Earlier quoted context omitted.
Seems like an easy problem to solve - every ECU generates its own encryption/signing key at first boot and dumps it over the serial port, which then gets recorded somewhere. This is eventually passed down to the car’s owner in the documentation, and the key needs to be presented before any firmware upgrade or configuration change. This isn’t bulletproof either, but surely more than “hey I’m legit, here’s your new fir…
Yes, like I alluded to it's trivial drawing from any other trusted boot chain implementation. The even better and less user-intensive way to do it would be with asymmetric encryption - the ECU only trusts flashes signed with the vendor public key and to make things even more secure, you could encrypt each flash file server side with a keypair derived each boot on the ECU and sent over the Internet (many manufacturers…
That part doesn't sound very secure to me :-)