In Estonian parliamentary election, 44% of the votes were cast online

Do you mean the public database of everyone's public keys? Tampering with that would get noticed really fast and anything like that would greatly erode the trust in the system and wreak havoc on the economy since most stuff is signed digitally.

The signatures are generated by government-issued cards. Doesn't it mean that it can issue any number of new cards and generate signatures using them?

Also, they cannot store signatures with votes because that would disclose voter's identity and their choice. They have to store signatures separately from the votes and it means that the votes can be freely modified.

Here is what Wikipedia says [1]:

> This criticism was underscored in May 2014 when a team of International computer security experts released the results of their examination of the system, claiming they could be able to breach the system, change votes and vote totals, and erase any evidence of their actions if they could install malware on the election servers.

Of course, the government can install enything on its servers.

Here is a quote from a report on vulnerabilities [2]:

> The e-voting system places complete trust in the server that counts the votes at the end of the election process. Votes are decrypted and counted entirely within the unobservable “black box” of the counting server. This creates an opportunity for an attacker who compromises this server to modify the results of the vote counting.

> ...

> The attack’s modifications would replace the results of the vote decryption process with the attacker’s preferred set of votes, thus silently changing the results of the election to their preferred outcome.

Read: the government can "draw" any outcome they would like. Maybe they already did it, who knows.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia

[2] https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/

According to this report [1], they published the source code and provided a video recording of installing the software (sounds like a joke):

> Despite positive gestures towards transparency — such as releasing portions of the software as open source and posting many hours of videos documenting the configuration and tabulation steps — Estonia’s system fails to provide compelling proof that election outcomes are correct. Critical steps occur off camera, and potentially vulnerable portions of the software are not available for public inspection.

[1] https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/

Certainly and nobody is being forced to learn languages in Estonia, as being an Estonian citizen isn't a requirement to live in Estonia. What's more, citizenships often come with language requirements when we're talking naturalization. Indeed you need to speak Russian to get a Russian citizenship via naturalization. [1]

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[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizenship_of_Russia#Citizens...

> I'm not going to go around spelunking on my old comments to prove to you that your attacks on me are unfounded. Do your own homework if you care about this for some reason but this is getting extremely aggressive for no reason.

You're asking me to prove a negative. I merely said I doubted you knew about receipt freeness because you didn't even mention it as an obvious counterpoint to your claim, which is a reasonable conclusion. If you consider that an “extremely aggressive attack”, fine. It is easy for you to prove me wrong, you just have to point out the comment in question.

In the meantime, I'll continue to assume you either had no idea what receipt freeness was, or deliberately created the false impression that a verifiable voting system cannot be receipt free.

> I wasn't about to go 10 rounds of "but you could do X and then be broken by Y".

You've failed to show that receipt freeness introduces something else that fundamentally "breaks" which wasn't in the original system, despite repeatedly claiming this is so (see also "They fix this issue and introduce others", a claim made with absolutely zero evidence).

> So here's how I attack it if I'm just a skilled hacker working alone:

So you just assume you can achieve all of this for any e-voting system. Fantastic argument. Really convincing. You may as well have said "Here's how I would attack and infiltrate banking networks or current voting systems surreptitiously. See, we can never trust either of these!" That's just laughable.

> At the end there's a very high chance your election is now fully distrusted and the country is in chaos. Even if it doesn't work 100% of the time it only takes one or two successful events globally for people to distrust these systems, whichever they are.

Clearly wrong as evinced by Estonia's voting system, even in the face of its demonstrated security flaws.

> The scary thing about what I just described is that plenty of it is indistinguishable from what is already happening in some cases in US elections today.

...and it hasn't led to the collapse of the voting system.

> If there are no advantages why do it?

Are you asking what the advantages of e-voting are?

> The difference for eCommerce and eBanking is that under any of those attack scenarios you just go to the bank branch and sort things out, including reverting transactions.

You're assuming banks are always aware of attacks, which is just not true.

> At this point it's on you.

It's not "on me". It's been mathematically proven that a system can possess these properties simultaneously. For example, see

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_...

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11818175_22