iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
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iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
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Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#2Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#3This is one of the reasons why Apple is still great. Their designs are thoughtful and deeply-considered. They may disappear up their own asses with a fair amount of regularity, but that doesn't stop them from excelling in certain areas (such as, indeed, privacy and security).
Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#4This is one of the reasons why Apple is still great. Their designs are thoughtful and deeply-considered. They may disappear up their own asses with a fair amount of regularity, but that doesn't stop them from excelling in certain areas (such as, indeed, privacy and security).
It is sad that something like the iCloud Keychain is so poorly implemented across the different devices.
I know I certainly wish there was a Keychain access app like on macOS available for iOS rather than only being able to access passwords via Safari settings.
Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#5http://www-inst.cs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/fa16/
(Yeah, it says optional on the syllabus but Weaver said required in lecture.)
Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#6Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#7http://www.cultofmac.com/280189/icloud-hacker-calls-apples-r... http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/technology-science/technology/a...
Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#8Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#9Its previous edition was required reading for CS 161 at Berkeley. Would that it were required reading in Mountain View. http://www-inst.cs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/fa16/ (Yeah, it says optional on the syllabus but Weaver said required in lecture.)
Re: iOS 10 Security White Paper [pdf]
#10Its previous edition was required reading for CS 161 at Berkeley. Would that it were required reading in Mountain View. http://www-inst.cs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/fa16/ (Yeah, it says optional on the syllabus but Weaver said required in lecture.)
Do they don't know/care about security, or is it simply the case that it is hard to have something like the secure enclave across all Android devices? Genuine question.
The latter is important: at the end of the day, software can only be as secure as the hardware on which it is installed. For example if someone can tamper with the hardware random number generator then your crypto becomes compromised.