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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

391–400 of 424 posts

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#391
This might be a good time to switch off main SSID and exclusively use Guest SSID which is a feature in many routers. At least it would help to isolate wired computers away from the common wifi network. One could then safely use weird computers for sensitive communication.

It might also be a good time to invest in NIC dongle manufacturers considering how many systems only ship with wifi.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#392

> OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure deadline: “In the open source world, if a person writes a diff and has to sit on it for a month, that is very discouraging”. Note that I wrote and included a suggested diff for OpenBSD already, and that at the time the tentative discl…

Seems rather prisoner-dilemma-ish[1]. Up until now, there were no indications that this was being exploited publicly. After a flaw like this gets known (whether through a coordinated disclosure or through OpenBSD's early patch) you can be assured people will be exploiting this. Do you both stay silent and take the minor risk of your users being vulnerable for a short time longer whilst patching and disclosure is bein…

I don't think it is just your users vs. all other users. Why are other vendors not patching as quickly?

In this case, it was not a short time.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#393
post #201

The Wi-Fi Alliance has published an official statement: 'There is no evidence that the vulnerability has been exploited maliciously […].' That is probably about to change … https://www.wi-fi.org/news-events/newsroom/wi-fi-alliance-se...

That is very strange for them to say. Unless someone is sitting around collecting full take packet captures of everything going on around them and looking through it all, there would be no way to be aware of this.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#394
post #36
post #5

> This can be abused to steal sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords, chat messages, emails, photos, and so on. ... if transmitted over plaintext http

Note that in the demo video they use SSLStrip to cancel attempts of websites to switch to https. The only protection here is HSTS (which is not enabled by most websites, but major ones like banks will usually have them) and manually typing https:// in your address.

This only applies to websites which land on a plain HTTP page and then load links to HTTPS pages. Entering “ https:// “ explicitly before any URL accessed will fully mitigate this.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#395

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm always tempted by this, I have time, I know people, but the thing is, you agree too far to many contracts by starting to use such a device, that just navigating the initial waters to find a path to sue anyone is a complete non-starter. I'm not able to tilt at this windmill. Hopefully the Purism phone succeeds and I can buy one. Till then ill keep buying a top of the line Apple phone each 4-5 years when support ru…

If it's anything like Australian Consumer Law, it's really really difficult to sign away those rights. In fact, even attempting to tell a customer that they can sign away those rights can result in company ending fines.

Hmmm, might have to lead with this line of reasoning when I ask Samsung here in Australia why my S6Edge doesn't have an update for this in a reasonable timeframe...

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#399
post #383

Just a FYI. Certain enterprise access points that implement counter measures against rogue APs should be able to thwart this attack. Here is a link to documentation of the feature in one such vendor’s products: https://docs.ruckuswireless.com/unleashed/200.5/t-EnablingDi... The AP will begin broadcasting deauth frames against the rogue AP as long as it sees it. There are probably some edge cases, but I would expect e…

This project seems to enable the same thing on commodity hardware:

https://github.com/moha99sa/EvilAP_Defender/wiki

Setup some RPis with WiFi dongles and you can likely make a perimeter defense. IANAL and I do not know how the FCC would view this, although I imagine it is not worse than the Ruckus APs that can do this, yet still passed their certification.

This is not a substitute for patching devices, but it might help somewhat with devices that will never be patched.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#400
post #267

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

No, you do not need expensive hardware such as SDR to carry the KRACK attacks. Most plain standard WLAN adapters support AP mode, which is all you need to simulate the rogue network, as demonstrated in the video.

I stand corrected. Rogue AP / MiTM only needs a AP with the ability to send raw packets, gotcha.
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