Live data from Hacker News

Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

motherboard.vice.com

71–80 of 126 posts

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#71
post #62

It won't last, at least for China. Their government is working on a clone of wiki, scheduled for 2018[0]. Once that's done they'll likely completely ban the original. Wikipedia publishes database dumps every couple of days[1]. So it shouldn't be that expensive for smaller governments to create and host their own censored mirror. You'd maintain a list of banned and censored articles, then pull from wikipedia once a mo…

Why hasn't it been done yet? It's not like Wikipedia is a new thing.

Baidupedia has been around for nearly a decade.

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh, huh! I missed that entirely, now I'm curious too. HTTPS should make that difficult, but China has been known to employ all sorts of weird shenanigans-- perhaps they're running a "trusted' MitM as part of the great firewall? I know that certain companies (like Google and Microsoft) will actively censor themselves to continue to operate within China, but I figured Wikipedia would be against that practice on princip…

Nitpick: Google opted to pull out of mainland China instead of self-censoring. They moved Chinese operations to Hong Kong, but operate uncensored there.

Google was perfectly willing to self-censor in China until they were hacked by the Chinese government in 2010. That's when Google China moved to Hong Kong.

https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-chin...

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#74
post #60
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a concern dating back many years that a government will mandate that UAs trust a particular government-controlled CA (that eventually, but maybe not at first, openly performs MITMs). This is one reason that browsers really want to keep control of their root programs and not be mandated by governments to include any particular trusted roots -- including to maintain a remedy against roots that do appear to del…

They wouldn't "routinely" abuse their root to monitor large populations. That would be too obvious and result in near-immediate loss of their precious root. What's more dangerous, and much more likely, is that they might use forged certificates against specific individuals for a short period of time, for example, to intercept login credentials. The attack will go unnoticed as long as they also block the corresponding…

I think this distinction is a good one, and I'll try to be more attentive to it when writing about this in the future.

Hopefully the risk for the attacker from the two kinds of attack are gradually converging, due to pinning and especially Certificate Transparency.

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh, huh! I missed that entirely, now I'm curious too. HTTPS should make that difficult, but China has been known to employ all sorts of weird shenanigans-- perhaps they're running a "trusted' MitM as part of the great firewall? I know that certain companies (like Google and Microsoft) will actively censor themselves to continue to operate within China, but I figured Wikipedia would be against that practice on princip…

I think china blocks zh.wikipedia.org but all other languages are not blocked.

When I visited China a bunch of years ago, zh.wikipedia was completely blocked, and on English wikipedia, only certain articles were deadholed (tiananmen square...)

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#76
post #60
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is a concern dating back many years that a government will mandate that UAs trust a particular government-controlled CA (that eventually, but maybe not at first, openly performs MITMs). This is one reason that browsers really want to keep control of their root programs and not be mandated by governments to include any particular trusted roots -- including to maintain a remedy against roots that do appear to del…

They wouldn't "routinely" abuse their root to monitor large populations. That would be too obvious and result in near-immediate loss of their precious root. What's more dangerous, and much more likely, is that they might use forged certificates against specific individuals for a short period of time, for example, to intercept login credentials. The attack will go unnoticed as long as they also block the corresponding…

revoking the root outside china will have no bearing within. All devices sold and used in china could be forced to include that root. There is not a lot a user could do , especially in mobile if you have locked phone and only access to the official app store

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#77

Currently HTTPS sends domain in clear-text before establishing a connection. It allows to host (and block) website by domain, not by IP. May be HTTPS should have optional extension to send URI in clear-text before establishing a connection. This way, if censors decide to block Wikipedia, users can opt-in into this behaviour and have unblocked Wikipedia except few selected articles.

And how would you make sure Wikipedia honors that clear-text URI (instead of a different encrypted URI inside the request)?

Even when using SNI (the optional extension that sends the domain name in cleartext), the web server fully entitled to ignore it.

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#78

Can an expert comment on side-channel attacks on HTTPS and whether they're less viable on HTTP/2? My assumption is that because wikipedia has a known plaintext and a known link graph it's plausible to identify pages with some accuracy and either block them or monitor who's reading what. I also assume that the traffic profile of editing looks different from viewing.

> My assumption is that because wikipedia has a known plaintext and a known link graph it's plausible to identify pages with some accuracy At least in theory, the latest versions of TLS should not be vulnerable to a known plaintext attack. TLS also is capable of length-padding, which would reduce the attack surface here as well for an eavesdropper. My understanding is that HTTP/2 makes it even more difficult to const…

[deleted]

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#79
post #76
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They wouldn't "routinely" abuse their root to monitor large populations. That would be too obvious and result in near-immediate loss of their precious root. What's more dangerous, and much more likely, is that they might use forged certificates against specific individuals for a short period of time, for example, to intercept login credentials. The attack will go unnoticed as long as they also block the corresponding…

revoking the root outside china will have no bearing within. All devices sold and used in china could be forced to include that root. There is not a lot a user could do , especially in mobile if you have locked phone and only access to the official app store

There's a fine line between cartoon-villain evil, exemplified by people like Kim Jong Un who just doesn't seem to give a fuck, and just-enough-to-achieve-your-objectives-but-not-enough-to-make-too-many-people-notice evil, which is what China is aiming at.

Lots of people travel in and out of China with all sorts of computing devices. China does care about the reputation of their root and of their highly profitable electronic exports.

Re: Wikipedia’s Switch to HTTPS Has Successfully Fought Government Censorship

#80
post #62

It won't last, at least for China. Their government is working on a clone of wiki, scheduled for 2018[0]. Once that's done they'll likely completely ban the original. Wikipedia publishes database dumps every couple of days[1]. So it shouldn't be that expensive for smaller governments to create and host their own censored mirror. You'd maintain a list of banned and censored articles, then pull from wikipedia once a mo…

I thought China already blocked https, so switching to https only would effectively ban/block wikipedia.
Post reply on HN