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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

371–380 of 424 posts

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#371

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a patch for iOS? Wonderful! Oh wait, there isn't.

Did you intend to post that reply to me? Because of course there isn't a patch for iOS yet, and when there is it will leave out hundreds of millions of devices that no longer receive patches. My point was that if one wants to stomp their feet and do the easy "Damn Android" complaint, at least wait until the basis is sound.

Ah, you're right, sorry: that was intended one reply up, where the poster seems to claim that iOS is already patched.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#372
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately, Google has given app developers a quite powerful tool to disable the use of their apps on non-official OS images, in the form of SafetyNet. So even if you can install an open source version of Android expect a bunch of stuff to no longer work afterwards.

SafetyNet doesn't actually detect custom ROMs, a stock LineageOS will pass it on most devices at least. It attempts to detect root or modifications to the ROM by malicious software. Certain newer devices have secure boot attestation that may cause SafetyNet to fail unless spoofed to be a different device which does not have such attestation.

It also detects unlocked bootloaders, even if nothing is modified. And you need either root or an unlocked bootloader to make proper backups.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#373

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Has anyone ever taken a vendor to court on the basis of consumer rights and not providing security updates and the product therefore not being fit for purpose? For example, under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the UK the product must last for as long as a reasonable person would expect it to, and Apple's interpretation of that is five/six years (see https://www.apple.com/uk/legal/statutory-warranty/ ).

I'm always tempted by this, I have time, I know people, but the thing is, you agree too far to many contracts by starting to use such a device, that just navigating the initial waters to find a path to sue anyone is a complete non-starter. I'm not able to tilt at this windmill. Hopefully the Purism phone succeeds and I can buy one. Till then ill keep buying a top of the line Apple phone each 4-5 years when support ru…

If it's anything like Australian Consumer Law, it's really really difficult to sign away those rights. In fact, even attempting to tell a customer that they can sign away those rights can result in company ending fines.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#375

As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.

"is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor." Using a VPN is the best way to mitigate this until your device is patched, assuming you trust your VPN provider or run your own VPN. Edit: Actually, even if you don't trust your VPN provider, you'll be protected against this attack (KRACK), given their client is implemented…

> given their client is implemented properly.

Unfortunately this is a big part of trusting your VPN provider. It’s shocking how bad the situation is, especially it seems on those marketed via Android apps. [1]

[1] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/01/major...

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#376

As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.

I know it's not ideal nor user friendly, but you can get a device that is supported by lineage os. You get updates every week.

Since this is fixed by a patch to wpa_supplicant LineageOS does fix it, but it is pointed out elsewhere in this thread that Lineage is still vulnerable to older hacks like broadpwn on many devices since they have a hard time patching kernel-level vulnerabilities without vendor participation.

Your advice is valid, but it’s important to not have a false sense of security.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#377

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To underline your point, even my Nexus 5 (_from Google_), which is a little less than 3 years old, will never receive security updates. And one of the main reasons I chose the Nexus was to be sure to get updates on time. Except for the security vulnerabilities, everything of the device is totally fine. It's such a waste of resources… (In this case I at least have an alternative in the form of Lineage OS, which will o…

The Nexus 5 was released 4 years ago. At the same time the iPhone 5C was released. The 5C also won't receive a patch for this. There is a problem with handset abandonment, but this is true across all vendors, and it does not underline sequence7's claim that this is solely an Android problem.

Quite frankly I don't think we should be counting elapsed time from when the device was first released but rather to when the device was last sold as new. I have a Sony Z3 first released September 2014, but which I purchased new over a year later in October 2015. The last security update this phone received is the May 2016 one.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#378

    Wonderfully Poetic Acronym
    ---

    WPA Privacy Attack!

    Wi-Fi Protected Access
    Wasn’t Programmed Appropriately
    Wads of Potential Attacks
    Wireless Public Access
    Without Prior Allowance
    Well, Pretty Apocalyptic
    WoPA!

    When Patches Arriving?
    Wardrivers, Present Arms!
    Weaponized Privacy Assault
    Wardriving’s Productive Again
    Wide-open Point of Access
    Wrecks Privacy Automatically
    Welcome, Protocol Attackers

    Where Patches, Admin?
    Worthless Privacy Attempt
    Wrong Protocol, Admin
    Won’t Protect Anything

    Weak Privacy Attempt
    Waste of Precious Attention
    Wins Prying Award

    Wired Past, Again

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#379

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ubiquity just released a patch for KRACK and soon others will I imagine. From a client perspective, same as always, wait for a patch from your OS vendor. edit: it seems this patch only handles modes where the AP is a client like a bridge or site-to-site. Its still a client-side fix and patching AP's used traditionally won't fix this. In practice, everything of value should be going over TLS. If you're worried you sho…

The thing is, not every protocol offers TLS. Take SMB (network shares) for example... encryption is only offered as of v3 and if a company/university wants to allow Windows 7 clients, they're capped to SMB v2.1.

That's a good example. I guess there's other mitigation at work here. In my case if I'm in a public wifi area and connecting to my work PC then I'm using VPN to access smb. Smb just isn't open to the wifi attacker.

In a case that it is, its curious how you would inject data into a smb stream and not fail checksums from client-side chechking. Maybe its trivial to deal with this, not sure.

If the WPA2 protected wifi network is using AES, which is the most common in my experience, then they won't be able to inject any data. From the Krack website:

If the victim uses either the WPA-TKIP or GCMP encryption protocol, instead of AES-CCMP, the impact is especially catastrophic. Against these encryption protocols, nonce reuse enables an adversary to not only decrypt, but also to forge and inject packets.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#380

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Special gear isn't all that expensive. From a cursory view of the video and a skim of the paper, they're using hostapd, which means that they simply need a wifi adapter with a sufficiently-good driver. Anything with the RTL8188CUS seems to be pretty nice (that's what I'm using in a raspberry pi project, myself). So - I agree with you that there's a barrier to entry, but it's not that big of a barrier.

On second read, timing requirements arent a thing if you are spoofing the network (obviously) so for that attack vector you don't need specialized hardware. (wont let me edit :( )
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