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iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

apple.com

31–40 of 99 posts

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#31
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you go with the Pixel, which is basically the iPhone of Android, you'll get a similar to iOS update experience.

You are mistaken. The pixel has the same 2 year support length of the Nexus series. iPhones are typically supported for 4 years.

Nitpick: Pixel has 3 years of security updates, and 2 years of Android OS updates.

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#32

Anyone here on an Android phone ever been hacked? Yeah I didn't think so. This is just more Apple propaganda

> Anyone here on an Android phone ever been hacked?

You must be new, but here's some resources I suggest you review before you go on a crusade in future Apple articles:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagefright_(bug)

https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/06/godless-apps-some-f...

https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/10/android-phones-root...

http://blog.elevenpaths.com/2016/07/another-month-another-ne...

Also, keep your bait to other sites like reddit, we don't stand for it here on HN.

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#33
post #8

I really do respect Apple's attention to security and privacy, however I was a little disappointed when I came across an Apple ID leak from their login form [0] last week. They patched a fix a couple days after I reported it, but still haven't responded to my initial report. It's quite concerning given how easy this simple flaw could have been used for malicious purposes to potentially collect millions of Apple ID's.…

That looks like extremely irresponsible disclosure? Publishing to GitHub and then "edit: I contacted apple" ????

There's nothing wrong with disclosing a security bug immediately.

https://hn.algolia.com/?query=author:tptacek%20responsible%2...

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#34
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, they're using the ARM Trusted Execution Environment rather than a separate Enclave chip with its separate OS (L4). Apple is an ARM architecture licensee, designing their own compatible chips. So the TEE would have been an available path (compatibility is still required, no?) but they instead went the extra yard with a separate Enclave chip. As their white paper details, they also go to insane levels with that ch…

Yes, indeed they went above and beyond - probably because they also need to defend not only against external threats, but against the user of the device himself to keep the walled garden intact.

Yes (dunno why all the downvotes) but Apple went even further than the walled garden would require. They could have easily left an Apple backdoor. But they encrypt the protocol going over wires to/from the Enclave. They go insanely far rather than sufficiently far.

Yeah, nation state level attacks will still work, especially if they have the phone. But with Android it's not nation state level. It's corporate level and maybe less if they have the phone.

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#35
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Mmm? Secure enclave is present on most Android devices and is mandatory since Android 6.0. (It's just called something else.) Historically Android has been lagging behind a bit from iOS devices when it comes to security, but Pixels and their software have a very similar security model and design (with some exceptions - less granularity with file-based encryption and some other mostly minor details). Non Google device…

Yes, they're using the ARM Trusted Execution Environment rather than a separate Enclave chip with its separate OS (L4). Apple is an ARM architecture licensee, designing their own compatible chips. So the TEE would have been an available path (compatibility is still required, no?) but they instead went the extra yard with a separate Enclave chip. As their white paper details, they also go to insane levels with that ch…

More recent ARM chips (A9+) come bundled with ARM TrustZone[1]. In a nutshell, the processor has two (hardware) isolated execution environments each running a different OS and different software. By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel (edit: this is incorrect, see reply below).

Could it be the case that Apple is leveraging TrustZone but with a customized L4 kernel? Or is it confirmed that the Secure Enclave is a custom IC designed by Apple? I wouldn't be surprised if it's the former as it becomes much cheaper to implement the required security features.

Edit: Check out this previous discussion on this exact topic: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8410700

[1]: https://www.arm.com/products/security-on-arm/trustzone

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#36
post #32

Anyone here on an Android phone ever been hacked? Yeah I didn't think so. This is just more Apple propaganda

> Anyone here on an Android phone ever been hacked? You must be new, but here's some resources I suggest you review before you go on a crusade in future Apple articles: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stagefright_(bug) https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/06/godless-apps-some-f... https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/10/android-phones-root... http://blog.elevenpaths.com/2016/07/another-month-another-ne... Also, keep…

Anyone who knows how to use a smartphone properly simply won't have security problems to deal with.

What difference does any of this make with iOS when we all know the US Gov't can simply access backdoors whenever they please? Don't fall for this security meme.

What does any of this matter when iCloud is a hacker's dream??

And I didn't ask if HN readers' phones CAN be hacked, I simply asked if they WERE asked. F off Elitist troll.

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#37
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, they're using the ARM Trusted Execution Environment rather than a separate Enclave chip with its separate OS (L4). Apple is an ARM architecture licensee, designing their own compatible chips. So the TEE would have been an available path (compatibility is still required, no?) but they instead went the extra yard with a separate Enclave chip. As their white paper details, they also go to insane levels with that ch…

More recent ARM chips (A9+) come bundled with ARM TrustZone[1]. In a nutshell, the processor has two (hardware) isolated execution environments each running a different OS and different software. By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel (edit: this is incorrect, see reply below). Could it be the case that Apple is leveraging TrustZone but with a customized L4 kernel? Or is it confirmed that t…

TrustZone was announced 2012 (?). The Security Enclave is a separate very Apple designed chip. They've patented aspects of it, dated also 2012:

https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-De... https://www.google.com/patents/US8832465

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That looks like extremely irresponsible disclosure? Publishing to GitHub and then "edit: I contacted apple" ????

There's nothing wrong with disclosing a security bug immediately. https://hn.algolia.com/?query=author:tptacek%20responsible%2...

Wow, he's nothing if not consistent... you gotta respect that. Same opinion and phrasing going back 4+ years!

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#39
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

More recent ARM chips (A9+) come bundled with ARM TrustZone[1]. In a nutshell, the processor has two (hardware) isolated execution environments each running a different OS and different software. By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel (edit: this is incorrect, see reply below). Could it be the case that Apple is leveraging TrustZone but with a customized L4 kernel? Or is it confirmed that t…

TrustZone was announced 2012 (?). The Security Enclave is a separate very Apple designed chip. They've patented aspects of it, dated also 2012: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mandt-De... https://www.google.com/patents/US8832465

> TrustZone was announced 2012

No, 2012 was when Trustonic was formed from competing TEE vendors: ARM, Gemalto, and Giesecke & Devrient.

TrustZone has been around since before that. TI OMAP were front-runners of using it.

Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]

#40
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, they're using the ARM Trusted Execution Environment rather than a separate Enclave chip with its separate OS (L4). Apple is an ARM architecture licensee, designing their own compatible chips. So the TEE would have been an available path (compatibility is still required, no?) but they instead went the extra yard with a separate Enclave chip. As their white paper details, they also go to insane levels with that ch…

More recent ARM chips (A9+) come bundled with ARM TrustZone[1]. In a nutshell, the processor has two (hardware) isolated execution environments each running a different OS and different software. By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel (edit: this is incorrect, see reply below). Could it be the case that Apple is leveraging TrustZone but with a customized L4 kernel? Or is it confirmed that t…

> By default, the secure environment of TrustZone runs an L4 kernel.

By default no SW runs on HW. "Mobicore" (now called "Kinibi" from Trustonic) is based on L4.

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