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Keybase Exploding Messages

keybase.io

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Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#71

Post by geofft »

madrox wrote: post #70
geofft wrote: post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> SnapChat, as far as I know, has none of the cryptographic implementation of Keybase. And yet it has likely protected hundreds of thousands of kids from severe bullying. Is this true? (Asking with no implication of criticism or being a leading question - I just genuinely don't know the answer) I can believe both that these teens were going to sext each other anyway and Snapchat is keeping them safer, or that they we…

That's certainly true of Snapchat in the past: http://www.businessinsider.com/snapchat-doesnt-delete-your-p... It's unclear how they protect images today, but they have never once mentioned any use of encryption.

I guess I quoted poorly - I meant "Is it true that Snapchat has likely protected hundreds of thousands of kids from severe bullying," not "Is it true that Snapchat does not use encyption in its implementation of disappearing messages".

I think it is possible that Snapchat has net caused more kids to get bullied as a result of ill-advised sexting, by being the company advising ill. I can see both arguments and I don't know which one is actually true.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#72

Post by ggg9990 »

LeifCarrotson wrote: post #43
ggg9990 wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A dead simple way to thwart the “screenshot” attack is to release a tool for accurately falsifying a screenshot. I’ve never seen this employed in practice though.

That's an interesting way to combat certain kinds of attacks - those in which the screenshot 'reveals' embarrassing, illicit, or illegal communication: things you've done or intend to do that have no external evidence aside from the message itself. But it does not combat attacks that are not embarrassing but rather a release of information you are known to have but which is intended to be kept secret, or which is eas…

If I release data that only I have, it’s obvious that I released it. If I release data that two people have, I can counter your screenshot with a faked screenshot of my own.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#73

Post by nebulous1 »

21 wrote: post #40
nebulous1 wrote: post #16

This is like snapchat, they're offering something that they can't actually guarantee. Of course keybase users are going to be generally more knowledgeable than snapchat users and most will understand the limitations.

It's still better to delete the message than to leave it there "because you can't guarantee it 100% either way". Defense in depth.

Yeah, I agree. The fact still remains though. Snap chatters, through ignorance, were under the impression that it was impossible for their photos to be shared with others. This was due to snapchat's failure to inform their customers and the experience level of their customers. It's notable that the blog post doesn't mention this at all, but on the other hand I would think that the percentage of keybase users that don't immediately understand this is extremely small.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#74

Post by exabrial »

malgorithms wrote: post #38

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

Can you make that disclaimer obvious in the software? "Keybase exploding messages only work if who you're chatting with doesn't have a hostile client or intent"

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#75

Post by grumdan »

geofft wrote: post #64
malgorithms wrote: post #38

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

> SnapChat, as far as I know, has none of the cryptographic implementation of Keybase. And yet it has likely protected hundreds of thousands of kids from severe bullying. Is this true? (Asking with no implication of criticism or being a leading question - I just genuinely don't know the answer) I can believe both that these teens were going to sext each other anyway and Snapchat is keeping them safer, or that they we…

I would also expect people's propensity to take screenshots to be correlated to how sensitive the image is. For example, I would expect many people to take a screenshot of a nude pic their partner sent just so they can look at it for longer than the default timeout of a snapchat message; this is even more likely for teenagers who may be less mature about not betraying the other person's trust.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#76

Post by 24gttghh »

wazanator wrote: post #67
24gttghh wrote: post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>And we can't have a different answer for 1-on-1 chats and group chats. What might be the reasoning here that Keybase won't do it yet Signal messenger does start the timer on the "receive" end?

It narrows the attack window. It's not hard to imagine a scenario where something happens to the receiver and as the sender you didn't realize this until you sent a few messages but the third party who got the receiver won't be able to access the device for some time. Hopefully by the time they get in they have self destroyed.

A valid point! Thanks for postulating!

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#77

Post by schoen »

geofft wrote: post #64
malgorithms wrote: post #38

Author here. I'm seeing the same comment in 4 different places on here, worded with various amounts of hostility. I now wish I had addressed this in the FAQ on the post. There's the suggestion that an exploding feature is worthless, given your partner can just take a screenshot or video of what you sent. This suggestion is missing (1) that your relationship with a partner is disproportionately okay at the time you se…

> SnapChat, as far as I know, has none of the cryptographic implementation of Keybase. And yet it has likely protected hundreds of thousands of kids from severe bullying. Is this true? (Asking with no implication of criticism or being a leading question - I just genuinely don't know the answer) I can believe both that these teens were going to sext each other anyway and Snapchat is keeping them safer, or that they we…

> I can believe both that these teens were going to sext each other anyway and Snapchat is keeping them safer, or that they weren't going to and Snapchat has convinced them that it can be done more safely than it can actually be done.

Related to

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_compensation

(I also don't know the answer!)

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#78

Post by kolbe »

> corporate messages

In this day and age, I do not advise this. Check with your company's compliance officer or corporate council before doing anything that is designed to remove evidence of communication.

Re: Keybase Exploding Messages

#80

Post by mholt »

I had to stop using Keybase after this issue [1] cropped up: when you re-install your OS, you lose access to the "device" and have to provision a new one, even though the machine is the same, and even in possession of an uncompromised private key.

Apparently this happens a lot [2-7... probably more]. Unfortunately, this renders Keybase unusable for me because, even though I still have my private key, I cannot access my laptop's Keybase when I install it.

[1]: https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/3460#issuecomment-2...

[2]: https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/3559

[3]: https://github.com/keybase/keybase-issues/issues/1952

[4]: https://github.com/keybase/keybase-issues/issues/1985

[5]: https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/4260

[6]: https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/2357

[7]: https://github.com/keybase/client/issues/2675

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