Making prosecuting the <0.1% easier at the cost of making 99.9%+ vulnerable should always be avoided.
Deniability and Duress
51–60 of 124 posts
Re: Deniability and Duress
#52Re: Deniability and Duress
#53> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).
If you are a terrible person with really weird requirements you might prefer the charges related to destruction of evidence to the charges related to the evidence itself. (if you are a terrible person without really weird requirements you avoid capturing or destroy the evidence on an ongoing basis, not after you are caught)
Re: Deniability and Duress
#54Re: Deniability and Duress
#55Fifth amendment distinctions between passwords and fingerprints aren't a solution to the problems in Egypt, China and Turkey as those countries aren't subject to US law.
In that situation, from one perspective a duress code that wiped the phone might seem useful - it would establish that there's no point in continuing to torture you for the unlock code, as there's no longer any data to decrypt. But when the thugs saw you'd used the factory reset duress code, wouldn't they throw you in jail anyway?
What you want in that situation is to present a plausible alternative story ("as you can see, I was writing a story about the great success of your glorious leader's agricultural productivity reforms") while keeping the war crimes work hidden from accidental or forensic discovery.
Of course, it would take work to keep the alternative story plausible - which a journalist working on war crimes might be willing to do, but your average mobile phone user probably wouldn't.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#56FTA: > If it isn’t baked-in to the operating system, the fact that the journalist was using some out-of-the-ordinary software itself, which may or may not have undeniable tells, would likely be a red flag and induce liberal use of the rubber hose. This is in fact a thought that I've had about Truecrypt/Veracrypt: given a user, it seems the probability of them having a hidden volume is high. It might be deniable in th…
Yes, that's why everyone should be using it.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#57iPhones require the password(/code) when turned on and (IIRC) under certain other conditions. But I believe this isn't enough considering recent developments. They write: It’s important to note that deniability refers to the ability to deny some plaintext, not the ability to deny that you’re using a deniable algorithm. It's now common for border agents in the US to demand login credentials for social media accounts,…
There needs to be a better way to manage user data -- there's no middle ground right now and the UI is awful.
My friends went through an invasive, humiliating search at a Canadian border crossing that also damaged my friend's car, because they matched a description of cigarette smugglers in the 90s. The border/customs people were within their rights to do that.
The frequency of US searches is high now, but you NEVER had rights at any border crossing, and thinking carefully about what you drag across a border is a consideration that you need to think about.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#58The first two paragraphs of the article are about a journalist covering war crimes exiting a country and being searched. Fifth amendment distinctions between passwords and fingerprints aren't a solution to the problems in Egypt, China and Turkey as those countries aren't subject to US law. In that situation, from one perspective a duress code that wiped the phone might seem useful - it would establish that there's no…
Re: Deniability and Duress
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think being a "terrible person" (whatever the hell that means) has any bearing on whether or not you would want to protect your privacy.
Sure, but someone carrying around evidence of crimes with heavier punishments than destruction of evidence is considering a different scenario than someone simply concerned with their privacy.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think being a "terrible person" (whatever the hell that means) has any bearing on whether or not you would want to protect your privacy.
Sure, but someone carrying around evidence of crimes with heavier punishments than destruction of evidence is considering a different scenario than someone simply concerned with their privacy.