How do governments censor only parts of Wikipedia when the site is encrypted? How do they know which pages you are browsing if they can't see the URL?
That's just it; they can't! When you visit Wikipedia over HTTPS, the only thing actually visible in plain text is wikipedia.org, and that's only if your browser is using Server Name Identification (SNI). Since the rest of the request, including the URL is hidden, governments and other malicious agents between you and the server cannot actually see what pages you're requesting directly. They can only see that you are…
Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
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Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why hasn't it been done yet? It's not like Wikipedia is a new thing.
Baidupedia has been around for nearly a decade.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mirrors_and_forks/Ba...
Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#83Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#84Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#85It won't last, at least for China. Their government is working on a clone of wiki, scheduled for 2018[0]. Once that's done they'll likely completely ban the original. Wikipedia publishes database dumps every couple of days[1]. So it shouldn't be that expensive for smaller governments to create and host their own censored mirror. You'd maintain a list of banned and censored articles, then pull from wikipedia once a mo…
Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#86Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#87Currently HTTPS sends domain in clear-text before establishing a connection. It allows to host (and block) website by domain, not by IP. May be HTTPS should have optional extension to send URI in clear-text before establishing a connection. This way, if censors decide to block Wikipedia, users can opt-in into this behaviour and have unblocked Wikipedia except few selected articles.
Absolutely not. The response to censorship should not be to make things easier for the censor. Anyway, the idea is unworkable as the user's client could simply lie about what URI it's going to send after the encrypted connection is setup.
It's not about making things easier for the censor. It's already easy. It's about making life easier for people who have to live with censorship (pretty much the entire world, I guess?).
> Anyway, the idea is unworkable as the user's client could simply lie about what URI it's going to send after the encrypted connection is setup.
Good server should response with error, I guess.
Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#88Can an expert comment on side-channel attacks on HTTPS and whether they're less viable on HTTP/2? My assumption is that because wikipedia has a known plaintext and a known link graph it's plausible to identify pages with some accuracy and either block them or monitor who's reading what. I also assume that the traffic profile of editing looks different from viewing.
> My assumption is that because wikipedia has a known plaintext and a known link graph it's plausible to identify pages with some accuracy At least in theory, the latest versions of TLS should not be vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. TLS also is capable of length-padding, which would reduce the attack surface here as well for an eavesdropper. My understanding is that HTTP/2 makes it even more difficult to const…
If they routinely MITM connections they will quickly be found out, and the CA would be removed from browsers.
Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
It isn't but if you live in China and want to use the internet, you'll likely be forced to use a proxy that MITMs and serves its own certificate....My point is that TLS is not a solution to prevent government interference when the user has to rely on the government infrastructure for access.
This is not how the great firewall works, check the facts known, not just baseless speculatation.
Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship
#90It won't last, at least for China. Their government is working on a clone of wiki, scheduled for 2018[0]. Once that's done they'll likely completely ban the original. Wikipedia publishes database dumps every couple of days[1]. So it shouldn't be that expensive for smaller governments to create and host their own censored mirror. You'd maintain a list of banned and censored articles, then pull from wikipedia once a mo…
wut? everyone in China already use Baike instead of Wikipedia, nobody really understand why they are making another website
Chinese Wikipedia has 940,000 articles, baike has 6 million articles.