"Quite a few countries have had dramatic and society-redefining events happen to them without experiencing a large number of revolutions as a consequence. So we can't say that China's revolutionary past is an obvious consequence of anything in particular that happened to it."
This argument is obviously fallacious.
It does not follow from the fact that lots of societies (L) have had X happen to them that no number or combination or tempo of X's can have an effect that was not present in L.
I'm not sure if the proposition that we can't ascribe China's revolutionary past to 'anything in particular that happened to it' is even coherent. How else do you think historical change takes place? From nothing?
"The UK had to go to the IMF for a bailout."
It's now historical consensus that the UK didn't have to do this at all. It was based on a miscalculation of the UK account (not that the economy wasn't in dire straits).
"The crisis of the 1970s wasn't "general to the west".
It was, for at least three reasons: (i) the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the beginning of dollar seigniorage; (ii) the OPEC crisis in 1973; (iii) and the emergence of widespread stagflation in 1973-1975.
"The cause was pretty clearly and directly militant socialism - once Thatcher got the unions under control and liberalised the economy, the UK caught up with its erstwhile foe and was no longer the 'sick man of Europe'."
I'm not going to get into this, because it's a rabbit hole. But that is clearly a highly simplified and ideologically charged perspective. I would mention that the rate of growth under post-war social democratic Keynesianism was higher than under Thatcherism and her epigones. I would recommend the work of David Edgerton, probably the foremost scholar of British economic history in the twentieth century - whose work reveals a quite different story to your own.