Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It made sense to go in to fetch Bin Laden, but not to do any nation-building. Yeah, a US policy of destructive interference in Afghanistan without stabilization after the immediate aim is acheived has never had any serious adverse long-term consequences that would militate against that. (Neither, I suppose, in your world, has the same thing in Iraq caused problems with merely completely botched stabilization ignori…
The U.S. has no patience for nation-building. Like it or not, that's the truth. That leaves us with three options in cases like 9/11: - do nothing - go in, do what you can to get the bad guys and deter future attachs - go in and attempt nation-building for as long as the public will stand it, then skip town The third option is the one we always try. It also always fails. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq. Intervention in th…
There are no other cases like 9/11, except maybe Pearl Harbor.
The third option worked pretty well there.
> The third option is the one we always try. It also always fails. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq.
Vietnam was actually an example of the second option failing. While there was some effort at nation-building, it was as a means to defeating the “bad guys” (the so-called “hearts and minds” campaign), not rebuilding after taking care of the “bad guys”.
The third option also isn't what we tried in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was more the second: get the Russians out, and don't worry about what happens after. There's a pretty direct line from that to the development of al-Qaeda (though the US option-2 intervention in the Middle East in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait also contributed. Notably, the idea that “the third option is what we always try” is completely false.)
> Intervention in the Balkans did work in the 90s, but we didn't occupy
The US was deeply involved in post-conflict peacekeeping and nation-building in the Balkans. In fact, it was still involved in that well into the time of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.