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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

krackattacks.com

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Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#251

Post by andoma »

twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

tcpdump -nw - | strings -n 6

Credit to https://twitter.com/marcan42

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#252

Post by iKenshu »

twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

So, even if I'm using the extension HTTPSEverywhere I'm safe?

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#253

Post by collinmanderson »

twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Don't forget about HSTS. The author demonstrates in the video that you can sometimes bypass TLS if HSTS is not set up.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#254

Post by kenaddams »

gruez wrote: post #196
kenaddams wrote: post #108

i don't get how they can run a mitm attack without knowing the secret passphrase, can someone explain this in laymans terms?

Because you are replaying the packet, which doesn't need the key.

thanks that makes sense

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#255

Post by tedunangst »

acqq wrote: post #137
asclepi wrote: post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

For reference, the OpenBSD patch in question released on August 30: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.1/common/027_n...

tedunangst: "We asked to commit without revealing details, he said yes" "I guess he changed his mind about that after the fact." The patch has obviously an explicit description: "State transition errors could cause reinstallation of old WPA keys." It's true, however, that anybody who analyzes the diffs would eventually figure that out, as Theo de Raadt argued. My conclusion is also that the real error was even wantin…

Oh, that's the problem? That's too much information? Well, shit.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#257

Post by pixl97 »

pfg wrote: post #250
Someone1234 wrote: post #239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HSTS only works if you have visited the site before or it is hard coded (see Chrome and Google services for example). Reality is that DNS remains and will continue to remain a giant hole in TLS.

All major browsers implement HSTS preloading, and getting added is quite simple. A very large percentage of your average internet user's traffic is covered by this.

Preloading is a problem waiting to happen. It works fine when only a small portion of the internet uses it. But when you have 2 GB preload file with a few billion entries things are not going to work so well.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#258

Post by prophesi »

Perseids wrote: post #155
sequence7 wrote: post #127

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have a HTC 10, a flagship device that's barely a year old the fact that I now have to wait a couple a months for a patch to what is clearly a critical vulnerability is just ridiculous. The fact that anyone without a flagship device should now throw that phone away because it will probably never be patched is despicable. I totally agree with your hope that this will kick both the manufacturers and Google in the butt…

To underline your point, even my Nexus 5 (_from Google_), which is a little less than 3 years old, will never receive security updates. And one of the main reasons I chose the Nexus was to be sure to get updates on time. Except for the security vulnerabilities, everything of the device is totally fine. It's such a waste of resources… (In this case I at least have an alternative in the form of Lineage OS, which will o…

On the bright side, Nexus 5 has a lot of community support. So, as you've stated, there are decent ROM alternatives like LineageOS that are actively maintained to implement these patches.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#259

Post by iam-TJ »

creatrixcordis wrote: post #200
Fnoord wrote: post #183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a feasible option on laptops running macOS or Linux, but not for Android clients. Running a SSH VPN (tunneling all traffic) requires root and has a severe performance penalty (which you will notice on your battery). You'd notice it on the laptops as well, but I guess that matters less. Funny enough, OpenBSD didn't impleemnt WPA(2) for a while. Instead, they were forcing their users to use IPsec and OpenSSH ins…

Debian repos and inherently Ubuntu's repos also have wpa_supplicant 2.4, we will see if they update to 2.6 or release a patch. Probably patch before 2.6. It would be nice if there was a rule which package repos and distros would adhere to. The rule would adapt, such as all the packages that have had a security issues, will always be required to be updated to the latest versions in the next release or sooner. As vulne…

There has always been a rule for bug-fix and security updates:

Apply the minimum necessary change to solve the problem.

This means cherry-picking the mainline patches where possible, or back-porting them where modification is required for them to apply (and work as intended) on older releases.

Especially with older versions it often isn't possible to update to a later upstream release because that depends on later versions of other packages. The dependencies can rapidly multiply to affect tens or even hundreds of packages.

Ubuntu patches were prepared and released within 4 hours of the security team being aware of the vulnerability. Same goes for Debian.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#260

Post by tedunangst »

ComputerGuru wrote: post #245
tedunangst wrote: post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We're not mind readers. If he says it's ok, we think it's ok. If other vendors have fucked up months long patch cycles, that's their deal, not ours.

What part of this commit description is "not revealing details"? https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.1/common/027_n...

All of it? The paper describing the attack is longer than one sentence.
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