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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

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Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#411

Post by alex_duf »

krrrh wrote: post #376
alex_duf wrote: post #110

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know it's not ideal nor user friendly, but you can get a device that is supported by lineage os. You get updates every week.

Since this is fixed by a patch to wpa_supplicant LineageOS does fix it, but it is pointed out elsewhere in this thread that Lineage is still vulnerable to older hacks like broadpwn on many devices since they have a hard time patching kernel-level vulnerabilities without vendor participation. Your advice is valid, but it’s important to not have a false sense of security.

I wasn't aware of that, thanks

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#412

Post by baby »

technion wrote: post #95
baby wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Note that in the demo video they use SSLStrip to cancel attempts of websites to switch to https. The only protection here is HSTS (which is not enabled by most websites, but major ones like banks will usually have them) and manually typing https:// in your address.

I'm seeing HSTS on 0/3 of Australian banks (I'm even seeing RC4 on one of them). https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=commbank.com.... https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=nab.com.au&s=... https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=westpac.com.a...

These are real issues that you can report to them.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#413

Post by baby »

sanqui wrote: post #55
baby wrote: post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Note that in the demo video they use SSLStrip to cancel attempts of websites to switch to https. The only protection here is HSTS (which is not enabled by most websites, but major ones like banks will usually have them) and manually typing https:// in your address.

You can (and should) also be using HTTPS Everywhere: https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere .

I think it's a nice plugin until you forget that you're using it and you rage for minutes/hours trying to understand why you can't access some website.

It might be worth it.

I remember spending hours trying to figure out why Google Adsense wouldn't render correctly. In the end I figured out that it was Adblock's fault :))

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#414

Post by acqq »

tedunangst wrote: post #255
acqq wrote: post #137

Earlier quoted context omitted.

tedunangst: "We asked to commit without revealing details, he said yes" "I guess he changed his mind about that after the fact." The patch has obviously an explicit description: "State transition errors could cause reinstallation of old WPA keys." It's true, however, that anybody who analyzes the diffs would eventually figure that out, as Theo de Raadt argued. My conclusion is also that the real error was even wantin…

Oh, that's the problem? That's too much information? Well, shit.

I still fail to get what you wanted to express with your comment here. I've just quoted two sentences from another comment of yours on the same page, have you understood something else?

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#415

Post by [deleted] »

Dylan16807 wrote: post #372
rightos wrote: post #360

Earlier quoted context omitted.

SafetyNet doesn't actually detect custom ROMs, a stock LineageOS will pass it on most devices at least. It attempts to detect root or modifications to the ROM by malicious software. Certain newer devices have secure boot attestation that may cause SafetyNet to fail unless spoofed to be a different device which does not have such attestation.

It also detects unlocked bootloaders, even if nothing is modified. And you need either root or an unlocked bootloader to make proper backups.

[deleted]

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#416

Post by rightos »

Dylan16807 wrote: post #404
evilDagmar wrote: post #403

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. It only cares about unlocked bootloaders on devices that shipped with Android 7 because a requirement of shipping with that was hardware support facilitating dm_verity, which is essentially a check that the bootloader wasn't tampered with. Without the necessary hardware there's simply no way to perform this check in anything resembling a reliable fashion. Also, neither root not an unlocked bootloader is required…

> No. It only cares about unlocked bootloaders on devices that shipped with Android 7 because a requirement of shipping with that was hardware support facilitating dm_verity, which is essentially a check that the bootloader wasn't tampered with. Without the necessary hardware there's simply no way to perform this check in anything resembling a reliable fashion. So in other words "yes, that is a requirement that will…

> So in other words "yes, that is a requirement that will eventually be on all android phones"? Am I misunderstanding something? Older phones being an exception does me little good going forward.

To date it means that it's very possible to bypass any protections put on this though - I believe this may even be possible without spoofing the device in this way, but in any case, Magisk works on any device available today.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#417

Post by beauk »

Is this a correct summary of this issue?

Very much like a a copy-cat rouge open (non wep/wpa/wpa2) access point could be set up to trick wireless clients, and become a man-in-the-middle device, this attack, because of way WPA/WPA2 protocol lets nonces get reset to 0 with the same key, they can therefore can be predicted, and a WPA/WPA2 device can essentially become a MITM.

And in the same way a public WAP can be used more securely, a VPN and HTTPS (assuming it's implemented correctly on the server), and SSH or other tunneling encryption standards, can be relied upon to mitigate this attack.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#418

Post by Dylan16807 »

rightos wrote: post #416
Dylan16807 wrote: post #404

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> No. It only cares about unlocked bootloaders on devices that shipped with Android 7 because a requirement of shipping with that was hardware support facilitating dm_verity, which is essentially a check that the bootloader wasn't tampered with. Without the necessary hardware there's simply no way to perform this check in anything resembling a reliable fashion. So in other words "yes, that is a requirement that will…

> So in other words "yes, that is a requirement that will eventually be on all android phones"? Am I misunderstanding something? Older phones being an exception does me little good going forward. To date it means that it's very possible to bypass any protections put on this though - I believe this may even be possible without spoofing the device in this way, but in any case, Magisk works on any device available today…

Oh sure you can bypass it, but effort is put into purposely breaking that bypass, and it can happen at any moment.

It's really not the same as being free of annoying and unhelpful restrictions.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#419

Post by wolfgke »

bzbarsky wrote: post #409
wolfgke wrote: post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In principle yes (if it is not against the app store guidelines). But if submitted as an app, it cannot use JIT compiling for security reasons. This will make the speed of JavaScript execution very non-competitive to WebKit.

It's not just JIT. Quoting from https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/ section 2.5.2: Apps should be self-contained in their bundles, and may not read or write data outside the designated container area, nor may they download, install, or execute code, including other apps. So your can't ship a JS interpreter either, even without a JIT. And section 2.5.6: Apps that browse the web must use the approp…

That is why I wrote:

> (if it is not against the app store guidelines)

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