you to vote for Jim Totes-Legitimate for President. But so that we can recognize your ballot paper and we can verify that you voted for him and we don't have to break your kneecaps, please also mark your other ballot races as follows: Fred Also-Ran for First Assistant Flangedoodle, Sheila Plausible for Second Assistant…

Browser fingerprinting for ballots -- how many bits of entropy on a long ticket? Not hard if you've got 10 or so multi-way contests or 20 or so ballot measures.

Exactly.

Which is also why the cryptographic voting systems cannot protect voter privacy. Those systems require hash collisions to hide your ballot in the herd of ballots. But the combination of precinct size and complicated ballots means any particular ballot is utterly unique (no hash collision).

I'd be far more charitable towards crypto advocates if they also specified the conditions required for their system to work correctly.

Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System

#290
post #282

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sort and stack is pretty good. When done at poll sites, it's fairly manageable (many hands make light work). In the USA, federal, state, and local contests are all on the same ballot. Where I live, general election ballots have 30+ items. For manual counting to be feasible, we'd have to split into separate ballots. Of all the people I've spoken with over the years, there's been no objections to this. But it is a big…

Having too many races on the same ballot already compromises ballot secrecy, to an extent. "We want you to vote for Jim Totes-Legitimate for President. But so that we can recognize your ballot paper and we can verify that you voted for him and we don't have to break your kneecaps, please also mark your other ballot races as follows: Fred Also-Ran for First Assistant Flangedoodle, Sheila Plausible for Second Assistant…

Yup.

Similarly, with postal balloting (vote by mail), your ballot is batched (upon receipt), so will be mixed with ballots from other precincts, therefore more easily tied back to its voter.

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