Earlier quoted context omitted.
Interesting. The feature is also available on Android.
Same thing exists on Windows Phone, BlackBerry, WebOS, even all the way back to Symbian I think.
Okay, likely a standard Exchange feature then.
The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
151–160 of 162 posts
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#152This might be a good scenario for Apple. Apple doesn't have to build a backdoor, which is good for PR, and the Feds got what they want to they'll stop bothering Apple. Which is the position Android/Google was in all along.
So the tinfoil hat theory here is that Apple itself leaks the cracking tech to Cellobrite to ease the fed pressure, and keep reputation intact? Sorry, I don't buy it.
I'm not suggesting any theories. I'm just pointing out that Apple isn't really in a terrible position because of this news.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#153Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're not wrong, but it has been shown that you can store small amounts of data in open resolving dns servers. https://github.com/benjojo/dnsfs
That's definitely true and I didn't dispute that part, I focused on the parts which were factually not correct.
I'll be the first to admit that to a DNS expert my original phrasing was not fully precise or fully complete, but calling it "factually not correct" is unfair. As the GP hints the idea is that you cycle through a large number of open resolvers around the world, putting the key into, let's say, 10 of them each time for redundancy & availability. As you usually cannot extend the timeout on those servers, you simply move to a different set of 10 servers during each refresh.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#154I wish there was a kind of "dead man switch" app that would wipe a device if it is not unlocked for x days or met some other kind of personalized criteria.
The dead man switch isn’t an option, but using the Apple Configurator (https://support.apple.com/apple-configurator), there are lots of additional security features that can be enabled that aren’t accessible via the iPhone’s UI.
EDIT Using Apple Configurator, you can change the number of times unsuccessful attempts can occur before erasing an iPhone to anything between 2-10.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#155Earlier quoted context omitted.
What here is illegally gathered?
let's say you need a warrant to get X. you use illegal methods to get X without a warrant. but you can't use that information legally. so you use your knowledge of X to find a legal way of learning X, after the fact. then you go to the courts saying you found X the legal way. but you didn't.
I understand the theory thanks, I'm just disputing that this scenario is anything other than exceptionally rare. Parallel construction is used to protect sensitive sources, not cover up illegality.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#156Earlier quoted context omitted.
What here is illegally gathered?
Nothing, if they have a warrant (or equivalent legal authorization). But the reason most of us care about having our data encrypted is not actually because we are committing heinous felonies, and want our phones to hide the evidence from legitimate cops (though of course sometimes that’s the case). It’s because we don’t trust the authorities to follow the law. If they can crack your phone legally, they can also crack…
It's my personal belief that this line of thinking, which is common among "geeky" types but not among the general population, is a form of slight delusion or power fantasy.
Is there anything you can provide to convince me it's remotely possible?
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#157Earlier quoted context omitted.
> As far as I know, the government isn’t stealing peoples iPhones to search them. Well, OK, now you know: The US government seizes phones and laptops, "without showing reasonable suspicion of a crime or getting a judge’s approval", on a regular basis, and has done so for a number of years. https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/laptop-seizure-border... https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/16/canadian_privacy_co... h…
The government is permitted to search anything that crosses the U.S. border. It's a power inherent to nations, which are entities defined by their borders. The founding generation provided for such searches and seizures in the very first session of Congress. You might not like it, but border searches aren't illegal, and the government doesn't need to go to Israel to do them.
I'm not claiming it's illegal. I'm just arguing that this is a new and serious security concern. You write:
> This technology isn’t being used to break into phones at surprise checkpoints, it’s being used to search phones of people who have been arrested.
and:
> As far as I know, the government isn’t stealing peoples iPhones to search them.
That implies it's nothing to worry about if you aren't being arrested, which is wrong.
First, you don't know when this technology is being used. It would be prudent to assume they US government could use this technology on any phone they seize.
Second, even if it's not "stealing" when government agents seize your phone at a border (or yes, at a surprise checkpoint, which they can and do use), from a security standpoint, it's the same thing.
The legality of these searches is not that interesting to me (witch-burning and slavery were legal too). What's interesting is that this new exploit, assuming the story is accurate, allows the government to search the data of phones that they seize.
Why should we worry about that? Because, as we have already established, they seize phones routinely, and not necessarily in conjunction with an arrest or even suspicion of criminality.
Yes, it's legal (in many cases, anyway). But before this new phone-cracking capability, it probably wasn't effective. The security on the Apple iPhone was believed to be good enough to stop such intrusion; now (again, assuming this article is accurate) we know it isn't.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#158Earlier quoted context omitted.
"On devices with Secure Enclave, the delays are enforced by the Secure Enclave coprocessor." Page 15 It was also confirmed explicitly during the Q&A at the blackhat talk in 2016, which I believe is on YouTube.
>It was also confirmed explicitly during the Q&A at the blackhat talk in 2016, which I believe is on YouTube. doesn't look like it. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-De...
That’s not the apple talk. Apple gave a talk specifically about hardware security in the iPhone.
Edit: this one. https://youtu.be/BLGFriOKz6U
Edit 2: the question was asked at 47:20
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#159Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fwiw, Apple has a $100k bounty on this type of exploit (pulling secrets from the secure enclave).
But Cellebrite apparently makes millions off of its service, so the economic incentives are still on their side.
This argument gets made really often. Consider that bug bounties and blackhat talks disclosing bugs both exist and are extremely popular. Not everyone wants to be a drug dealer. Cellebrite hardly has a monopoly on hardware research.
Re: The Feds Can Now Probably Unlock Every iPhone Model
#160Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's definitely true and I didn't dispute that part, I focused on the parts which were factually not correct.
I'll be the first to admit that to a DNS expert my original phrasing was not fully precise or fully complete, but calling it "factually not correct" is unfair. As the GP hints the idea is that you cycle through a large number of open resolvers around the world, putting the key into, let's say, 10 of them each time for redundancy & availability. As you usually cannot extend the timeout on those servers, you simply mov…
> As you usually cannot extend the timeout on those servers, you simply move to a different set of 10 servers during each refresh.
Think about that from a technical perspective and you’ll realize the flaw. :)
You can’t cycle to a new set unless the authoritative server is still responding with the key. If the authoritative server still has it, what difference does the fact a caching name server has it? Furthermore, there’s zero guarantees a caching resolver will cache for the length of the specified TTL, so you literally have a land mine that’ll explode randomly and cause you to lose your data.
> As the GP hints
Read it again. GP’s Github link doesn’t allude to what you imply it does. Storing arbitrary data in DNS is of course possible and others will cache it for you, but implying anything like what you described as feasible just doesn’t hold merit.
> but calling it "factually not correct" is unfair.
This entire theory you posted originally doesn’t hold up to even basic technical review. It’s nothing against you personally, the idea simply doesn’t provide any actual benefit and very fairly is factually incorrect.