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Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

arstechnica.com

181–190 of 296 posts

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If you haven't, the attack vector still exists, and if you are traveling with a trusted laptop with fingerprint unlock, the attack vector still exists with one level of indirection. You can't setup TouchID without a passcode. The "attack vector" only exists if you 0 security on your iPhone to begin with. (So , yes, technically the attack vector exists if you choose to use no locks at all).

You misunderstand. The vector is: I take random persons phone, compel them to provide me their finger print, and now when I plug the phone in to a computer, I can unlock the device and then tap "trust" in order to back up the phone to the computer. If the iPhone was already powered on and the user had entered their passcode after it turned on, even if it was two weeks ago (there may be a time out I'm not aware of, bu…

That's changed now, from the article:

> Under iOS 11, this sequence has changed to also specifically require the passcode on the device after the "Trust This Computer?" prompt.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#182

I have never seen a company both so technically capable and supportive of user privacy as Apple. It stands completely apart from all of the tech giants of today.

Thinking about it, Apple is benefiting right now from the same debt-based economy that benefits the FBI/NSA. I don't think there even is much local US manufacturing, so Apple imports products made in China and sell them at a high profit margin. Apple's cash piles came from debt, and I think national debt is exactly the thing that increases when FBI/NSA spends more money, right? (Of course, it is only one kind of debt, but it is important for example because of the bonds other countries buy with their FX reserves)

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#183
post #180
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This would be awesome.

No it is not. It signifies a divide between the tech sector which strives for privacy and government (which is/was supposed to protect the people)

Oh? I might have misunderstood your post.

I thought you were suggesting a way that meant phone backups all appear the same size as the disk 100% of the time. (meaning the true volume of content is hidden)

Then the second point is the user could potentially have two (or more) profiles on the device, and it is possible to unlock it into one or the other. Meaning a user under duress can unlock a device and not reveal the true content while the person trying to get into the device has no way of knowing if that is the true profile or not.

I figured that would be a pretty sweet feature. It would also tie neatly into allowing users to have multiple profiles on their device which is currently impossible on iOS...

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#184
post #183
post #180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No it is not. It signifies a divide between the tech sector which strives for privacy and government (which is/was supposed to protect the people)

Oh? I might have misunderstood your post. I thought you were suggesting a way that meant phone backups all appear the same size as the disk 100% of the time. (meaning the true volume of content is hidden) Then the second point is the user could potentially have two (or more) profiles on the device, and it is possible to unlock it into one or the other. Meaning a user under duress can unlock a device and not reveal th…

It is a good feature, but my comment was on "awesome". It is not an awesome situation, far from it.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#185
post #184
post #183

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh? I might have misunderstood your post. I thought you were suggesting a way that meant phone backups all appear the same size as the disk 100% of the time. (meaning the true volume of content is hidden) Then the second point is the user could potentially have two (or more) profiles on the device, and it is possible to unlock it into one or the other. Meaning a user under duress can unlock a device and not reveal th…

It is a good feature, but my comment was on "awesome". It is not an awesome situation, far from it.

ahhh, haha ok I see!

yeah it isn't awesome that we feel we need these security features. However I think even without the fear of government (etc...) this is still a great feature I would love to have.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#186
post #75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lying to a federal agent is a crime. Edit: No seriously. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Making_false_statements . Refusing to unlock your device is one thing. Claiming that you did unlock it but in fact just used a "duress passcode" is a lie and can land you in jail.

This makes me wonder something. I know that while they can't force you to enter your passcode, they can force you to unlock with your fingerprint. I've heard people ask for a feature where you basically have a "duress fingerprint," since fingerprint is already different than password, would using a duress fingerprint be acceptable?

I believe if you tap the power button 5 times on the iPhone, it disables fingerprint unlock. Perfect for a scenario where you are afraid you might be compelled to fingerprint.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#187

For anyone concerned that authorities force you to give up your password to them (thus allowing them to image your device), you can pair your iPhone to a computer with a MDM (managed device profile), which will prevent any other device from connecting to it. iOS security researcher (now Apple employee) Jonathan Zdziarski has 2 blog posts on this: Counter-Forensics: Pair-Lock Your Device with Apple’s Configurator: htt…

What happens if your computer breaks? Is the iPhone paper weight then?

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#188
post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I see your point, but: That's not an excuse, that's an explanation. It is anti freedom whether that's their end game or not. I don't really care about Apples motives, I care about the product. Really, Apple is anti Nothing and pro only one thing: money. Everything else is a corollary. Including ease of use, freedom, and privacy. It's just that those things do matter to me (and GP).

What's an example of a common use case in which Apple is anti-freedom in your opinion?

Web browser engines. Default apps.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#189

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This makes me wonder something. I know that while they can't force you to enter your passcode, they can force you to unlock with your fingerprint. I've heard people ask for a feature where you basically have a "duress fingerprint," since fingerprint is already different than password, would using a duress fingerprint be acceptable?

I believe if you tap the power button 5 times on the iPhone, it disables fingerprint unlock. Perfect for a scenario where you are afraid you might be compelled to fingerprint.

This is apparently an upcoming feature in iOS12 but doesn't work in iOS11 now

What does work is putting the wrong finger on your sensor until it tells you TouchID is disabled and needs your passcode (which is 5 times) or rebooting your device without logging in.

Re: Under iOS 11, authorities won’t be able to image your device without a passcode

#190
What if Apple also added a feature for showing an innocent/clean phone if a specific password is pressed? How would the law enforcement know the difference? You only need to show the cellular call log, because they already have it and could use it to prove that you used the "mode".
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