There are a lot of great books on the founding, planning, engineering and delivering the A380. All of them come to one painful conclusion - the A380 was driven more by politics and enabled by launch aid, rather then by real market need.
Airbus has seen the effect of the Arbus 300, Boeing 767 and Boeing 757 in the transatlantic market and knew that large twins capable of going trans-pacific (777 and 787) would similarly fragment pacfic markets. But it was worth it to the EU project, especially in the heady millennium world when it was planned, to have it as a prestige project, and the market would be solid enough, if not as large as Leahy and others were projecting.
People forget because of the debacle of the 787's engineering, but A380 had massive engineering problems - not with the fundamentals (the 747 was the worlds first double decker, first widebody - and the A380 was only a marginal capacity over the 747) but rather in that they had a lot of political problems, configuration errors, etc. The 787 still hasn't shown a profit (but it will) the A380 will never do so, even if EK does order a new plane.
Finally, Emirates Airline (EK) is in a pickle here. They have a unbelievable percentage of the overall A380 frames. Airbus ending the program plane will result in the resale value of the A380s simnifically depreciating. EK saw this coming a while ago and moves most of their orders over to leasing, but Airbus has EK in a unenviable position here.