Not even wrong: Why does nobody like pilot-wave theory? [pdf]

What is the problem, though? Who says the uni/multiverse has a finite memory capacity? For more in this vein: http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-...

My understanding of QM is only surface-level, so there may be subtleties I'm missing, but this presentation's arguments against the many-worlds interpretation seem pretty weak.

Page 28 grudgingly alludes to the idea that MWI could be simpler than other theories ("Objection based on surprisingly common misconception that standard QM defined solely by Schrödinger's equation ... It is only within a many-worlds framework that this view could begin to make sense"), but later introduces MWI as a contender beginning with a nonsense news headline and then characterizes it as intuitively bizarre for proposing a large multiverse, as if the size for its proposed multiverse was an obvious point against it. It seems to me there's an implied misuse of Occam's razor: "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity" is most properly applied to the number of rules in a theory, not the amount of matter a theory predicts. (If you apply it based on the amount of matter a theory predicts, then Occam's razor surely should rule out theories that dim clusters of light in the sky correspond to trillions of galaxies like our own, and should prefer theories that predict that they're illusions, reflections, or something otherwise insignificant that fits the observations.)

Page 39 and 40 both quote paragraphs from books that seem more convincing to me than the presentation's seemingly hand-waving refutations. Page 40's refutation appears to do nothing but insist upon PWT's "epiphenomenal 'pointer'", naming our branch as real and explaining away the many deep interactions of other branches as only being "mathematical significant" rather than having "ontological significance". ... Maybe this is a bad time to mention my preference for the Mathematical universe hypothesis ("which posits that all computable mathematical structures (in Gödel's sense) exist"), which seems to make the idea of something having mathematical significance but not ontological significance meaningless.

Also Bohm was unpopular with the US government in the early 1950's - he had to leave for Brazil because of McCarthyism and anti-communist feeling.

This answer seems to be assuming the universe must be implemented on a classical computer and computed in a reasonable amount of time (that's not slowing down exponentially over time). That's not necessarily true.

I feel that assuming that the nature of how the universe is computed matches up with our first intuition feels a bit like the assumption in geocentrism that the universe matches up with our intuition of Earth being the center and the most significant body.

Even if you accept the basic premise of the universe being a simulation, there are still many ways it could work with MWI. The simulator's universe needn't have classical physics; the simulation could be running on quantum computers or something more advanced. Or the simulator's universe could be classical with a classical computer doing the simulation at exponentially-decreasing speeds as it has to simulate the increasing number of branches. It wouldn't make any difference to us how long the simulation takes to compute us, as long as the simulating machine doesn't break down and succumb to entropy. The simulator's universe could be something like Conway's game of life, and the simulation is running on a turing machine pattern which will never decay or break down. (I might be borrowing more than a few ideas from Permutation City here.)

Google "multiverse". OP isn't making up this idea.