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Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk

71–80 of 80 posts

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think it would be a map/territory confusion to consider it a kind of actual randomness. Even though it makes perfect sense to apply probability theory to it? We found a perfect coin, one that we know that you can't predict in advance even in principle, and you want to avoid considering it a kind of randomness? Why does the mechanism by which the universe implements randomness -- in this case via determinism -- ma…

The many worlds case I was responding to is different to the coin case you are taking about. In the MW case we know enough to see that the situation is not at all random. In your example you're postulating a coin that may well actually be random.

I don't understand what you mean here. I think "the many worlds case I was responding to" in your comment is justinpombrio's "which way you will see a photon go in a half-silvered mirror", but that's functionally identical to the "indexical coin flip" referred to by the LessWrong article, where the coin flip causes a bifurcation, landing heads in universe A and tails in universe B. From within the multiverse it is impossible to know ahead of time which universe you will observe, same as the photon example. It's "random" in the sense of being absolutely unpredictable (otherwise MWI would not be experimentally equivalent to alternative interpretations of quantum physics).

So, does indexical randomness fit your definition of "fundamental" randomness? And what did you mean when you said "a coin that may well actually be random" if it wasn't the indexical kind of coin?

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The many worlds case I was responding to is different to the coin case you are taking about. In the MW case we know enough to see that the situation is not at all random. In your example you're postulating a coin that may well actually be random.

I don't understand what you mean here. I think "the many worlds case I was responding to" in your comment is justinpombrio's "which way you will see a photon go in a half-silvered mirror", but that's functionally identical to the "indexical coin flip" referred to by the LessWrong article, where the coin flip causes a bifurcation, landing heads in universe A and tails in universe B. From within the multiverse it is im…

> does indexical randomness fit your definition of "fundamental" randomness?

No, it does not. MW is determinsitic. The fact that you don't know which universe you will observe is a limit on your knowledge. It does not make the things actually random.

There are other interpretations of QM where there is literal randomness, independent of an observers knowledge.

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I think it would be a map/territory confusion to consider it a kind of actual randomness. Even though it makes perfect sense to apply probability theory to it? We found a perfect coin, one that we know that you can't predict in advance even in principle, and you want to avoid considering it a kind of randomness? Why does the mechanism by which the universe implements randomness -- in this case via determinism -- ma…

The many worlds case I was responding to is different to the coin case you are taking about. In the MW case we know enough to see that the situation is not at all random. In your example you're postulating a coin that may well actually be random.

By "a prefect coin", I was referring to a half silvered mirror.

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#74
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What is the problem, though? Who says the uni/multiverse has a finite memory capacity? For more in this vein: http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-...

It's not about the memory capacity ..

What is it about?

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#75
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

MWI doesn't mean anything and everything can happen because there's infinite universes. The equations of quantum mechanics describe the ways that worlds can branch apart and the proportions of those branches. Sorry if I'm underestimating your familiarity with MWI here; if I am, szemet has a much better response. I'm just a little concerned that some people in the thread don't realize MWI refers to something much more…

I hear a lot that MWI implies that everything that can happen does happen. What I find frustrating is that the obvious next interesting question then is 'well what can happen?', and people don't seem to talk too much about that.

I would have thought that the answer to "what can happen" is pretty unequivocally the Schrödinger equation?

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#76
post #67
post #47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why do you say that quantum randomness is a problem in MWI? I thought it was one of the neat things of MWI that it doesn't require randomness. There are no random events: instead you have a branch for each outcome. The only randomness is which branch you find yourself in as an individual.

In short the problem is that there's no explanation for why you only experience a single branch, and no explanation of why the probabilities associated with those branches are given by the Born rule. Although there are many versions of MWI, the general claim is that a single axiom (a unitarily evolving wavefunction) is sufficient to explain our observations of the universe. Without getting into what it means to "expl…

>there's no explanation for why you only experience a single branch

Isn't that obvious given that the particles of your brain can't interact with the particles of your brain in physically-different branches?

>it seems fair to demand that a sufficiently intelligent agent with no prior knowledge of our physics should be able to predict what the theory says about their future observations. ... Even if you add that in, there's nothing to suggest which branch the agent will experience

Don't you get that same problem with other interpretations that instead assume interactions can have a truly random result on some probability distribution?

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#77
post #40

I have an unrelated question to the physics nerds. Is it even possible to determine whether the universe is deterministic or not from inside the universe? Let's imagine a simplified example. I give you two sets of numbers (let's pretend they are atom coordinates). One set is purely random, another one is generated with a very simple formula (example: f(n) = SHA256(N + salt)). I will give you as many of the numbers as…

Real physics nerd, non-popsci answer: everything that is obersed rather than conjectured about the universe implies that it has no "outside" and your question is a bit like asking what is North of the North Pole. It just isn't a meaningful concept, like "before the big bang" or "what did the universe expand into."

> everything that is obsersed rather than conjectured about the universe implies that it has no "outside"

"outside" is not very rigorous. For example, we seem to be observing objects vanishing behind the comoving horizon. It seems unlikely that the individual cosmic horizons centred on each of our microscopic components is destroying these objects, and it seems unlikely that they will ever reenter the comoving horizon. The metric expansion induces other interesting horizons, too, and each has an "inside" and an "outside". But how many of these horizon-crossings are directly detectable by the objects crossing them? (Reflectively, we are each exiting the horizons of distant observers at slightly different scale factors because we aren't occupying the same point in spacetime).

"More of same" for some distance outside of e.g. the cosmological event horizon is wholly reasonable. We can even put lower bounds on "some distance" depending on how we look at the homogeneity and flatness problems. They're big. IIRC Guth's original cosmic inflation work predicted that the Hubble volume is no more than 10^-26 of the total causually connected volume at the start of inflation. We can also put bounds on any sort of gradient on various apparent constants such as c and G, and the region in which they are virtually certian to have the same values we have experimentally here is also big.

However we currently can't do much better than that. The bits and pieces that were close to us in the hot dense phase of the universe are mostly inaccessible to us now, but there is every probability that they have identical local physics to us. There may be bits and pieces that were insufficiently close to us in that phase that have wildly different physics; and we do not really know anything about the still denser phase of the universe. It is perfectly reasonable to consider observables generated by detailed guesses that e.g. avoid an actual singularity like Carroll & Chen (who propose one or more other universes evolving towards de Sitter space from some arbitrary shared values surface) for instance. But even there, "outside" gets tricky.

Moreover, "inside" vs "outside" is not really the best way to approach the underlying question, "what is the nature of the metric expansion of space?" where the real answer should identify the cosmological frame and its preferred coordinate system in which almost all matter remains at essentially the same spatial coordinates from the big bang to the infinite future, with the scale factor relating to radar distances (and radar beam wavelength changes) between objects at distant spatial coordinates. Then we can admit that there are various ways to interpret the radar observables, with the "easiest" one being a purely local evolution of the vacuum at each point along the radar's path, which in the preferred cosmological frame can be seen as dark energy, but which with other systems of coordinates can be seen as anything from "the local creation of more space" to a Doppler effect to (somewhat less usefully) a change in the vacuum's refractive index.

> what is North of the North pole

Well, a change of coordinates on the Earth gets rid of that particular coordinate singularity, doesn't it? We can get rid of all sorts of oddities by swapping the coordinates we're using, which is probably the greatest strength of general covariance.

What we can't do by changing coordinates (even to accelerated systems of coordinates) is eliminate the Earth's oblateness.

Likewise, we can change from FLRW coordinates to other coordinates on the cosmological frame and get rid of (or introduce) all sorts of oddities. We can't, however, get rid of angle-brightness-redshift relations.

It is a bit silly to introduce all sorts of additional action-at-a-distance forces to explain the Earth's oblateness in an effort to do away with the rotation-oblateness relation for objects close to hydrostatic equilibrium.

Similarly, it could be a bit silly to introduce all sorts of new (and presently broken) symmetries in an effort to do away with away with causally disconnected regions (with possibly different physics) before inflation or whatever mechanisms produced the relic field anisotropies. And I think it's reasonable for physical cosmologists to argue that it's hard to foreclose on that type of multiverse without doing so.

Moreover, "before the big bang" is perfectly reasonable if one starts adding in new symmetries anyway; if quantum gravitation avoids the BB singularity (as practically everyone hopes it will avoid BH singularities), why wouldn't it be meaningful to consider the universe before the classical singularity BB? It's just technically difficult as a theoretical programme and is unlikely to be guided by current data. Well, so what? It's technically difficult to predict early structures or them right after reionization, let alone say anything about or observe anything at slightly higher redshifts, and we don't even expect new physics to be relevant in those regions at all.

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#79
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

MWI doesn't mean anything and everything can happen because there's infinite universes. The equations of quantum mechanics describe the ways that worlds can branch apart and the proportions of those branches. Sorry if I'm underestimating your familiarity with MWI here; if I am, szemet has a much better response. I'm just a little concerned that some people in the thread don't realize MWI refers to something much more…

I hear a lot that MWI implies that everything that can happen does happen. What I find frustrating is that the obvious next interesting question then is 'well what can happen?', and people don't seem to talk too much about that.

The short answer is the Schrödinger equation.

If you want a more layman's explanation of what sort of things would cause a branch and how the branches would differ: one simple example is that when an excited atom emits a photon, it doesn't emit it in a random direction, instead there's a superposition of it emitting the photon across all paths away from itself. In many of these paths, the photon will interact with particles differently than happens with other paths, and the paths will decohere into different branches of the world with separate consequences from the photon hitting in a different place in each branch. In one branch, the photon could hit a particle in the air and affect its temperature and velocity by the tiniest amount. In another branch, the photon could instead hit a receptor in a person's eye and immediately trigger a reaction that would not have otherwise occurred.

Small differences between the branches could build up into bigger differences over time, especially when you consider the sheer number of concurrent interactions that are creating overlapping superpositions which decohere in many different ways. It could be that there's enough branches that most things that could have reasonably happened by chance do happen in some branch.

(If you're wondering how we could know in theory that the world may branch like this, it's because branches where particles take different paths but then later have all of their positions line up together interfere with each other. See the two-slit experiment.)

Re: Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

#80
post #76
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In short the problem is that there's no explanation for why you only experience a single branch, and no explanation of why the probabilities associated with those branches are given by the Born rule. Although there are many versions of MWI, the general claim is that a single axiom (a unitarily evolving wavefunction) is sufficient to explain our observations of the universe. Without getting into what it means to "expl…

>there's no explanation for why you only experience a single branch Isn't that obvious given that the particles of your brain can't interact with the particles of your brain in physically-different branches? >it seems fair to demand that a sufficiently intelligent agent with no prior knowledge of our physics should be able to predict what the theory says about their future observations. ... Even if you add that in, t…

> Isn't that obvious...

Not immediately obvious to me. An agent could calculate the entangled state of themselves (including brain particles), the system and the measuring apparatus. This overall entangled state would in principle be pure, although the agent's own reduced state would be in a superposition which could be written in one of an infinite number of ways. What the agent should expect to experience in this situation is not at all clear, to me.

> Don't you get that same problem with other interpretations...

Most other interpretations have an explicit postulate relating physical probabilities to parts of the mathematical formalism. The agent can use this to make predictions about future observations.

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