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Keybase Exploding Messages

keybase.io

81–90 of 155 posts

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#81

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

This is what people don't seem to get, exploding messages aren't an airtight solution to the risks of sharing sensitive information with someone. You're always taking a risk when you do that. Exploding messages change the default way that sensitive information is handled, and changing the default can have a profound impact, for all the reasons you lay out.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#82

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

I will suggest that if you add this to the FAQ, you spend more time talking about things like your device can be compromised by loss, theft, or hackers, at any time. Exploding messages are gone when that happens. and less time talking about how people can go from seemingly a Nice Guy to r/niceguy when a relationship ends. Make relationship drama a footnote, not your primary emphasis.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#83
post #64

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

> SnapChat, as far as I know, has none of the cryptographic implementation of Keybase. And yet it has likely protected hundreds of thousands of kids from severe bullying. Is this true? (Asking with no implication of criticism or being a leading question - I just genuinely don't know the answer) I can believe both that these teens were going to sext each other anyway and Snapchat is keeping them safer, or that they we…

There's a theory about this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation

> "Risk compensation is a theory which suggests that people typically adjust their behavior in response to the perceived level of risk, becoming more careful where they sense greater risk and less careful if they feel more protected. Although usually small in comparison to the fundamental benefits of safety interventions, it may result in a lower net benefit than expected."

There's a book too, with a special emphasis on on financial crises. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/oct/12/foolproof-greg...

> "In the run-up to the crash, consumers and even policymakers had come to believe that smart regulators and forward-thinking bankers had made the world of money a much safer place.

> "The fundamental insight of Ip’s new book, Foolproof, is that this very belief was a key factor in the lead up to the crash. When people believe they are safe, they take more risks – they drive faster, in motoring terms – and “speed makes everything worse”. Or as the economist Hyman Minsky, whose work Ip revisits, put it: “Stability is destabilising.”

There are applications in our field too:

- safety features for users might make them behave less safely (e.g. exploding messages)

- better reliability of systems might lead us to put more trust in them, leading to even bigger outages when they occur (e.g. centralising trust in cloud providers)

It's interesting to see things like Chaos Engineering (https://principlesofchaos.org/) introducing intentional "danger" into a system in order to improve system-wide stability. Of course, maybe Chaos Engineering will give us more trust in our systems which may lead us to take even bigger risks...

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#84

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

I would be hesitant to trust a controversial screenshot of text because I know that can be faked so easily. A lot of people don't have that awareness, though.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#85
As a security layperson my initial reaction was "how can cryptography help with expiring messages, once it's decrypted it's decrypted, that doesn't sound right", but I'm curious if I'm understanding correctly that this is actually two separate features: 1) clients voluntarily respecting "please delete this message at X time" and 2) forward secrecy. And Keybase has tied them together for UX reasons since people tend to not have an intuitive understanding of when they might want to use forward secrecy, but they always want it in the case of exploding messages.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#87
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely - That's my understanding as well. There are ways to mitigate (snapchat detects screenshots, etc) but no way to fully prevent - Someone could always use an external camera, etc. I was just really hoping that they had come up with some sort of cool technical way to stop the ability to decode messages after XYZ time, even if they couldn't prevent it from being copied once decoded. For example, imagine if a m…

I think the solution is pretty simple: encrypt with a one-time pad and then store the pad in a box that will burn that pad at your desired time; make sure no one can ever see the pad and your secret will be pretty safe.

And how do you make sure the box will burn at the desired time? What if someone stomps on the fuse?

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#89
post #80

I had to stop using Keybase after this issue [1] cropped up: when you re-install your OS, you lose access to the "device" and have to provision a new one, even though the machine is the same, and even in possession of an uncompromised private key. Apparently this happens a lot [2-7... probably more]. Unfortunately, this renders Keybase unusable for me because, even though I still have my private key, I cannot access…

I'm not entirely sure what your issue is here. Why not reprovision (either with a different provisioned device or your paper key) and give it a new name?

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#90
post #80

I had to stop using Keybase after this issue [1] cropped up: when you re-install your OS, you lose access to the "device" and have to provision a new one, even though the machine is the same, and even in possession of an uncompromised private key. Apparently this happens a lot [2-7... probably more]. Unfortunately, this renders Keybase unusable for me because, even though I still have my private key, I cannot access…

I'm not entirely sure what your issue is here. Why not reprovision (either with a different provisioned device or your paper key) and give it a new name?

Because it's the same device as before. I only have one name for it.
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