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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

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Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#181

Post by pfg »

peterwwillis wrote: post #86
pfg wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All major browsers implement a HSTS preload list[1] to get around the first connection problem. Manually deleting the HSTS pin for a site is quite involved and not something I'd expect most users to do. [1]: https://hstspreload.org/

Preload lists are not a realistic solution (you can't preload the whole internet) and a sufficiently complicated site will be subverted due to 3rd party dependencies. And does uninstalling a browser not clear the hsts cache?

Perfect is the enemy of good. A large portion of sensitive traffic is protected by HSTS today, and the preload list compresses well. By the time it'll become a problem, we'll hopefully be at the stage where HTTP is treated as insecure anyway.

I'm not certain if uninstalling a browser clears the cache (do uninstalled browsers retain their profiles?), but preloaded sites would not be affected - they're included in the browser binary. Either way, let's not act like there's a massive hole in HSTS because there's a possibility that users might go as far as reinstalling their browser to visit a not-preloaded HSTS-enabled site that's being targeted.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#182

Post by danilocesar »

cm2187 wrote: post #172
twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Also doesn't it require the attacker to have access to your wifi already? If that's the case, it's a hazard for connecting in a Starbucks or on your mobile service wifi, but you would be safe on your home or corporate wifi (unless the attacker is a colleague or relative!).

> Also doesn't it require the attacker to have access to your wifi already?

No it doesn't. Watch the video. It creates a clone of your network and tricks the victim's software stack to connect into it.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#183

Post by Fnoord »

creatrixcordis wrote: post #152
nullbyte wrote: post #141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well yeah, you'd always be safe against these types of attacks if you're wired in. Even on Ethernet.

So if i use my wired in node as an ssh tunnel out to the "internets" to tunnel all traffic from my wifi connected nodes then this mitigates the issue till updates come through?

That's a feasible option on laptops running macOS or Linux, but not for Android clients. Running a SSH VPN (tunneling all traffic) requires root and has a severe performance penalty (which you will notice on your battery). You'd notice it on the laptops as well, but I guess that matters less.

Funny enough, OpenBSD didn't impleemnt WPA(2) for a while. Instead, they were forcing their users to use IPsec and OpenSSH instead.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#184

Post by user5994461 »

greedo wrote: post #165
user5994461 wrote: post #135

Earlier quoted context omitted.

July => October. It's 3 month. It's a reasonable delay if you have to alert lots of manufacturer and they need time to roll out critical patches to lots of devices.

Full disclosure is reasonable, and the only truly effective methodology. Anything else just allows vendors to delay or ignore.

It takes time to understand a vulnerability, create a patch and distribute it.

Please stop confusing slowness with an intent to delay or ignore.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#185

Post by dboreham »

"This can be abused to steal sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords"

This really isn't true (because that kind of information is protected by TLS) and the article is highly disingenuous to not say so.

Nobody has trusted WiFi encryption as protection for sensitive information for more than a decade.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#186

Post by user5994461 »

mimi89999 wrote: post #176
user5994461 wrote: post #128

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The state actor should be least of your worries compared to the millions of script kiddies would could use the vulnerability once it is disclosed publicly.

No as I would know about it by following security news?

Are you so great that you know all the vulnerabilities all the time since the second of disclosure?

Do you seriously expect the other billions of people on the planet to be that great too?

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#187

Post by Jach »

JumpCrisscross wrote: post #111
stsp wrote: post #105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hi, I am the person you are accusing of mischief. I didn't break any agreement. I agreed with Mathy on what to do, and that's what I did. The fact that Mathy decided to get CERT involved and subsequently had to extend the embargo has nothing to do with me. (edit: typo)

To be clear, I accuse you of nothing less than playing a rational response to the researcher's apparent "always coöperate" strategy. "Defect" in a prisoner's dilemma context does not mean "breach" in a legal one. (For example, an OPEC member defecting has zero legal consequences. It does, however, affect their standing in the next round of negotiations.)

'Defect' doesn't mean 'breach' in a legal situation, it also doesn't mean 'sociopath and/or economics professor' in a psychological one, but people form connotations, so be careful what you accuse. Anyway I think you're playing the PD analogy too much... But I'll play a bit too. Construct a payoff matrix. What does real defection look like? It's patching mid-July, when the patch was received, instead of waiting to the agreed upon end of August time. I see no defect here. There could only be one if, after CERT was involved and set a new date, Mathy asked OpenBSD to postpone the prior date agreement, and instead of cooperating they patched immediately for the biggest gains to their users. There is no mention of such a request, hence it probably didn't come.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#188

Post by discreditable »

dboreham wrote: post #185

"This can be abused to steal sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords" This really isn't true (because that kind of information is protected by TLS) and the article is highly disingenuous to not say so. Nobody has trusted WiFi encryption as protection for sensitive information for more than a decade.

Demonstration video has the researcher sniff passwords from match.com, which uses TLS. The catch is they aren't using HSTS and so they are vulnerable to sslstrip.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#189

Post by cpach »

dboreham wrote: post #185

"This can be abused to steal sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords" This really isn't true (because that kind of information is protected by TLS) and the article is highly disingenuous to not say so. Nobody has trusted WiFi encryption as protection for sensitive information for more than a decade.

Did you watch the demo video[1]? Apparently some sites (Vanhoef’s example was Match.com) are suspectible to MITM by using Moxie Marlinspike’s sslstrip tool[2].

[1] https://youtu.be/Oh4WURZoR98 [2] https://github.com/moxie0/sslstrip

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#190

Post by orblivion »

Jach wrote: post #161
orblivion wrote: post #149

I'm not sure I understand the concern with breaking WiFi. Okay, so you're vulnerable to snooping and injection by people in the same coffee shop or your neighborhood. But you're already vulnerable to that from anybody on the Internet between you and the site. HTTPS solves both of these. Am I missing something?

Lots of sites aren't on https yet. Some never will be. Additionally there could be intranet communications no one bothered to secure, so maybe the company email's POP server was never configured to send text encrypted.

Yeah, Intranet is a good example.
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