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An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

dustingmixon.wordpress.com

31–40 of 76 posts

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#31

So the question is if "Minimizing Efficiency Gap" is what we should be aiming for. Its a solid proposal, but I guess its up to the courts to decide if "Efficiency Gap" is a good metric. I guess I'll be interested in hearing the arguments as they come up.

>So the question is if "Minimizing Efficiency Gap" is what we should be aiming for.

100% agree. I think this can be further broken down into the questions:

(1) What are the problems caused by extreme gerrymandering?

(2) How will efficiency gap minimization alleviate these problems?

(3) What assumptions are we making in (2)? How likely are they to be true? And how robust is the solution to their falsification?

(4) How could this all go catastrophically wrong?

My intuition is that efficiency gap minimization is an incomplete solution and probably should be only one of several factors considered.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#32
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure I like the name "Efficiency Gap" but the metric of "require the overall district results be within a certain range of the popular results" seems pretty straightforward to me. I've always thought they should just reverse the order of operations. Instead of having people draw the districts, then machines evaluate them, they should have machines draw a bunch of potential "low efficiency gap" districts, then…

The main takeaway from the article is that sometimes there is a trade-off between nice geometrical shapes and proportional district results. If a machine gave you a crazy-shaped district map because that's the only way to get "low efficiency gap", would you agree to them?

How often are districts able to be redrawn? The same crazy shaped map that is valid in 2020 may not be very good in 2025 or even 2021.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#33
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are actually more extreme examples. Consider, Hillary Clinton got 90.9% of the DC vote Trump got 4.1%, I am not sure how you could slice up DC to get 10% Republican representation. In Maryland's case it might be able to make 2 districts Republican, but that's assuming a very concentrated geographic minority which may or may not actually exist. IMO, If we really want proportional representation then we should us…

DC is a single city and doesn't even have one representative in Congress (Okay, they nominally have one. But she's non-voting so.... that's not really useful). They're technically a US Territory and have no more power than say Puerto Rico. So once again, if you're talking about US Representatives and Voting Districts, it only makes sense to talk about well... Voting Districts. Name me one US State with 80/20 split an…

These rules are not limited to National elections. State elections are also based on redistricting. DC is part of the US and has District Elections so these rules will apply to it.

https://www.dcboe.org/election_info/election_results/v3/2016...

So, no you can't dodge the question. And I ask you to draw a DC map with some Republican representation.

PS: AKA draw a map such that WARD EIGHT MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL is likely Republican.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#34
> Our paper proves that in some cases, it’s impossible to get a small efficiency gap without drawing bizarrely shaped districts.

Italics mine. Is there any reason to believe that any real life situation would fall under their impossibility? The key is to get a system which is good enough to prevent gerrymandering for the world that exists, not for any possible world.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#35

I think this indirectly hints at something much more fundamental: district based plurality does not make sense as an election system anymore. I think an eye opening example is to consider a hypothetical single state with 10 representatives. This state has a population, perfectly well distributed, of 35% democrat, 30% republican, 20% libertarian, and 15% green. And we draw our districts up with absolutely no bias what…

For an improvement on the "1 seat for every 10% of the vote you get" system you mention, take a look at the system Cambridge, MA uses for their at-large city council election [1]. Citizens cast ranked-choice ballots, and through an iterative process each of the 9 councilors are elected if they receive over 10% of the vote. (Excess votes for winners and votes for candidates below a certain threshold are transferred in each iteration.)

[1] http://www.fairvote.org/cambridge-massachusetts-elections-a-...

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#36
post #12

> Now suppose you are tasked with drawing 5 districts for this region. Or, we could go with proportional representation, make it a single district, and now we can reasonably expect to get 2-3 blue reps and 2-3 red ones, handling both the districting problem and efficiency/fairness problem in one go.

Yes. Much better.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems to me that a system with zero efficiency gap would be equivalent to one big election with proportional representation. If that's what people really want, why talk about voting districts at all?

You're either thinking about this too broadly, or as a system filled with static entities. Within voting districts, politics is local - individuals can sway voters, voters can decide to show up/skip voting, etc. Also, the concept of a 'blue/red' district can be very blurry - there are many examples of 'blue' districts (districts with democrat congress reps, and a history of voting blue) that voted red in the last pre…

Do people in the US have the same feeling for what area is 'local' as they did when districts were drawn up ?

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#38

I think this indirectly hints at something much more fundamental: district based plurality does not make sense as an election system anymore. I think an eye opening example is to consider a hypothetical single state with 10 representatives. This state has a population, perfectly well distributed, of 35% democrat, 30% republican, 20% libertarian, and 15% green. And we draw our districts up with absolutely no bias what…

Or just add more districts...

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#39

So the question is if "Minimizing Efficiency Gap" is what we should be aiming for. Its a solid proposal, but I guess its up to the courts to decide if "Efficiency Gap" is a good metric. I guess I'll be interested in hearing the arguments as they come up.

It seems to me that a system with zero efficiency gap would be equivalent to one big election with proportional representation. If that's what people really want, why talk about voting districts at all?

Something that you can do is something like we have here in Sweden - we have a district setup with some places for each district that is proportionally distributed.

But that create inefficiencies as that heavily favour some parties. So we have a chunk of undistricted delegates that are given out to even out the overall proportionality. This get you pretty good results as long as the amount of parties stay within reasonable boundaries[].

[] Which they of course haven't - we currently have 8 parties in the Riksdag.

Re: An impossibility theorem for gerrymandering

#40

I think this indirectly hints at something much more fundamental: district based plurality does not make sense as an election system anymore. I think an eye opening example is to consider a hypothetical single state with 10 representatives. This state has a population, perfectly well distributed, of 35% democrat, 30% republican, 20% libertarian, and 15% green. And we draw our districts up with absolutely no bias what…

What I don't like about this analysis is that it enshrines the notion of political parties. It makes individuals into automata that simply vote for whatever candidate is thrown at them.

The ideal is that candidates can rest on their own merits, with the party mechanic existing to provide support to candidates who nominally align with the party's interests. People vote for candidates, not parties.

Even the reality is that people are not determined by their party affiliation; New York City, for example, has repeatedly elected Republican mayors despite being overwhelmingly Democratic in state and national elections. This has even been used in a derogatory sense, as "Rockefeller Republicans" or "New York Republicans"; people affiliated with the national party but who skew to the preferences of voters in their region.

In your hypothetical state, once you created the districts, then the competition inside that district is between candidates who try to align themselves with that region; people who, for example, can be a "green-republican" to draw voters from both blocks, or just a person who speaks to the needs of voters in that district, regardless of party affiliation.

Using some sort of state-wide rank-preferential or approval system means that we remove a lot of the strategizing on the part of voters, which is a positive, but the strategizing on the part of political parties and individuals seeking office become much more complex, and not in a way that serves to present candidates that appeal to issues confronted by groups of people regardless of their party affiliation. Geography is just a heuristic for this, but not the worst one you could think of.

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