Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not quite, I think, although I haven't read the original paper. There are some mathematicians who doubt that there is an infinite object (we call such mathematicians "finitist"). For such mathematicians, there is a large chunk of the mathematical literature they just can't use, because it relies inherently on the existence of an infinite set. Ramsey's theorem for pairs looks like it relies on the existence of an infi…
How do these finitists handle things like the real numbers? Do they just not consider questions that require the notion of infinity?
You may enjoy "Meta Math" by Gregory Chaitin (jump to Chapter 5 for the impatient):
http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0404335
"Finally, and perhaps even more devastatingly, it turns out that the set of all reals that can be individually named or specified or even defined or referred to—constructively or not—within a formal language or within an individual FAS, has probability zero. Summary: reals are unnameable with probability one.
So the set of real numbers, while natural—indeed, immediately given—geometrically, nevertheless remains quite elusive:
Why should I believe in a real number if I can’t calculate it, if I can’t prove what its bits are, and if I can’t even refer to it? And each of these things happens with probability one!"
You might also want to take a look at some of Norman Wildbergers work, like:
"Set Theory: Should You Believe?"
web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~norman/papers/SetTheory.pdf