Earlier quoted context omitted.
All major browsers implement HSTS preloading, and getting added is quite simple. A very large percentage of your average internet user's traffic is covered by this.
Preloading is a problem waiting to happen. It works fine when only a small portion of the internet uses it. But when you have 2 GB preload file with a few billion entries things are not going to work so well.
Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
301–310 of 424 posts
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#302So is there any precautions I should take with my macbook and iphone?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#303Earlier quoted context omitted.
Debian repos and inherently Ubuntu's repos also have wpa_supplicant 2.4, we will see if they update to 2.6 or release a patch. Probably patch before 2.6. It would be nice if there was a rule which package repos and distros would adhere to. The rule would adapt, such as all the packages that have had a security issues, will always be required to be updated to the latest versions in the next release or sooner. As vulne…
There has always been a rule for bug-fix and security updates: Apply the minimum necessary change to solve the problem. This means cherry-picking the mainline patches where possible, or back-porting them where modification is required for them to apply (and work as intended) on older releases. Especially with older versions it often isn't possible to update to a later upstream release because that depends on later ve…
i looked here and i don't know where to pick up the patch also ran update manager in my ubuntu distro but no dice :(
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/wpa/+bug/1723909 http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/pkg/wpa.htm...
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#304This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
I do think it's an end-of-the-world type vulnerability, at least as far as Wi-Fi goes. 1) The paper claims confidentiality compromise allows the attacker to hijack a tcp connection: "allow an adversary to decrypt a TCP packet, learn the sequence number, and hijack the TCP stream to inject arbitrary data", this on all cases, even in the cases where it doesn't allow forgery (CCMP) 2) There's no such claim on the paper…
The attack is a standard break exiting secure TCP connection and trick the target to re-create it to a host controlled by the attacker via arp poisoning or route hijacking. After that either convince target to accept a bogus cert or redirect to insecure connection. In the former case the issue is that browsers have way too many root CAs included in them and those CAs can issue certs for any domain; the issue in the second case is that users are not being paranoid enough.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#305Assuming neither client and router is upgraded, can this be mitigated my making the SSID hidden, so the attacker wouldn't know which AP to spoof?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#306Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#307This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
> 3. Everything you care about _should_ be going over TLS, which mitigates all effects of this attack. This is probably the biggest misconception. Many, many websites and APIs don't have HSTS enabled to force all connections to use TLS. The author demonstrates using sslstrip to downgrade the connection of match.com to steal credentials. How many people watch the green "secure" indicator in the URL bar to ensure it do…
I honestly never considered that one...
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#308Is there a way I can install an open source phone OS on my old Android phones to keep them patched? I'm not prepared to keep buying new phones just because manufacturers only provide intermittent updates for a year or two. Anyone got any suggestions for options?
Unfortunately, Google has given app developers a quite powerful tool to disable the use of their apps on non-official OS images, in the form of SafetyNet. So even if you can install an open source version of Android expect a bunch of stuff to no longer work afterwards.
I'm actually persuaded that I don't need terminal root access on a device (except for system debugging), but rather a firmware signed with my own release keys, and apps that need privileged access baked in.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#309Earlier quoted context omitted.
This probably hasn't been exploited in the wild. Anyway the point of coordinating disclosure is to leave fewer people vulnerable overall. If one team releases a patch early, attackers can analyze the patch and start using the vulnerability against unpatched systems. Waiting for everyone to patch at once closes that window.
How can you state that it probably hasn't been exploited in the wild with any degree of confidence? It's possible that the same flaw was found and exploited years ago by black hat hackers and/or state security services. We have no way to know whether this actually happened, or even estimate the probability.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#310Earlier quoted context omitted.
Special gear isn't all that expensive. From a cursory view of the video and a skim of the paper, they're using hostapd, which means that they simply need a wifi adapter with a sufficiently-good driver. Anything with the RTL8188CUS seems to be pretty nice (that's what I'm using in a raspberry pi project, myself). So - I agree with you that there's a barrier to entry, but it's not that big of a barrier.
Agreed. Not specialized equipment. Just something that lets you shoot raw frames and run as a WiFi AP. I have 2 such USB WiFi dongles in my bag for setting up such environments. Give: http://www.tp-link.com/us/products/details/cat-5520_TL-WN722... a shot. It will let you setup an AP in a VM easily, etc. It is our currently anointed dongle for VM hosted MiTM setups. I haven't tested it, but it should work fine if they…
My suggestion is Alfa AWUS036NHA (The last three letters are important!) which has AR9271 chip with great support with the ath9k driver.
[1]: https://wikidevi.com/wiki/TP-LINK_TL-WN722N
[2]: https://wikidevi.com/wiki/TP-LINK_TL-WN722N_v2
[3]:http://www.ebay.com/itm/ALFA-AWUS036NHA-802-11n-Wireless-N-W...