> LinkedIn violates their own users' privacy in an effort to detect the usage of browser extensions. At the time of writing this, LinkedIn is scanning visitors for 38 different browser extensions. No it is defending against malicious actors from abusing its API.
> No it is defending against malicious actors from abusing its API. I do not really understand the concept of "abusing an API". If an API is amenable to a "bad" use, it seems entirely to be the fault of the API designers, not of its users. The designers built an API that enabled an usage that they did not want. That is their fault, how could it be otherwise?
How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
81–90 of 113 posts
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Extensions have the same auth rights as your logged-in account (the ability to see people who are out of network, for example). It’s against LinkedIn’s ToS to scrape data.
This should go both ways. It is against my ToS for LinkedIn to scrape which extensions I have installed.
But that said, LinkedIn never agreed to your ToS.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#83> LinkedIn violates their own users' privacy in an effort to detect the usage of browser extensions. At the time of writing this, LinkedIn is scanning visitors for 38 different browser extensions. No it is defending against malicious actors from abusing its API.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#84Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#85Earlier quoted context omitted.
This should go both ways. It is against my ToS for LinkedIn to scrape which extensions I have installed.
I'm on the anti-LinkedIn side of this scraping debate. But that said, LinkedIn never agreed to your ToS.
If my computing node is interacting with your computing node, we should either both be able to put restrictions on the use of obtainable information or neither.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm on the anti-LinkedIn side of this scraping debate. But that said, LinkedIn never agreed to your ToS.
True, and I accept this is a potentially good legal refutation of this kind of argument. However, I do consider ToS-es untenable and unjust because of this power asymmetry. If my computing node is interacting with your computing node, we should either both be able to put restrictions on the use of obtainable information or neither.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
But how is this data accessible to the extension? I ‘m not an expert, but it seems that this data has to publicly available for an extension to find and parse it. Extensions don’t have magic Auth rights or credentials.
Extensions have the same auth rights as your logged-in account (the ability to see people who are out of network, for example). It’s against LinkedIn’s ToS to scrape data.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#88Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think it's a cat and mouse game. The more that Linkedin publishes about their anti-spam techniques, the more information spammers have to try to evade those anti-spam techniques.
It can seem that way with server-side anti-scraping techniques with brute force detection and the like. But at some point you have to accept that playing the game on the client-side needs to stop escalating once you're making dozens of local extension resource requests in a user's browser. It makes me want to publish and maintain a legit scraper for LinkedIn that replicates human interaction. They'd DMCA the repo I'm…
...and then the scrapers replicate interaction with that app instead. UI automation isn't hard these days.
Re: How LinkedIn detects browser extensions
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
iMacros is a legit extension. But yeah, I guess there are recruiters using it to spam people.
Agree. iMacros is a completely fine macro recorder. Similar extensions like Kantu and Selenium IDE are not in the list.