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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

261–270 of 424 posts

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#261
post #191

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Nexus 5 was released 4 years ago. At the same time the iPhone 5C was released. The 5C also won't receive a patch for this. There is a problem with handset abandonment, but this is true across all vendors, and it does not underline sequence7's claim that this is solely an Android problem.

To be fair, these two examples are both on the extreme end: The Nexus 5 being one of the longest supported Android phones on the market, and the 5C having a rather short support period, compared to other iPhones like the 5S, which was released along with the 5C and got iOS 11. Security updates for the Nexus 5 also stopped shipping about a year earlier. There's still room for improvement for Apple (5 years of security…

Mobile devices also have much less reason to lose support than they used to. In 2010, the difference in hardware between a new phone and a 3-year-old phone was huge - 8 times the RAM, 4 times faster CPU, twice the display resolution, etc. Nowadays, the Nexus 5's specs are on par with midrange phones being released as new. It has all the hardware required to run modern apps. There's no good reason why it can't be supported, besides getting more money from people if they have to buy a new phone every 3 years.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#262

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Totally safe, until your local war-driver sniffs out your insecure device and comes back at two in the morning to upload illegal content via your ISP.

Except the attack doesn't get you access to their wireless network. It allows you to redirect someone from their wireless network to your own (spoofed) wireless network and then you can snoop the traffic.

If it works in one way what reason is there to think it won't work the opposite direction? This flaw is in the protocol itself.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#263
post #181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Preload lists are not a realistic solution (you can't preload the whole internet) and a sufficiently complicated site will be subverted due to 3rd party dependencies. And does uninstalling a browser not clear the hsts cache?

Perfect is the enemy of good. A large portion of sensitive traffic is protected by HSTS today, and the preload list compresses well. By the time it'll become a problem, we'll hopefully be at the stage where HTTP is treated as insecure anyway. I'm not certain if uninstalling a browser clears the cache (do uninstalled browsers retain their profiles?), but preloaded sites would not be affected - they're included in the…

I'm not saying it's a massive hole, i'm saying it's an easily preventable hole that the entire industry is ignoring for unknown reasons. One simple URI change could make HSTS obsolete and fix the hole with no need for awkward workarounds and half-measures. Nobody has yet explained to me why "good enough" is better than "fixed".

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#264
post #69
post #3

Do we now need WPA3? No, luckily implementations can be patched in a backwards-compatible manner.

How many BT and Virgin home routers will be patched? Somewhere around 0?

Both Virgin & BT force upgrade consumer routers overnight.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#265
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

LineageOS has a moderately large selection of supported phones for a custom ROM and it has weekly updates. My two and a half year old Moto E has the October 5th security patches for Android.

> My two and a half year old Moto E has the October 5th security patches for Android. But it has very few kernel security patches: https://cve.lineageos.org/android_kernel_motorola_msm8610

Look through the list yourself, but at least on my device, most of those kernel security issues aren't really of significant impact as apps don't have access to the APIs needed to trigger them and they're not remotely exploitable.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#266

As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.

I orded a librem5 for this among other reasons. https://puri.sm/shop/librem-5/

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#267

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

No, you do not need expensive hardware such as SDR to carry the KRACK attacks. Most plain standard WLAN adapters support AP mode, which is all you need to simulate the rogue network, as demonstrated in the video.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#268
post #165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Full disclosure is reasonable, and the only truly effective methodology. Anything else just allows vendors to delay or ignore.

It takes time to understand a vulnerability, create a patch and distribute it. Please stop confusing slowness with an intent to delay or ignore.

Vuln disclosure has historically been associated with vendors delaying and ignoring issues for a long long time. That's the whole reason FD came about. There's no confusion on my part.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#270

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

I do think it's an end-of-the-world type vulnerability, at least as far as Wi-Fi goes.

1) The paper claims confidentiality compromise allows the attacker to hijack a tcp connection: "allow an adversary to decrypt a TCP packet, learn the sequence number, and hijack the TCP stream to inject arbitrary data", this on all cases, even in the cases where it doesn't allow forgery (CCMP)

2) There's no such claim on the paper and according to the researcher, exploiting this on Android and Linux is trivial. Apparently also macOS. Did you see the video on their website?

3) There's no way for you to control this (apps, https stripping, for instance). Most importantly, there's no way for the average user to control this, short than using a VPN.

Again, as far as Wi-Fi security goes, seems pretty end-of-the-world to me. I don't think the huge attention this is getting is unwarranted.

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