Android had user profiles for a while. If you associate different fingerprints or different pin codes with different accounts, you can have your sneaky account with all the warcrime photos and the "open" account which is full of dick pics and selfies, as per usual. Almost no new technology required. This all assumes the border guard is simply going to go through texts, pictures and maybe open up a facebook or similar…
Deniability and Duress
31–40 of 124 posts
Re: Deniability and Duress
#32> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).
Better to disable anyway, but it's an option.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#33> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).
Re: Deniability and Duress
#34Re: Deniability and Duress
#35> Scanning a pinky (or some other fingerprint / combination of fingerprints) might cause the phone to factory reset, or unlock and trigger deletion a specified portion of user data. IANAL, but AFAIK there is a strict line between not providing incriminating evidence (legal, protected under 5th Amendment) and destroying evidence (criminal).
(if you are a terrible person without really weird requirements you avoid capturing or destroy the evidence on an ongoing basis, not after you are caught)
Re: Deniability and Duress
#36I'm a classic "nothing to hide". But I am seriously considering taking no electronics with me next time I cross the border. Might make work more of a hassle, but I'm sure it's doable.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#37iPhones require the password(/code) when turned on and (IIRC) under certain other conditions. But I believe this isn't enough considering recent developments. They write: It’s important to note that deniability refers to the ability to deny some plaintext, not the ability to deny that you’re using a deniable algorithm. It's now common for border agents in the US to demand login credentials for social media accounts,…
I wish EU and other non-US countries would offer "US-border treatment" to all US citizens when they enter, and normal border control when they leave. That way they could maybe get an idea on how unfriendly, impolite, invasive and denigrating it actually is. And then when leaving get the idea that border agents can be helpful and friendly too. Edit: And oh yes, all communication and paperwork is done in the language o…
Re: Deniability and Duress
#38The worst thing to do, when facing rubber hoses, or legalistic equivalents thereof, is to lie. Especially if you're not a well-trained lier. And especially if there may be independent evidence that would trip you up. The best option is having nothing to hide. When crossing hazardous borders, sensitive stuff should be securely in the cloud. And when coercion is likely, a third party should control access to it.
> securely in the cloud isn't this a contradiction? Given how the NSA and co have backdoors in the cloud and such, and can order the operators of said cloud service to release information from their users. If you have sensitive stuff, best not to cross any borders I'd say. Stay away from the US.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#39The takeaway for me: US law enforcement can compel you to provide a fingerprint to unlock your phone, but cannot compel you to provide a password. In particular, a recent precedent-setting court case in Minnesota has decided that fingerprints used for access control can be taken from a suspect without violating his fifth amendment rights. The logic of the decision [...] is that fingerprints are tantamount to similar…
> US law enforcement can compel you to provide a fingerprint to unlock your phone, but cannot compel you to provide a password. This may be true for normal law enforcement, but if you're at (or perhaps near) the border, the rules are different.
Re: Deniability and Duress
#40FTA: > If it isn’t baked-in to the operating system, the fact that the journalist was using some out-of-the-ordinary software itself, which may or may not have undeniable tells, would likely be a red flag and induce liberal use of the rubber hose. This is in fact a thought that I've had about Truecrypt/Veracrypt: given a user, it seems the probability of them having a hidden volume is high. It might be deniable in th…