91–100 of 312 posts
Moxie and team, bravo. You've made the snoopers jobs a whole lot harder. Your goal of making encryption easy to use by the masses is coming come true. It looks as if PGP's days are numbered.
And runs as a Tor hidden service at https://facebookcorewwwi.onion/: https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/making-conn...
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There's no way for a site to securely store keys in the browser. The server can't put them there because then the server would have them too. A client-side script could generate them, but it can't store them without extensions (or the server via some JS it sends) also having access to them. This is why Signal and WhatsApp require the client to run on the phone - the phones are doing the decryption for the web apps. T…
Server would have the keys _because_ the client-side code can send it to the server. That's also possible in the native app, isn't it?
Installing a malicious extension, tricking users into typing commands in the developer tools, XSSing FB, all of these are much easier to do than attacking a native app on a phone.
As much as this is a step in the right direction, you have to specifically enable encryption for individual conversations in Messenger. This implementation seems a little sketchy to me. They really should just encrypt every conversation automatically. Otherwise, encryption only encourages scrutiny.
If they end-to-end encryption all the conversations then they won't be able to mine all that data for advertising purposes...
From what is written, I understand this to mean that users can select this feature for specific conversations. That not all messages are subject to this encryption. I am not usually one for paranoia, but is anyone else becoming more suspicious about Facebooks motivations and involvement with gov? This feature is a massive boost for intelligence services dealing with unsophisticated actors. This reduces the haystack s…
(where properly means that the protocol and implementation are sound and so on)
So ... no comment on the choice of picture in the blog post? I hadn't heard of Jules Bonnot, but found the wikipedia article illuminating: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Bonnot This seems like it's a subtle endorsement for using Open Whisper Systems for criminal activities. Is it just me, or does that seem like the wrong image to gravitate towards?
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Well, the keywords there are next to. Like @remy_ implied, you need a mechanism for guaranteeing that the logic you're executing in-browser is protected from server compromise. That's where the Cyph example came in, since as far as I can tell, Cyph is the team to have hacked together a solution to that dilemma, though Cyph also is not using the Signal Protocol right now. Anyway, there's an upcoming defcon talk which'…
What is the difference between compromising a web server that serves js library vs the one that serves device-native app binary? This always s gets brought up when discussing in-browser crypto and could never get a satisfactory answer.
Reasons from not enabling it by default by @alexstamos (CSO @ Facebook): - FBM is multi-device, and we'd like to see E2E usability improve to support this. For now, pick one device and keys never leave it - Secret conversations don't currently support popular features like searching message history, switching devices, voice/video, etc - Hundreds of millions use Messenger from a web browser. No secure way to verify co…
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Well, the keywords there are next to. Like @remy_ implied, you need a mechanism for guaranteeing that the logic you're executing in-browser is protected from server compromise. That's where the Cyph example came in, since as far as I can tell, Cyph is the team to have hacked together a solution to that dilemma, though Cyph also is not using the Signal Protocol right now. Anyway, there's an upcoming defcon talk which'…
What is the difference between compromising a web server that serves js library vs the one that serves device-native app binary? This always s gets brought up when discussing in-browser crypto and could never get a satisfactory answer.
Implementing this with JS is far, far, far more difficult, and the only solution known (touched on in my other comments) still pisses people off because it's running in a web context that, if improperly mitigated, can still facilitate disruption via code injection i.e. XSS.
That said, we're all conveniently ignoring the fact that all of this assumes that the devices themselves haven't been owned. If you think you're a target of entities capable of getting into a fully patched phone, you've got bigger problems.
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Hi. To move all messages to be E2E encrypted, we need credible solution for web clients and every other platform, including old feature phones. This is easier said than done, but is something we are thinking about. Secret Conversations is a step in the right direction.
"feature phones" sounds like newspeak. Why are they called that? If anything I'd think they'd be called "lack-of-feature-phones".