Live data from Hacker News

Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

whispersystems.org

181–190 of 312 posts

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#181

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Why doesn't FB just apply encryption on all messages? The same reason Gmail can't work with end-to-end encryption--they want to advertise at you based on message content. I highly doubt there is any government intervention in FB's business strategy, but there seems to be plenty of cooperation after the business decisions are made. (The same is largely true with Microsoft, Google, and yes, even Apple.) It's not real…

Text advertisements are cheap, bandwidth-wise. I wonder if they couldn't just send everybody dozens of advertisements, and decide on the client side what to show. Or even, download a dozens of MBs of graphical ads with each app update / the first time you visit the site. You could go further and do something like, email sent by people to people is off-limits and will be end-to-end encrypted and not looked at - but (a…

> Text advertisements are cheap, bandwidth-wise. I wonder if they couldn't just send everybody dozens of advertisements, and decide on the client side what to show. Or even, download a dozens of MBs of graphical ads with each app update / the first time you visit the site.

Shh, don't tell everyone about my next project. I think it can be done with images as well sending 5 of them for various demographic groups would be doable and should create enough noise (one tampon ad, a video game ad, an ad for amazon, a mountain dew ad, and a retirement plan ad for example). For those who care not for anonymity, but more for bandwidth they can opt out and only download the ad's they need.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#182
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile. I wouldn't use the web version if they had not disabled Jabber access... and then I could use OTR. This trend makes me very sad... IM networks are getting more centralized as ever. I don't feel thankful for this kind of development. End-to-end encryption should not be a feature of the serv…

I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company. This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.

Can you elaborate on the "anti-federation" stance of Signal's creator? I'm not familiar with this.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#183
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile. I wouldn't use the web version if they had not disabled Jabber access... and then I could use OTR. This trend makes me very sad... IM networks are getting more centralized as ever. I don't feel thankful for this kind of development. End-to-end encryption should not be a feature of the serv…

I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company. This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.

Makes me wonder... what's the current total number of active XMPP users (for chat, I mean, not for Android notifications)? Is it still bigger than the number of Signal uses?

I have a feeling that federation is one of those Good Things that reduce the potential user base until it isn't good any more.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> No secure way to verify code or store keys without routing through mobile. Weeeeeeell, not quite. Every device and browser the user uses can get it's own private key, and then you use Facebook's central servers and SSL to exchange keys. If I don't trust Facebook for key exchange, then I can't trust them with their app. Any encryption they implement, they can trivially circumvent by putting a backdoor in their app.…

Yes I completely agree. Actually, what is the difference in security between an app that generates a key pair on first use and exchanges the public key via a 3rd party servers and a web application doing exactly that. As long as the connection is secure and you trust the 3rd party for not having you send the private key to them, the model seems reasonably secure for both scenarios. Though public key exchange can be i…

I assume the issue is more to do with private key storage on the device. JS provides several local storage mechanisms, but none of them have cryptographic guarantees and all are potentially vulnerable to attacks like XSS and "attacks" like development console disclosure. There's been calls for the Web Application Platform to standardize on an HTML5 "Key Store" for cryptography, but thus far it doesn't sound like any consensus has been managed to be reached on how that key store would operate.

Certainly, there are mitigations such as very short lived private keys and relying on existing sandboxing and XSS protections browsers already have to do for JS local storages, but it's easy to understand how from a paranoia standpoint there's no guaranteed safe key store just yet in a browser, especially not one backed up by OS-level security guarantees as one would be able to use on mobile devices.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#185
post #14

This article doesn't mention it, but Facebook Messenger will be using the Signal protocol: https://whispersystems.org/blog/facebook-messenger/ also, here is the white paper (from the above post): https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/secret_conv...

We moved this comment here from the other thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12055042.

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#186
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company. This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.

Can you elaborate on the "anti-federation" stance of Signal's creator? I'm not familiar with this.

You can't run your own signal server. All accounts use phone numbers in the same namespace as ID, and all messages go from the phone to opensystems.org, further on to google, and from google to the destination phone (with lots of encryption being added and removed at various points). This has advantages (it's difficult for the Man distinguish a received signal message from other android notifications) but also disadvantage (moxie can do traffic analysis and you can't do anything about it).

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#187
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company. This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.

Can you elaborate on the "anti-federation" stance of Signal's creator? I'm not familiar with this.

I assume the GP is referring to https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#188
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I honestly find this centralization as worrying as mass surveillance itself. I'm as afraid of the Facebooks of this world as I am of any government, and I don't want all my communication locked in with one company. This is why I will not use or recommend Signal. Moxie's anti-federation stance is unacceptable to me. It's replacing one problem with another.

Can you elaborate on the "anti-federation" stance of Signal's creator? I'm not familiar with this.

[deleted]

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#189
post #3

From what is written, I understand this to mean that users can select this feature for specific conversations. That not all messages are subject to this encryption. I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov? This feature is a massive boost for intelligence services dealing with unsophisticated actors. This reduces the haystack s…

Multi-millions of FB messages must be sent every day, brute-forcing encryption on all of these is probably not possible

It's kind of a Hobson's Choice. You can message in the clear, or you can encrypt your messages and the government can keep your messages forever.

https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130620/15390323549/nsa-h...

Re: Facebook Messenger begins testing end-to-end encryption using Signal Protocol

#190
post #160
post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. But let's assume FB doesn't want the keys (because if they have them, then it's no longer E2E encryption), then client-side generated keys in a browser are still exposed to XSS attacks and extensions. Installing a malicious extension, tricking users into typing commands in the developer tools, XSSing FB, all of these are much easier to do than attacking a native app on a phone.

How is the possibility of XSS worse than the status quo (plaintext)? Thats like saying SSL is useless on desktop because root kits and keyloggers exist on desktop.

A false sense of security can be more damaging than no sense of security.

Certainly it can be important to know when you have a "no compromises" security option versus "mostly better than plaintext but maybe not secure".

It could be a UX judgment to not confuse users they have a "secure connection" when in fact they might not. Look at all the various attempts over the years browsers have made to keep the UX semi-reliable and easy for users to understand whether or not their SSL connection is secure.

Post reply on HN