I once wrote a thesis on DMCA and Youtube during that huge Viacom vs Youtube litigation was going on. The copyright holders wanted to shift more of the burden of detecting and blocking copyright breach onto the web services by removing the DMCA safe harbor. Youtube ultimately won the case but they also implemented much of what Viacom wanted anyway - a fairly aggressive content filter that probably caught most of what Viacom wanted. However, the automated systems also prevented the posting of much fair use content since it can't really make the nuanced judgement call between blatant copying and fair uses. If Viacom had won that case, Youtube would have been forced to be much more restrictive in their automated filtering. Other video platforms would either have had to invest in the filtering tech or go out of business.
The Coase theorem says that where there are two rational negotiating parties, the laws governing property rights don't really matter. The parties will generally negotiate their way to an optimal outcome. What does matter is the impact of those laws on the transaction costs. The transaction costs are higher for smaller parties and for parties where there is no significant financial interests at stake.
Thus in evaluating these new laws, it's not really Google or big European news that we need to consider - rather we should ask how small news aggregators, independent bloggers, small news outlets, and individual readers going to react to this. Are small content creators going to go through the trouble of negotiating payment schemes with each and every news aggregator and vice versa?
All laws that increase transaction costs will concentrate more market power in larger firms that have the scale to deal with the additional costs and undermine smaller players who do not. Lawmakers focus too much on the Google and the like. Google can look after itself.