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The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

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Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#152
post #134

> This driver was digitally signed by Realtek, which means that the authors of the worm were somehow able to break into the most secure location in a huge Taiwanese company, and steal the most secret key that this company owns, without Realtek finding out about it. > Later, whoever wrote that driver started signing it with secret keys from JMicron, another big Taiwanese company. Yet again, the authors had to figure o…

That's not how it works. You need the private key to sign the drivers. This is not a file that developers of those companies have access too. These keys are usually stored on a HSM. Even if you want to, you wouldn't be able to access the keys stored inside. This is specifically designed to protect against rogue/bribed personnel. So it's highly unlikely that the stuxnet developers had possession of the key. I'd bet th…

Isn't a national security letter enough to "break in" to any US company?

Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#154

What do you think, are the authors of Stuxnet reading Hacker News? I wonder how tempting it is to comment, and what the repercussions would be.

Of course at least a few of them are reading Hacker News. I understand from the Snowden files that the teams are moderately large and then run for years. So there were likely many dozens of software developers who contributed to Stuxnet.

My guess is no, for maximal compartmentalization. They have a treasure trove of exploits and they grab one off the shelf and might need to burn it after they use it. I bet the people finding vulnerabilities have no clue how they end up getting used. Stuxnet probably got the top shelf attack vectors, and they were burned.

Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#155
post #152
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not how it works. You need the private key to sign the drivers. This is not a file that developers of those companies have access too. These keys are usually stored on a HSM. Even if you want to, you wouldn't be able to access the keys stored inside. This is specifically designed to protect against rogue/bribed personnel. So it's highly unlikely that the stuxnet developers had possession of the key. I'd bet th…

Isn't a national security letter enough to "break in" to any US company?

Oh realtek is Taiwanese, but I don't doubt they have reason to cooperate as well.

Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#156
post #144
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not how it works. You need the private key to sign the drivers. This is not a file that developers of those companies have access too. These keys are usually stored on a HSM. Even if you want to, you wouldn't be able to access the keys stored inside. This is specifically designed to protect against rogue/bribed personnel. So it's highly unlikely that the stuxnet developers had possession of the key. I'd bet th…

> I'd bet that they somehow had access to the HSM, to have it sign the driver for them. Or were able to duplicate the HSM before it was delivered. You know, like how the NSA intercepted shipments of internet routers in transit and inserted backdoors.

That wouldn't work because HSMs are typically not delivered with keys, you generate the private key yourself.

Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#157
post #147

If someone adds a layer to OS's file system such as only the know good white list app, exe, .so, .dll, .sys files with complete crypto-hash signatures are allowed to run in "lockdown" mode. Everything else are reported and blocked. Would it be enough to prevent such worm? It would be interesting exercise to take an old exploitable OS (Win XP, or 10 years old Linux with known issue) add such layer to it. Put it on int…

Depending on the hash, an attacker would look for collisions to get something running that could then change settings or launch other things. Failing that, you would look for flaws in the system or vulnerabilities in the OS in order to bypass it. Going deeper you run into trusted computing issues, of how do you know the verification firmware hasn't been tampered with?

The simplest approach though is if you're running Chrome, and I exploit Chrome, I'm now running as Chrome and could persist in memory at least until you shut down.

Re: The Stuxnet worm may be the most sophisticated software ever written

#159
post #144
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not how it works. You need the private key to sign the drivers. This is not a file that developers of those companies have access too. These keys are usually stored on a HSM. Even if you want to, you wouldn't be able to access the keys stored inside. This is specifically designed to protect against rogue/bribed personnel. So it's highly unlikely that the stuxnet developers had possession of the key. I'd bet th…

> I'd bet that they somehow had access to the HSM, to have it sign the driver for them. Or were able to duplicate the HSM before it was delivered. You know, like how the NSA intercepted shipments of internet routers in transit and inserted backdoors.

You don't ship HSM's with keys (you initialise them on-device yourself) nor can you read read keys out from one (at least in theory).
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